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Cosmopolitanism and Anti-Cosmopolitanism in International Ethical Thought: A Critical Evaluation

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Abstract

It would be more accurate to describe cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism as points on a spectrum of universalism rather than as diametrically opposed extremes that represent a major gulf between universalism and particularism. Both cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans share a worldview and way of thinking that is based on the principles of equality and liberty. Cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans differ greatly from one another, although they have a similar lexicon of equality and freedom, albeit with diverse interpretations of these ideals. Only in terms of those pillars' scope, content, and interpretation can notable disparities emerge. Universalists in morals are cosmopolitans. They contend that morality should be viewed as a single society among humans, with universally applicable laws. Cosmopolitans contend that morality is a global concept and that everyone should be able to follow a really moral code. Cosmopolitanism is, at its most fundamental, the moral predicate that all individuals ought to be treated equally, regardless of their gender, color, ability, or other characteristics. Cosmopolitans place a strong emphasis on broad cross-border positive (like justice and assistance) and negative (like non-harming) responsibilities. National borders, according to anti-cosmopolitans, offer significant ethical restraints. Opponents of cosmopolitanism contend that people should be viewed as a collection of distinct groups, each with its own morality and no real shared moral principles. This paper presents a broad summary of cosmopolitan theory and centers on the central tenet that all people belong to one moral community. It outlines many interpretations of cosmopolitanism and explores their similarities and differences. Particularly cosmopolitans stress some universal aspects of morality and moral knowledge, whilst anti-cosmopolitans base their argument on the notion that morality is a cultural construct. Because of this, this paper tackles a number of important issues that may initially appear to have nothing to do with international ethics. Additionally, it discusses the anti-cosmopolitan stances of nationalism, realism, and communitarianism. One of the main points of this paper is to show that, despite their significant differences, they may all be seen as belonging to the same anti-cosmopolitan tradition. It shows that the three are derived from communitarian moral epistemologies, emphasizing the social or community source of moral and ethical knowledge. As a result, it highlights the limitations of cosmopolitans' global theories of justice. A few observations on the shortcomings of the natural obligations argument and the anti-cosmopolitan stance round up this paper.

Keywords: International Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Cosmopolitanism, Anti-Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, Humanity.

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Introduction

Rather than being seen as diametrically opposed extremes that represent a major chasm between universalism and particularism, cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism should be recognized as points on a spectrum of universalism. The twin pillars of liberty and equality serve as the foundation for the shared worldview and way of thinking shared by cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans. Both cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans have a similar lexicon of equality and freedom, but they understand these ideals in rather different ways. Only in the scope, substance, and interpretation of those pillars can notable distinctions emerge. According to popular culture, being cosmopolitan means having sophisticated and worldly traits, sharing traits with or having been exposed to many different regions of the world, and feeling more like a part of the global community than of any one specific national culture. Similar to this, a cosmopolitan city is defined as having a wide variety of populations and cultures coexisting together. In political and moral contexts, however, the term "cosmopolitan" refers to a more particular but related concept. The belief that all people should be treated with moral respect is what unites the vast "church" of cosmopolitanism (Lu 2010).

From the Stoics to Kant, cosmopolitans have argued in favor of an international moral order. It is still possible to identify as a member of humanity and to have moral concern for the rest of humanity, even while mankind is divided into several historically formed societies. It is necessary that no one be inherently excluded from the domain of moral obligation in order to have such a concern. A cosmopolitan framework is one in which no individual or group of individuals is excluded from moral consideration based only on their participation in distinct groups or other factors. According to Martha Nussbaum, the cosmopolitan ethos dates at least as far back as the Stoics, while writers from a variety of different traditions have also exhibited comparable moral principles. Fundamentally, cosmopolitanism asserts that we have obligations to those who live outside of our boundaries and that we should not be callous to their needs and suffering. Its most audacious argument is that there is no moral difference that can be made between insiders and outsiders. This implies that we ought to regard ourselves as governed by a single moral rule. There is a wide range of interpretation in between. Some cosmopolitans believe that we should just try to treat outsiders with kindness; others believe that cosmopolitanism entails the creation of a world government (Cabrera 2014) or a single global distribution system that guarantees that everyone gets an equal share of the world's

output. Nearly all of the main Western ethical traditions have cosmopolitan thinkers and arguments, while the ethical traditions of China, India, and the Middle East occasionally exhibit cosmopolitanism as well.

It is necessary to separate and deconstruct the most significant cosmopolitan facets and variations for the sake of this paper. Before describing the main subcategories within modern cosmopolitan philosophy, the paper first briefly distinguishes between a number of various focuses of the movement. The main points of contention are utilitarianism, contractarian Rawlsianism, and Kantianism, which are essentially variations on liberal cosmopolitanism. These categories express cosmopolitanism differently whether it is primarily considered as a case for inclusion in the ethical domain that is universal or a priori. Our common beliefs about insiders and outsiders are ethically flawed from a cosmopolitan perspective. Cosmopolitans contend that our moral obligations should not be impacted by distance or diversity. Stated differently, we need not let our attachment to a particular group of individuals cloud our judgment of our duties toward everyone. Thus, cosmopolitans respond that, while culturally significant, nations are moral of only derivative significance when Robert Goodin (1988: 663) asks, "What is so special about our fellow countrymen?" Nussbaum (1996: 133) argues further that "to count people as moral equals is to treat nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, race, and gender as morally irrelevant' – as irrelevant to equal standing." This is because:

> The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident, any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, . . . we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic members or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings (Nussbaum 1996).

Cosmopolitans contend that our moral obligations shouldn't be lessened by geographical separation, cultural differences, or a sense of community. We must acknowledge our feeling of responsibility and commitment to every individual, regardless of our personal connections to them. In this sense, cosmopolitanism elevates our hazy common sense of humanity to the forefront of moral philosophy. To put it another way, cosmopolitans start off by asserting that all issues pertaining to international ethics must be examined in light of the obligations, both good and bad, that each person has to each other. In conclusion, proponents of cosmopolitanism make the case for the existence of a moral universe. In the end, this implies that no one should be treated in a way that diminishes their humanity, renders them inhuman, or indicates that they are not deserving of respect or moral consideration.

Most individuals find this to be confronting and a threat to their moral worldview. When considering it from a different angle, though, it really amounts to asking us to do something that many of us already know and feel: that is, to treat everyone with respect. If we genuinely think that all people are born equal and have certain unalienable rights, we ought to consider what that idea means for us to do with and for the rest of the world, according to Martha Nussbaum (1996: 13). This implies that we should treat strangers as equals and that it is unethical not to, according to the majority of cosmopolitans. Adopting this viewpoint places the onus of proof on those who want to uphold moral communities and practices that exclude others and deny human equality, not the other way around. Therefore, there is no justification for restricting our understanding of equality—or moral consideration—to members of our own group if we believe that all people are created equal. Instead, we have to apply the same standards to everyone on the planet. Cosmopolitans must, of course, also confront the issues of "what we do to them" and "what they do to each other," as they recognize that the world is not politically organized in accordance with this view. The perspective of "what everyone owes to each other" informs cosmopolitanism's response to these queries (see Linklater 2012a).

