An Aspect of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

Abstract

Russell's renowned Theory of Descriptions has been hailed as possibly his greatest accomplishment; in fact, Ramsey referred to it as a philosophical paradigm. However, Strawson and other language philosophers have recently sharply criticized the theory of descriptions. This essay aims to investigate a particular facet of Russell's theory of descriptions by contrasting it with Aristotle, Frege, and Strawson's accounts of descriptive phrases. Following this comparison, it might be able to offer a method for assessing the notable distinctions between Strawson and Frege and Russell. In addition to pursuing its primary goal, this essay aims to investigate some of the philosophical underpinnings of Aristotle's own distinctive perspectives on the logic of descriptive phrases. Russell's holding that the existential presuppositions behind the descriptive phrase—that is, that the so-and-so exists—are in fact a component of the statement's content is a crucial component of his analysis of descriptions. Because of this, the existential claim is stated explicitly when the term is defined in usage as one of the included statements made by an original sentence.