Cosmopolitanism and Anti-Cosmopolitanism in International Ethical Thought: A Critical Evaluation

Abstract

Abstract

It would be more accurate to describe cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism as points on a spectrum of universalism rather than as diametrically opposed extremes that represent a major gulf between universalism and particularism. Both cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans share a worldview and way of thinking that is based on the principles of equality and liberty. Cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans differ greatly from one another, although they have a similar lexicon of equality and freedom, albeit with diverse interpretations of these ideals. Only in terms of those pillars' scope, content, and interpretation can notable disparities emerge. Universalists in morals are cosmopolitans. They contend that morality should be viewed as a single society among humans, with universally applicable laws. Cosmopolitans contend that morality is a global concept and that everyone should be able to follow a really moral code. Cosmopolitanism is, at its most fundamental, the moral predicate that all individuals ought to be treated equally, regardless of their gender, color, ability, or other characteristics. Cosmopolitans place a strong emphasis on broad cross-border positive (like justice and assistance) and negative (like non-harming) responsibilities. National borders, according to anti-cosmopolitans, offer significant ethical restraints. Opponents of cosmopolitanism contend that people should be viewed as a collection of distinct groups, each with its own morality and no real shared moral principles. This paper presents a broad summary of cosmopolitan theory and centers on the central tenet that all people belong to one moral community. It outlines many interpretations of cosmopolitanism and explores their similarities and differences. Particularly cosmopolitans stress some universal aspects of morality and moral knowledge, whilst anti-cosmopolitans base their argument on the notion that morality is a cultural construct. Because of this, this paper tackles a number of important issues that may initially appear to have nothing to do with international ethics. Additionally, it discusses the anti-cosmopolitan stances of nationalism, realism, and communitarianism. One of the main points of this paper is to show that, despite their significant differences, they may all be seen as belonging to the same anti-cosmopolitan tradition. It shows that the three are derived from communitarian moral epistemologies, emphasizing the social or community source of moral and ethical knowledge. As a result, it highlights the limitations of cosmopolitans' global theories of justice. A few observations on the shortcomings of the natural obligations argument and the anti-cosmopolitan stance round up this paper.