It is possible to determine that cosmopolitan ethics influences current international politics and has genuine normative value for moral behavior. For example, a lot of things that we in the twenty-first century take for granted are manifestations of the basic cosmopolitan ethical viewpoint. Since many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the growing global civil society are focused on the welfare of people as individuals rather than as citizens of certain governments or groups, their activity is frequently cosmopolitan in scope. Global environmental groups function with a multicultural mindset that considers the globe as a whole and incorporates people from many different nationalities who share a concern for the environment. Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other international human rights treaties are based on cosmopolitan principles because, although governments continue to be the actors, human individuals—rather than nations—are the focus, subject, and bearers of rights. The international law of armed conflict also adopts a cosmopolitan ethical stance by considering the rights of non-combatants. When military triumph meant rape, robbery, and enslavement in ancient Greece, there was no such ethical position (Linklater 2016). Debates concerning the rights of displaced peoples and refugees are likewise influenced by cosmopolitan ethics. States invoke the cosmopolitan concept when they assert universal jurisdiction over crimes committed in other nations, such as the Rwandan

genocide. Finally, people act on a cosmopolitan drive known more popularly as humanitarianism when they see that others in far-off and foreign nations need help or support.

Though many cosmopolitan thinkers contend that they just reflect a charitable attitude, all of them demonstrate the existence of a minimal level of cosmopolitan ideals in international decision-making. Cosmopolitans stress the crucial distinction between morality and charity as the appropriate scope of duties that are not of a voluntary character. States, people, and non-state actors should all see themselves as obligated to uphold some cosmopolitan obligations, which are unacceptable to neglect or neglect to perform. The cosmopolitan focus on positive responsibilities acknowledges considerably more significant duties of justice in terms of equality in addition to duties of charity. Thus, an explanation of both global justice and global humanitarianism follows for many as the obvious conclusion. Put differently, cosmopolitanism is a duty rather than a theory of universal kindness. As we shall see later in this paper, this is one of the primary traits distinguishing cosmopolitans from anti-cosmopolitans.

This is not to argue, however, that cosmopolitanism is only focused on "justice," either distributive or juridical. This is an assumption made by a lot of critics and anti-cosmopolitans. Nonetheless, the ideal way to conceptualize cosmopolitanism is as having several foci that distinguish various agents, or actors, in charge of performing cosmopolitan responsibilities. First, cosmopolitanism can be defined as the single, straightforward idea that everyone should be treated with respect, the concept of a common human community, and the more substantial view that this calls for broad, universally applicable rules about what constitutes right and wrong behavior. This might be understood as a contrast (in a strict, formal sense) between cosmopolitan justice and cosmopolitan ethics, or ethos. An ethical perspective that recognizes all people as sentient agents and finds no justification for excluding any individual from ethical consideration from the outset is known as ethical cosmopolitanism. Put differently, a cosmopolitan ethos maintains that while deciding on an ethical course of action, inclusivity is presumed. It alludes to the belief that "all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another" in a more abstract sense. Respecting one another's standing as the supreme moral concern is necessary (Pogge 1994: 90). According to Charvet (2011: 9), a cosmopolitan ethical theory posits the existence of an ideal moral order that is applicable to all people and of which they are directly members. They so have obligations and rights toward all other people. It does not, however, always provide a detailed explanation of what it means to treat someone with respect. In this regard, ethical cosmopolitanism is frequently articulated at an extremely broad level.

A helpful difference between institutional and ethical, or interactional, cosmopolitanism is made by Thomas Pogge (2014: 90). "Postulates certain fundamental principles of ethics, these principles... are first order in that they apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups," is how interactional moral cosmopolitanism describes individual behavior (Pogge 2014: 91). According to the interactional model, a range of social actors, including people, non-governmental organizations, and government agencies, carry out their cosmopolitan responsibilities. The question of how to implement, apply, or even conceive of cosmopolitan ideas in a world where sovereignty still holds sway is addressed by the ethical component.

The tenets of institutional cosmopolitanism state that institutional systems must adhere to "certain fundamental principles of justice." According to institutional cosmopolitanism, institutional designs are subject to general moral principles. Criteria for judging the fairness of organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are provided by institutional cosmopolitanism. According to institutional cosmopolitanism, the fundamental tenets of society, or large-scale institutional schemes, serve as the "agent" in charge of bringing cosmopolitan ideals to life. Does society as a whole uphold the ideals of equality and is it fair in how it assigns obligations and rights? The institutional dimension looks for a moral universal rule and works to align global constitutions with it. It does not inevitably result in the abolition of nations in favor of a world state, but rather in a fundamental restructuring of the laws regulating international relations. The two schools of cosmopolitanism differ in that the former regard cosmopolitanism as a moral code that should direct the behavior of both individuals and groups, while the latter contend that cosmopolitanism should be enshrined in institutions, fundamental social laws, and international law.

Both methods are deontological, but they distinguish between the actors who should be subject to these principles. The key finding of this distinction between institutional and interactional types of cosmopolitanism is that, in the case of institutional cosmopolitans, fairness serves as the main yardstick for behavior and practices. According to institutional approaches, the primary goal of cosmopolitanism should be to explain institutional justice so that personal and collective actions may be assessed. Conversely, ethical or interactional methods inquire as to whether behavior, concerning interpersonal relationships, is consistent with the fundamental moral tenets of cosmopolitanism. In short, the debate is whether moral behavior and practices should come from more broad individual fairness or if ethics should be reduced to or derived from (institutional) justice. Though cosmopolitanism and liberalism are not often the same thing (Beitz, 1999), the most significant cosmopolitan narratives are liberal in a wide sense.

Specifically, they all agree with the liberal thesis that morality ought to be individual-centered, universally applicable, and objective toward all points of view.

Additionally, the nature, essence, and reasoning of anti-cosmopolitanism are examined in this paper. Anti-cosmopolitans have attempted to portray the moral domain as being essentially distinct from that supported by cosmopolitanism, a position that has been held by realists and communitarians of the twentieth century such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, and John Rawls, as well as the Athenian generals of the Peloponnesian War and G. W. F. Hegel. Anti-cosmopolitan viewpoints share a moral theory that is skeptical of global equality and substantive universalism. It is important to highlight that no specific anti-cosmopolitan tradition is mentioned. Rather, anti-cosmopolitanism is a position that has existed in many traditions at various points in history. It is, at most, a collection of arguments that have all been used from various angles. This varied group is united by their rejection of substantive moral universalism and cosmopolitanism in favor of local or contextual morality, rather than any single ideology or shared aim. In order to maintain notable, but not absolute, limits on human loyalty and to assign moral precedence to groups that are not universal, anti-cosmopolitans make both positive and negative statements about the nature of morality and cosmopolitanism. Anti-cosmopolitans oppose cosmopolitan universalism and contend that real particularistic communities, like nationality, supersede any imagined or abstract ties among members of the human species. They do this by highlighting the contextual roots of ethics and community.

Anti-cosmopolitanism is based on the idea that morality is always local, which makes cosmopolitanism both impossible (impractical) and undesirable. These reasons include, but are not limited to:

a) the international insecurity in the international state of nature;

b) the existence of profound cultural and normative pluralism, which implies that there is no universal agreement about what is good or right;

c) any attempt to act in accordance with or realize universal values would be an unjustified imposition of one account of "the good society" upon others; and

d) a world state based on universalism would be a source of violence, dominance, and tyranny.

Furthermore, Simon Caney lists three normative and six conceptual grounds against universalism:

> Universalism is (1) flawed because it is committed to the idea of a common human nature; (2) too abstract and decontextualized to have relevance; (3) unable to provide an adequate account of moral motivation; (4) false to the experience of moral reflection; (5) unattainable because moral argument can take place only within historical traditions; and (6) vitiated by the existence of profound moral disagreement (2015: 39).

The sections of the paper will address these assertions.

This paper will explain why cosmopolitan justice is prioritized over interpersonal relationships, altruism, or humanitarianism. It will first address this aspect of cosmopolitan thought, and then go on to discuss some responses to common criticisms of liberal cosmopolitanism. This paper will go on to examine the shortcomings of the cosmopolitan emphasis on rationality and the need to include other elements that contribute to human moral unity, particularly the experience of pain and suffering. This paper focuses on the defense of the concept of a globally inclusive moral domain by cosmopolitans, not on a substantive explanation of cosmopolitan morality or the cosmopolitan stance on any particular ethical issue. Additionally, the two most prevalent and strong forms of anti-cosmopolitanism that are the subject of this paper are pluralism and realism. Realism contends that because nations are ethically obligated to prioritize their national interests over the common (cosmopolitan) good, the conditions of international existence exclude the possibility of cosmopolitan ethics or a cosmopolitan revolution. According to pluralists, the limitations on our moral obligations stem from the lack of universally accepted conceptions that are analogous to the ethical agreement found within the national context. What Chris Brown calls a communitarian interpretation of the roots of the nature of morality and ethics is shared by both of these anti-cosmopolitan stances (see Brown 1992). The notion that morality is fundamentally communal rather than global in character and that moral rules are cultural rather than transcendental is a foundational tenet of both realism and pluralism.

Cosmopolitan Individualism, Universalism and Impartiality

What justifications do cosmopolitans offer for the morality of cosmopolitanism being universal? What foundation do these assertions have, and are they credible or tenable? The majority of ethical theories aim to ground their explanation of the moral life in an understanding of human agency or moral capacity—that is, an explanation of the qualities of individuals that

merit moral deference. They then go on to define who possesses these attributes and, in turn, the extent of moral concern, or who it pertains to, as well as the reasons why those characteristics are, in actuality, universal. Cosmopolitans typically assert that morality is applicable to all people because they recognize that all people possess the morally relevant traits of reason and suffering. As a result, we may describe liberal cosmopolitanism as unbiased, individualistic, and universalistic. According to Thomas Pogge, every variety has the following components in common:

> First, individualism, ultimate units are human beings, or persons . . . Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally, not merely to some subset . . . Third, generality . . . persons are ultimate unit of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like (1994: 89).

Cosmopolitanism, in its most basic form, is the belief that morality should be centered around the individual human being. Every explanation of rights, justice, and ethics should be measured against the individual. In the end, cosmopolitanism is the idea that people should all be treated with the same moral respect since they all possess morally relevant traits, regardless of where they live or who they are. The many cosmopolitan sub-traditions have diverse interpretations of these three traits. According to Kantian perspectives, our ability to reason sets humans apart from other creatures and enables us to create moral guidelines. According to utilitarians, a person's ability to experience both pleasure and misery determines their moral value. Since only people—not corporations—are capable of experiencing pleasure and misery, only people are able to give the requisite moral measure. Similar to Kantian methods, utilitarian approaches hold that every human being is created equal, and that every regulation should be based on this principle and aim to serve the interests of people rather than particular governments or groups of persons.

Naturally, this brings up the second point of contention, which is universalism—the idea that all people who meet the necessary qualifications ought to be treated equally and subject to the same set of universal moral principles. According to universalism, everyone should be subject to the same laws. This more formal, liberal interpretation of universalism, according to Pogge, applies to any moral system that:

> (A) subjects all persons to the same system of fundamental moral principles, (B) these principles assign the same fundamental moral benefits (for example claims, liberties,

> powers and immunities) and burdens (for example duties and liabilities) to all, and (C) these fundamental moral benefits and burdens are formulated in general terms so as not to privilege or disadvantage certain persons or groups arbitrarily (1994: 30).

Consequently, he contends, we should apply the same standards of treatment to everyone, insiders and outsiders alike. From this perspective, cosmopolitan universalism differs from, for example, an imperial or hierarchical form of universalism, which would be a legal system that applies to every person on the planet but also makes distinctions between different people, granting certain rights to some people or groups but not others, as was the case, for example, in ancient Rome. Universal values, like the mandate that taxes be paid by everyone, must not only apply to everyone but also to everyone equally and without bias. Blonde individuals are rewarded for a trait that has no influence on their ability to pay taxes, thus a regulation that states everyone must pay taxes but that they pay less tax is arbitrary. The payment terms should be equitable for all parties. National identity is seen by cosmopolitans as an arbitrary attribute that is unrelated to one's entitlement to equal treatment.

According to Simon Caney (2015: 27), universalism in cosmopolitan thinking possesses two attributes. He makes a distinction between universalism of justification and universalism of scope, in line with Larmore. The words "values that apply to everyone in the world" and "rules that can be justified to everyone in the world in terms they would accept" are known as universalism of scope and universalism of justification, respectively. Because imperialism extends to everyone, but not always on conditions they would agree to, it may be considered universalism of scope rather than justification. First-type universalists, but not always second-type ones, are shared by all cosmopolitans. The second kind of universalists, which often belong to the Kantian school, includes Linklater, O'Neill, and Habermas. Understanding the distinction is crucial to comprehending the many defenses of cosmopolitanism and the assertions made in support of it. The issue with scope arguments is that they are open to attack from those who just disagree with their substantive substance and who contest the idea that any given set of universal laws actually exists. Human rights disputes frequently end up here in non-Western nations like Singapore or Malaysia, where the government just disregards the importance of individual rights in favor of collective obligations (Bauer and Bell, 1999). As we shall see later, a common objection to cosmopolitan philosophy is to draw a comparison between cosmopolitanism and imperialism.

But since cosmopolitans also assert that justification arguments may be used to universalize particular values—rather than imposing them—they find that this kind of criticism presents less of an issue. For rules or principles to be considered really universal, they must be deemed acceptable by all rational actors who stand to gain from them. The substantive nature of this version of universalism prevents it from being dismissed out of hand. This is not to say that justification arguments are without flaws; rather, it is to say that they are less susceptible to being rejected on the basis of prima facie (Shapcott: 2011). More importantly, three assertions are involved in cosmopolitan moral universalism, according to Caney:

> P1 The belief that moral principles are legitimate;
>
> P2 The assertion that moral principles that apply to certain individuals also apply to all individuals who have some common morally relevant qualities; and
>
> P3 The belief that moral principles are applicable to all individuals worldwide who share some morally significant commonalities (2015: 36).

According to Caney (2015), "(c) there are some moral principles with universal form (the same principles apply) and universal scope (these principles apply to all)" if these three precepts are true. Individuals must be regarded equally and as the center of moral philosophy, which implies cosmopolitanism must be unbiased by definition. An impartial viewpoint attempts to view things from a neutral standpoint, without favoring any one group or set of ideals above another. As said by Charles Beitz:

> A cosmopolitan view seeks to see each part of the whole in its true relative size . . . the proportions of things are accurately presented so that they can be faithfully compared. If local viewpoints can be said to be partial, then a cosmopolitan viewpoint is impartial (1994: 124).

According to Beitz, to remain impartial toward all specific connections, alliances, and situations while considering the benefit of the total entails seeing people just as individuals and not as fellow citizens or nationalities. When making moral decisions, an unbiased viewpoint encourages us to set aside our historical national disparities. From an objective standpoint, national boundaries seem less morally significant than other considerations. Some liberals believe that the foundation of individual equality is where impartiality begins. "Impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected by our choices" is necessary if people are to be seen as equals (Beitz 1991: 25). It would be consider it unfair to use skin

color as a criterion for determining someone's eligibility for welfare benefits, for example, as it favors certain people's interests over others. Cosmopolitans believe that the use of national identity as a criterion for selection is no more relevant than arbitrary characteristics like height or skin color. The idea here is not that national communities are unimportant in general, but rather that these kinds of details should not be the main factor in determining our moral obligations. When it comes to fundamental moral principles, we cannot treat people differently based on their nationality. Consequently, in line with Singer:

> When subjected to the test of impartial assessment, there are few strong grounds for giving preference to the interests of one's fellow citizens, and none that can override the obligation that arises whenever we can, at little cost to ourselves, make an absolutely crucial difference to the wellbeing of another person in real need (2012: 197).

Singer (2012) emphasizes this argument by using the first Bush administration's stance on the Kyoto Protocol's drafting. In this case, the Bush administration prioritized the interests and ideals of the residents of the United States of America over those of mankind as a whole. Singer (2012: 3) remarks, "It was not negotiable, apparently even if maintaining this lifestyle will lead to the deaths of millions of people subject to increasingly unpredictable weather, and the loss of land used by tens of millions more people because of rising ocean levels and local flooding." This is in response to the Bush administration's refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol, claiming the American lifestyle is "not up for negotiation." Many others took President Bush's rejection to mean that his government was prepared to sacrifice foreigners' lives in order to protect American interests. Because one group of people is given particular treatment, a cosmopolitan perspective challenges the partiality of such an approach. One can only be prejudiced, not impartial, to advocate condemning the rest of the world to suffer in order to maintain one's own level of living, especially if that lifestyle is opulent.

It is evident to the majority of liberal cosmopolitans that the cosmopolitan critique of national borders stems from impartiality. For some, on the other hand, impartiality seems to follow from moral universalism. However, it is accurate to state that impartiality is essentially a definition of what universality and equality represent. National boundaries are shown to be, at most, of secondary importance in an argument for universal moral responsibilities that combines individualism, universalism, and impartiality. The three qualities identify the foundations from which this cosmopolitanism emerges rather from being side effects or outcomes of the liberal stance. They are therefore necessary to comprehend the justification offered by liberal

cosmopolitans for distributive justice and ethics. Thus, a thorough understanding of these ideas is required. Various traditions or variations may give each of the three qualities varying weights, and their meanings may be understood differently.

The primary subcategories of cosmopolitan thinking are covered in the following sections, along with an interpretation of these three attributes from this angle.

Deontology, Kant and Cosmopolitanism

Deontological theories address the nature of moral laws that are inherently good regardless of the repercussions and the essence of ethical human responsibility or obligation. The subject of "what everybody does to everybody else" is central to deontology. Deontological perspectives, in particular, focus on moral obligations or directives that are acceptable for everyone and everywhere at all times. Deontological theories are moral theories in the strict sense that their main goal is to explain "the right," which is defined as abiding by universal laws. More specifically, they aim to explore the possibility of adopting a morality that can establish "rules about what everybody ought to do," regardless of the individual's circumstances, culture, or country (Habermas, 1990).

Deontological methods usually place more weight on "right" than "good," emphasizing laws that are always morally correct to obey rather than laws that might benefit me personally or my community. Put another way, these moral obligations are justified in and of themselves and do not rely on the results or consequences of their actions. It is common for many philosophers to distinguish between notions of virtue and morality. Virtuous theories are theories of the "good," as opposed to deontological theories. Their focus is on the traits and attributes of performers that help them become and accomplish "good," rather than the laws that everyone should abide by. Unlike virtue theories, which seek to explain what John Rawls referred to as "comprehensive" goods—that is, to address significant issues regarding what constitutes a decent society and what constitutes evil—moral theories do not attempt to do this.

Deontological methods are in opposition to consequentialist or teleological viewpoints. According to consequentialist theories, activities are morally evaluated based on their results, or at the very least, the purposes for which they are performed. Therefore, a rule is not justified and ought to be altered if it is not lead to a desirable aim, such as the happiness or welfare of humans. According to utilitarians like Peter Singer, outcomes should be evaluated in terms of "the greatest happiness (good) of the greatest number." The most important consequentialist explanations come from utilitarians (see below) and contractarians (mostly Rawlsian).

A deontologist might contend that an ethical norm should be followed because it is logical, acceptable to everyone, or just plain right, regardless of how it affects a single person or even the majority of people. Put differently, MacIntyre (1966: 206) illustrates that the morality of the behaviors leading up to the consequences does not imply that the outcomes were good. For the deontologist, not only are the two realms separate, but the right comes before the good. Put another way, what is best for me and my kind comes second to our obligations to one another, to everyone, and ourselves.

Immanuel Kant is without a doubt the source of the most significant deontological type of cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the elimination of war and the establishment of a global society ruled by a logical cosmopolitan law was the most significant philosophical and political challenge confronting humanity. The majority of Kantian thinking is concerned with the nature of the duties that come along with the conviction that each person is equal and autonomous. Although not all cosmopolitan viewpoints are in line with Kant's moral universality thesis, the majority do. The main goals of Kantian cosmopolitanism have been to uphold moral universalism, create a political order alternative based on Kant's writings, and investigate what it could mean to live by this imperative in the current divided world of communities. As a moral (interactional) and political (institutional) concept, the core claim of Kantian cosmopolitanism is that people may and ought to establish a universal, or global, moral community. Although a global state is not necessary for that community to exist, there should be components of a global legal system founded on shared obligations and rights. These rights and obligations include both good and negative aspects since to treat others with respect, we must actively help those in need and avoid doing certain actions, such as putting misery on them.

Kant and the Categorical Imperative (CI)

The categorical imperative (CI), a standard by which to judge whether a course of conduct or a set of moral principles is "right," is the primary moral concept of Kant's writings. It is arguably the most comprehensive exposition of the fundamental idea of human equality. The CI challenges us to consider if we could reasonably expect everyone to act by the principle at all times. A rational being must constantly consider if their actions are morally justified by adhering to a universal, or universalizable, law—one that all people might follow without making exceptions or establishing unique regulations—before acting in a morally righteous manner. A reasonable moral position, in Kant's opinion, requires that one should:

CI 1 Act only on laws which are universalizable, or which any and all reasonable beings could also act on at the same time;

The following deduction is made in light of this observation, according to which one must act morally:

CI 2 Act only in such a way that you treat all others as ends in themselves and not as a means to your own end (Kant 1785/2002).

According to Kant, some laws can be applied to all people, but only if they make sense to all rational beings. Put otherwise, "the purpose of this formulation is to emphasize that, in addition to my being able to will that the particular precept be acknowledged as a law globally, you also need to be able to will that it be applied globally – under the proper conditions" (MacIntyre 1966: 193). This indicates that "a principle is not moral if a person acts on it because it is something he could not wish another person to do to him" (Linklater 1990a: 100). The most well-known illustration of this concept—one that Kant employed—is the idea that lying should not be accepted as universal law. It's also impossible to hope that I'm the only one who can lie and nobody else can. First of all, this is because everyone would be treated equally and the society would disintegrate if everyone believed that lying was acceptable. In the second scenario, lying would become obsolete for me as no one would be able to trust me if I was permitted to lie. As demonstrated by MacIntyre:

> To will that this precept (lying for me only) should be universalized is to will that promise keeping should no longer be possible . . . But to will that I should be able to act on the precept (which I must will as part of willing that the precept should be universalized) is to will that I should be able to make promises and break them, and this is to will that the practice of promise keeping should continue, so that I can take advantage of it. Hence to will that this precept should be universalized is to will both that promise keeping as a practice should continue and also that it should not. So I cannot universalize this precept consistently (1966: 193–4).

The concept of reasoned consent is central to this argument. Only when I believe that my activities can fairly be accepted by all rational beings—that is, when they can constitute a universal law—should I take action. Since everyone is a rational creature, a global law must be acceptable to all rational beings. As a result, no one may be left out of the creation of the law or the principles of duty. I ought to be allowed to get people's permission before acting if what I do has an impact on them. In other words, I have to consider what their interests are. To put

it another way, nobody's freedom should trump another person's right to pursue their own goals. The political implication of acknowledging the categorical imperative in this way is that the pursuit and realization of an individual's goals and aspirations shouldn't be predicated on the disapproval of others who stand to gain from their accomplishment.

The CI explicitly forbids us from acting by injunctions that are not universalizable and instructs us to only act on laws that can be applied to everyone. Another scenario that comes to me is if we imagine living in a society where the majority of people are wealthy and contented but where one of the main laws prohibits blondes from owning property. Kant would argue that the law denying blondes property rights is unjustifiable because, contrary to popular belief, blondness is not associated with the ability to reason. This is true even if the happiest members of the society were blonde and had access to all the material wealth they required, such as through wages.

In the past, the system of slavery, which saw humans as tools or property to be used only as means to an end for other people, is blatantly in violation of the categorical imperative. When a slave is no longer required or helpful, their masters get rid of them; they are not given the opportunity to acknowledge their reasoning abilities as human beings. Their owners' profit is their only motivation. Another infringement is when a state engages in warfare with another state, using both citizens and non-citizens as nothing more than tools to achieve its goals of conquest or triumph.

Kant's philosophy is important because, to act morally, he begs us to abide by the rules of duty and conscience. Kant highlights that behaving properly requires having the right moral motive. He is a true deontologist in this sense as a good deed should be evaluated based on its motivation rather than its result. A deed can only be considered moral if it is motivated by duty rather than habit, innate tendency, or mindless submission to authority. It must also come from an awareness of the categorical imperative as an "ought": "An action motivated by duty derives its moral worth, not by the purpose which is to be attained by it, but the maxim from which it is determined" (Kant 1785/2002: 305). In addition to addressing important matters, Kant may have been attempting to critique people who consider themselves to be good Christians or citizens because they attend church or contribute to the needy. Kant suggests that you are not acting morally or out of obligation if you act in this way because it is required of you or because you believe you will benefit from it. It is not an act of obligation when you perform a good action because you are a good person and it comes from your "natural" temperament. Being

moral is abiding by your duties because you freely acknowledge and know them to be correct. This indicates that, contrary to what Kant believed the consequentialist arguments to be, there are situations when duty requires me to act against my own wishes or well-being.

It appears that Kant is pointing to something that does appear to be at the core of ethics and morality when he makes this assertion. His justifications for obligation, reason, and motive all point to a transcending ethical understanding, according to which selflessness is the ultimate source of ethics. It is noteworthy to observe that a large number of deontologists nowadays appear to disagree with Kant's definition of obligation. According to these philosophers, ethics is about the principles that allow for the coexistence of many ideas of what is good, not about the qualities or intentions of particular individuals. John Rawls and other liberals, for example, along with critical theorists like Jürgen Habermas, contend that while we cannot define the good life or dictate to individuals what kind of person they should be, we can create laws, or rules, about how society should be structured (Rawls) or how best to balance divergent interests (Habermas). These people believe that as long as you obey the law, it does not really matter why you do so. (However, it would be unfair if you obeyed a law out of coercion as opposed to voluntarily choosing to do so. But this is a statement about the legitimacy of the legislation, not about your intentions. According to Kantians, the standards of impartiality, individuality, and universality originate from, and are embodied by, the categorical imperative. It is generally applicable to consider each person as an individual when one regards peoples as ends in and of themselves. Another method for achieving some degree of impartiality is universalizability. A stance that satisfies the universalizability test is considered unbiased. Every person is given equal moral standing in respect to one another as a result of the CI. It creates a framework of obligations and rights oriented toward personal autonomy.

How does Kant defend his assertions? He provides a concept of morality in The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785/2002), saying that morality is duty and imperative, and that "everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force... it must carry with it an absolute necessity" (Cooper 1998: 169). Kant attempted, in a way, to situate morality outside the bounds of human experience, tradition, and desire. According to Cooper (1998), the one viable solution to this dilemma for him was reason—pure reason that was "a priori to him (man) as a rational being." He contends that the laws are revealed by reason alone. They are generated only from reason; they are neither supplied by providence or natural law nor their anticipated outcomes develop them. Kant sought a foundation for morality. He aimed to give it some assurance that it ultimately a morality for sensible creatures, but also free from the whims and frailties of

particular human impulses. The only thing that can protect the moral domain from the whims of human experience, tradition, habit, and desire is pure reason, yet this reason does not exist apart from humans.

An assertion that someone should be regarded morally is equivalent to a declaration that all individuals should be considered as persons, according to Kant. According to Kant, persons are distinct from non-persons, who may be able to act and do things in the world but lack the other qualities necessary to be moral. Persons are capable of moral action, or freedom. For instance, individuals with significant mental impairments are capable of acting and feeling pleased or dissatisfied, but few of them can consider the methods and goals they will use to get there. Similarly, young infants are not seen as moral agents since they do not yet possess the full capacity for reason, which means that they cannot behave in a way that is consistent with ideas of good and evil. However, most young children and those with mental impairments are seen as moral objects rather than agents. That is, those who can treat them morally and ethically should, even though they are unable to exercise agency in the fullest sense. Because of their lower mental capacities, individuals do not have an equal moral standing. A rational being is a reasonable being no matter where they dwell or how far away they are. Therefore, these things do not lessen our responsibility to them. We are unique among animals because of our capacity for reason, and we owe moral obligations solely to other rational creatures. Because reason is a tool that all people can utilize, it not only helps us understand and establish moral universals but also serves as a uniting force for mankind.

The exact relationship to Kant is not often evident in debates of cosmopolitanism today (see Beitz, Moellendorf, Rawls). Onora O'Neill and Jürgen Habermas, among others, are notable outliers in this regard. According to O'Neill, Kant's explanation of practical reason offers the strongest foundation and rationale for considering ethics from a global perspective. According to O'Neill, a concept of practical thinking determines the nature of ethics and our international responsibilities. She contends that for us to reason about action, about what to do or how to act, we must recognize the reality that we live in a world inhabited by other people who, like us, are imperfect and limited yet nonetheless possess the ability to make judgments and carry them out. Others who possess the ability to act or be agents have ethical standing on our behalf, and we cannot hypocritically deny them this standing. Consequently, once we begin interacting with people, we "are committed to ascribing to them the same moral standing that we ascribe to nearby and familiar others in whom we assume like capacities," regardless of where they may be (O'Neill 2010: 197). The main argument put out by O'Neill is that since we engage

with people on an ethical level with all of them, ethical behavior applies to everyone. In this view, national boundaries and cultural distinctions are mostly irrelevant. Because others are bound by universal law, we must regard them as goals in and of themselves within this morally constrained connection.

Jürgen Habermas has put out an alternative reading of Kant's ideas. Although Habermas's work is still not widely used in the field of international ethics, it represents one of the most significant attempts to reevaluate Kant's concepts in the modern era and suggests a different way to approach the subject (see also Linklater 1998; Shapcott 2011; Benhabib 1992). Habermas contends that Kant overemphasized the importance of abstract, solitary thought apart from society. A distinct understanding of the categorical imperative was articulated by Habermas. He maintained that it should be interpreted as a principle of genuine inter-subjective dialogical consent rather than as a singular monological exercise in abstract reason and hypothetical consent. Only those norms that meet (or might meet) with the consent of everybody affected in their role as participants in a practical discourse may claim to be genuine, according to Habermas (1990: 66). According to Habermas, however, universal applicability results from a process of discourse and argumentation between actual people: “rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its claim to universality” (Habermas 1990: 67). In other words, for Kant, universal applicability was the product of private reasoning on the part of the philosopher.

According to this view, universality and impartiality can only be attained by universal dialogue between equals who are prepared to follow reason alone. Since each member must be treated equally, the discourse itself provides an unbiased platform for evaluating various moral views. This kind of cosmopolitanism contends that any laws that are universal, or that apply to everyone, should come from a process of discourse that involves everyone. As Kant attempted, we cannot just sit in our rooms and draw such norms from reason alone to determine what rules would be acceptable to everyone. Rather, we must work to discursively redeem them in genuine discussion. The political implication of acknowledging the categorical imperative in this way is that the pursuit and realization of an individual's goals and aspirations shouldn't be predicated on the disapproval of others who stand to gain from their accomplishment. To put it another way, nobody's freedom should trump another person's right to pursue their own goals.

"The need for the destruction of all systematic forms of exclusion and the pre-eminence of the obligation to develop global arrangements that can secure nothing less than the consent of every member of the human race" is what Linklater claims Habermas's defense of universalism emphasizes (Linklater 1992: 92). The assent of states, not citizens, is the foundation of the existing political system among sovereign nations. Therefore, before anything is permitted to happen that affects you, wherever in the world, you should be contacted and allowed to give your agreement.

Kant and International Politics

According to Andrew Linklater, Kant's arguments inevitably lead to a criticism of the state structure and imply that the kingdom of ends will never be realized as long as state sovereignty endures. Therefore, by arguing that the current international order is morally flawed and that changing it is both possible and desirable, Kantians pose a challenge to our understanding of international politics (Kant 1795/1983; Franceshet 2012; Shapcott 2018a). The nation-state institutionalizes not only a physical but also a moral divide between people by restricting rights, obligations, and consideration to insiders. Above all, the modern international order, or society of states, founded on the idea of reciprocal acknowledgment of sovereignty, is not entirely moral from a cosmopolitan perspective. In Linklater's words:

While men remain estranged from one other through their membership of particularistic communities they could lead neither morally unified lives nor enjoy a social and political world subject to their control or responsive to their capacity for individual and collective self-determination (1990b: 25).

States and their subjects/citizens have been allowed to reject the interests of outsiders since they are not bound by any universal law. Even those rights guaranteed by republican constitutions are not guaranteed to people since governments operate by their purposes rather than the categorical requirement of universality. The ideas underlying the categorical imperative could only be implemented in a cosmopolitan global order where governments were subject to the same constraints as citizens. Therefore, only a cosmopolitan world system can completely actualize freedom.

But it is crucial to remember that Kant himself only ever saw a federation of sovereign, republican nations that abstained from internal violence (Kant 1795/1983). As such, his views on sovereignty are, at most, unclear (Franceshet 2012; Shapcott 2018b). As a result, Kantian thinking has left a dual legacy in the global setting that spans from the moral arguments he

made to their connection to his political arguments. The majority of Kantian perspectives highlight the responsibilities and challenges nations have when attempting to determine, understand, and act by these duties and integrate them into their foreign policy. These responsibilities include acting in line with the categorical imperative (CI) as well as working to establish an international institutional legal framework that upholds individual equality. Kant makes it rather evident that the CI pertains to people and is concerned with the character of their acts, as was already said. However, it also refers to rules, suggesting that it may also be used in more political domains like the law. Furthermore, Kant's well-known essay on perpetual peace also imagines a global political system that is, to the greatest extent feasible, in line with the CI. Thus, there are at least two ways in which the Kantian tradition is present in international ethics. The first is an effort to create and follow universalizable laws and the CI; the second is to imagine and create a global political arena and examine the institutional manifestations of these ideals.

Regarding the former, it is evident that Kantian ethics are interactional in Pogge's meaning, as they specify guidelines for agents' behavior. It is important to remember that the CI is a formal concept and does not explain what it means to regard people as a means to a goal in every situation. As a result, Kantian ethics pushes us to consider how to apply the CI in specific situations, including those involving state foreign policy as well as, for example, the methods used by non-governmental organizations to provide humanitarian relief. However, Kant's ideas also have an impact on institutional design, particularly in theories of global distributive justice that aim to establish a globally just system of governance where all people can exercise their moral autonomy in addition to having legal rights. Numerous cosmopolitan perspectives have been impacted by this school of Kantian philosophy, most notably David Held's work (1997).

To wrap off this part on Kant, it is crucial to emphasize his claim that reason serves as the foundation for moral universalism and his cosmopolitan view. Reason tells us that we have obligations to other sensible creatures. Only rational humans are capable of moral conduct since only they can understand and adhere to the CI, or the rules of morality. Only perfectly rational individuals may see other people as means to an aim in and of themselves or want for acts to be common to everyone. Although they do not support rejecting reason, utilitarians contest that reason is the best source of support for cosmopolitanism. The next section will address these arguments.

Utilitarianism

In contrast to teleological or consequentialist perspectives that emphasize ends, deontological principles relate to things that are just right in and of themselves. Utilitarianism is perhaps the most methodical and rigorous kind of consequentialism, and it is from this tradition that cosmopolitanism's most well-known defenses originate, probably next to universal human rights. While utilitarianism emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consequentialism has existed for millennia in one form or another. The British philosophers John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are considered the founding fathers of utilitarianism and its most well-known theories. Unlike deontologists like Kant, Mill, and Bentham believed that putting moral laws in abstract terms that had no bearing on what people genuinely desired was asking too much and vaguely missing the point. These thinkers believed that morality was bloodless or devoid of empathy and compassion since it ignored pain, motive, effects, or outcomes. They argued that abstract moral obligations could not persuade people to act morally. Furthermore, it was impractical to create abstract regulations without considering the effects they would have on individuals' lives or their ramifications. These philosophers posed queries like, "What good is a moral law if it causes general suffering and unhappiness?" Utilitarians would contend that the legislation was appropriate under the aforementioned scenario since everyone—including the blondes—is content in a society where they are denied property rights. Bentham and Mill, like Kant, were interested in finding reasonable or logical rules that might direct behavior. They did not, however, attempt to articulate these as categorical imperatives or infer moral precepts from the theoretical underpinnings of reason. Rather, Bentham and Mill contended that universally held objective traits, such as the desire to avoid suffering and pursue pleasure, serve as the driving forces behind human motivation. Thus, in the words of utilitarians, "the assessment of the pleasurable and painful consequences of any particular action is the only rational and consistent criterion available for the guidance of action" (MacIntyre 1966: 233). To put it another way, anything is good or terrible depending on how much it makes others happy or uncomfortable. Mill and Bentham claimed that happiness was a better gauge of morality than impersonal laws of obligation. The sole standards for evaluating a society, an action, or a rule were those related to human value or happiness. More particular still:

an action is right if and only if A(it) has as high a utility as any alternative action that the agent could perform instead (Timmons 2012:106).

Bentham used a now-familiar formula to explain his ethical case. According to him, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" should be the goal of a moral code. Laughing makes

people happy, and Bentham was not saying that comedians like Jim Carrey are moral agents because of this. Rather, he advocated for welfare, or happiness in a broader sense—that is, enjoying contentment and well-being.

Utilitarianism seems like a more sophisticated version of hedonism at first appearance; in fact, Bentham's method is frequently referred to as hedonistic utilitarianism. It would be beneficial if the maxim "the greatest good of the greatest number" dictated that substances like cigarettes, alcohol, and strong narcotics be readily accessible since they made people happy and more people would be happy if they were. Naturally, this is not what Bentham and Mill intended, as "happiness" is a general term that encompasses all human desires, including hard labor and fine wine. In a society where both were possible, there was justice. Of fact, widespread inebriation can also result in significant misery and make it harder to fulfill other, more significant ambitions or objectives. J. S. Mill examined this kind of thinking to distinguish between joys and pains that are higher and lower on the scale. Not all forms of pleasure may be seen as equal; for example, the pleasure derived from drinking and excellent poetry are not the same.

Like Kant, Bentham contended that the foundation of his theory was found in human nature. According to Bentham, human nature is oriented toward pleasure and away from suffering rather than toward noble duty and reason. Furthermore, pain and pleasure are quantifiable, which is why the felicific index exists. The impulse to pursue pleasure and shun suffering, according to utilitarians, also provides their theory with a stronger foundation in human nature and, thus, a larger chance of successfully influencing people's behavior. Not because they are "enlightened beings," but rather because of self-interest and empathy, people are driven to do good deeds. Consequently, an action is evaluated as good or harmful by the utilitarian based on its outcomes rather than the moral intentions of the performer. Oscar Schindler, the real-life figure who served as the inspiration for Thomas Kenneally's Booker Prize-winning novel Schindler's Ark and the movie that followed Schindler's List, is an intriguing example of this. The movie about Schindler's actions during the Holocaust makes it seem as though we don't quite understand why he tried to protect "his" workers from the Nazis. Did he do this to make money? To comfort himself? By instinct? Or, in a Kantian sense, from a conscious knowledge of his obligation? It would be difficult to justify Schindler's actions as moral if they were solely motivated by self-interest or financial gain, but it would also be difficult to criticize him for acting in a way that saved lives, regardless of his reason. Considering the examples of lying and fulfilling promises is another method to draw comparisons between utilitarianism and the Kantian perspective. According to Kant, lying is immoral as it cannot be universalized.

However, according to utilitarianism, lying is only wrong when it has negative effects. Another example would be torture, which Kant believed to be evil since it lowers a person to the means of another (obtaining information). Nonetheless, torture may be justified from a utilitarian perspective if, for example, it stopped a terrorist attack that would have killed thousands of people and the severe suffering endured by one would be vastly offset by the thousands of lives saved.

In formulating his standards, Bentham aimed to refute the burgeoning belief, expressed in the French and American Revolutions, that individuals have inherent rights, presently recognized as human rights. Bentham believed that the concept of human rights was absurd and that discussions about natural rights were "nonsense upon stilts," in part because it was impossible to come to a consensus about which rights should be prioritized or where they should end. As a result, rights discourse offers no yardstick for assessing action. But Bentham was by no means a conservative. In terms of politics, utilitarianism has been a critical—and occasionally even revolutionary—approach to established organizations and methods (Nardin 2022a). It is critical not just of deontology but also of custom, faith, and the status quo since it applies the utility principle to all social structures. Utilitarianism was perhaps the most significant ethical theory up to the middle of the 20th century, at least in English-speaking nations. However, due to very grave challenges of its core tenets, utilitarianism has lost favor as a whole (see, for example, B. Williams 1985). The language of rights has been widely adopted as one of these. Utilitarianism may permit the suspension of rights in the name of usefulness, as the instance of torture indicates.

The dedication to fairness and human equality is at the core of utilitarianism. The maxim "the greatest good for the greatest number" is the ultimate concept that utilitarians interpret when defining impartiality. Put differently, utilitarians aim to arrive at an unbiased evaluation of the greatest good that does not give preference to any certain viewpoint, interest, set of standards, or individual. The utilitarian explanation does not support restricting one's moral thinking to one's own group. Since impartiality is egalitarian, it does not acknowledge state borders. According to Bentham and his later adherents, such as Singer, the measure of happiness should be the overall quantity of happiness; nevertheless, no person's pleasure should "count for more than one" when determining happiness. Therefore, a pauper's pleasure is just as vital as a king's. In a similar vein, the happiness of a man is not superior to that of a woman, nor is the pleasure of a white person superior to that of a black person. Similarly, Jones (2010) states that "no perspective or group of perspectives should be privileged when making moral assessments."

Moral values should be assessed objectively, that is, based on how they benefit all parties involved, as all parties are equal.

Utilitarians started to distinguish between acts and norms in the twentieth century. Act utilitarianists defined Mill and Bentham's traditional methods. They concentrated on evaluating how decisions will affect the greatest amount of utility or happiness. On the other hand, rule utilitarianism describes how a rule or collection of rules maximizes their utility—that is, how much they satisfy their interests and wants. This is how Mark Timmons presents the fundamental idea of rule utilitarianism:

> An action (A) is right if and only if A is mentioned in a moral rule whose associated utility is at least as great as the utility associated with any alternative moral rule applying to the situation (2012: 139).

Because it challenges us to determine what would happen if most people or everyone behaved according to the same principles as I do, rule utilitarianism is more in line with Kant. Stated differently, Rule Utilitarianism requires us to determine the utilities of entire patterns of behavior rather than the utilities of individual acts (Timmons 2012: 140). Consider what would happen (in terms of usefulness) if most people consistently violated their commitments, or if everyone did. This appears to lead us back to Kant's CI once again, or at least very close to the same conclusion: that commitments should never be broken unless there are extremely special circumstances. Because upholding the rule of acknowledging human rights increases utility overall, rule utilitarianism may also be used to reconcile rights and utility. Most notably, act utilitarianism is largely focused on people, but rule utilitarianism allows for an institutional solution to ethical dilemmas.

Perhaps the most well-known act utilitarian is Peter Singer, who made the controversial argument that everyone with riches more than they need ought to donate it to organizations that fight poverty. When Singer applies utilitarianism, he expressly mentions the standards of individuality, impartiality, and universality. Individuals, not groups, experience pleasure and suffering (Ellis 1992: 172; Walzer 2013; Nardin 2022b). Ethics must take into account those who experience pain and pleasure because, in the utilitarian paradigm, these experiences serve as the yardstick for moral behavior and the basis for moral motivation. Since every human feels these emotions uniquely, all people must count as one (universalism). This principle also keeps utilitarianism from ultimately concluding that the amount of happiness in total is what matters. If this were the case, it is possible that the number of ecstatically happy people would exceed

the number of only moderately happy or even depressed people. Accordingly, utilitarianism is unable to unconditionally support one person's or a group of people's pleasure at the expense of another. It's not hard to see from here that the ability of wealthy nations to provide for necessities, satiate interests, and find happiness does not explain or justify the absence of these qualities in developing nations. In actuality, the reverse is true. According to utilitarianism, the degree of wealth enjoyed by wealthy nations can only be justified if poverty has been eliminated everywhere else. Because Singer's utilitarianism lays forth individual obligations, it is largely articulated in an interactional rather than an institutional form. This raises some possible objections to utilitarianism. Where does this dedication to equity originate? Why should we regard every person as one and only one? Does it originate from inside utilitarianism, or does it follow from its premises? The answers provided by classical utilitarians have not been very satisfactory, and it may be argued that they partially depend on an equality principle—a rationale for treating individuals equally—which Kant better develops and defends. One person who appears to see this is Peter Singer, who defends his ethical and impartial stance by using Kant's CI (Singer 2012). Similarly, Timmons (2012: 146) contends that the distinctions between the utilitarianism theory and Kant's theories "seem to evaporate" if "the main injunction of the utilitarianism theory... really amounts to the injunction to produce as much good as one can that is compatible with respect for persons (including oneself)." Sterba (2015) echoes this line of reasoning, which Mill hinted to when he revised Bentham's writings.

Contractarianism and Rawlsianism

Presumably, the contractarian tradition—which espouses the notion of a worldwide social contract—has produced some of the most significant and far-reaching defenses of cosmopolitanism. According to contractarians, morality derives from an imaginary social compact that exists between members of a community. Typically, contractarians do not show real social contracts between real persons. Rather, they imagine what norms a community should accept by using the concept of the social contract. Contractarian theory's central claim is that laws do not come from transcendental concepts, natural law, intuition, or revelation from God. Rather, they conjure up a potential consensus among society's members, supposing that lawful regulations originate from the agreements reached among (fictitious) individuals. Probably the most well-known contractarian theorist is Rousseau. Since republics looked to the people rather than the Church or the monarch for moral justification, contractarianism served as a basis for something akin to popular or republican sovereignty as an alternative to absolutist monarchy (Rousseau 1968).

Although cosmopolitanism has a long history, modern interest in it dates back to the 1970s and the resurgence of Rawlsian ideas about global distributive justice. Since Rawls, establishing "the basic structure of society" has been seen as determining the character of justice (Rawls 1972: 7), and the emergence of Rawlsian explanations of justice has shaped much of current cosmopolitanism. However, Rawls' social compact was applied widely by cosmopolitan interpreters of his work. Since Rawlsian cosmopolitans hold that justice is global but also that it should, in theory, be acceptable to all rational persons, they are universalists in both scope and justification. The fact that Rawlsian views are Kantian, consequentialist, and contractarian makes them unique. Rawls's theory of justice addresses the allocation of wealth and social benefit from both a procedural and substantive perspective. Contractarian theorists must devise a method for determining what reasonable contractors would agree to to reach a contract. According to Rawls, the primary virtue of social institutions is justice, hence the goal of a political theory of justice is to specify the conditions that allow a society's institutions to be regarded as legitimate or just. The only way to achieve this is to think about the results. Thus, Rawls is interested in the effects of certain social norms on allocating responsibilities and rights within a community.

The experiment that led to Rawls's theory of the social contract was giving members of a closed society the task of creating the fundamental laws governing that society. The problem is that nobody can predict where they will end up in this society. Every person can be rich or poor, black or white, male or female, gifted or not, bright or not, and so on. All that people in this culture are aware of about themselves is that they are capable of envisioning "the good," thinking clearly about goals, and having some fundamental bodily demands. This is what Rawls refers to as making decisions "behind a veil of ignorance" (Rawls 1972: 12). A society where everyone has "an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others" is what Rawls believes rational contractors who are subject to these constraints will select (1972: 52). In addition, he believes that there would be equality of opportunity and outcome. The difference principle, as articulated by Rawls (1972: 52), states that "inequality is unjust except insofar as it is a necessary means to improve the position of the worst-off members of society." A second contracting session between the representatives of peoples occurs for the international sphere. This round's agreement is a contract that echoes the established principles of international society, including non-intervention, self-determination, just war, and mutual recognition. Stated differently, laws of

cohabitation rather than justice. This was clarified by Rawls (1999) in his subsequent book, The Law of Peoples.

Rawls's conclusion and the need for a second session are rejected by cosmopolitan interpretations of his work (Beitz 1979; Barry 1989; Pogge 1989; Jones 1999; Shapcott 2018a). Many others, like Simon Caney and Darrell Moellendorf, disagree with Rawls's decision to ignore the cosmopolitan implications of his theory. While it comes to accepting more egalitarian principles of global justice than the meager ones he accepts, Rawls "is vulnerable to an imminent critique," according to Simon Caney (2001a: 986), even while working within his limitations. These authors contend that nothing in the Rawlsian framework implies that the explanation of justice must be limited to the home sphere. Rather, the universality of the Rawlsian theory stems from two factors: first, its explanation of the moral person's character; and second, the global system's economic interconnectedness.

Rather than only a national or domestic society, as Rawls claims, cosmopolitan contractarians contend that the contract should be regarded as binding between members of human society as a whole. Contractarians' central tenet is that a global society has emerged as a result of interdependence between nations. However, the difference principle must apply universally to persons rather than nations since Beitz sees justice in terms of cosmopolitanism, individualism, impartiality, and universalism. However, the fact that this thesis bases cosmopolitan justice only on the reality of economic interconnectedness is among its most problematic aspects. The main problem here is that, as many have pointed out, it is a little much to say that economic interdependence is inevitably equivalent to "a system of mutual advantage," as Rawls defines a society. According to Rawls, the international domain, and the international economy in particular, is the domain of modus vivendi, or strategic bargaining rather than mutual advantage. Given this, Beitz's assertion that there is a worldwide plan for mutual gain is not supported by economic cooperation. It would follow that we have no obligations of justice to those who live outside of our boundaries if there were no such requirement.

Beitz subsequently acknowledged that adopting this concept is not sufficiently justified by dependency alone. Specifically, he has conceded that if we are looking for support for the universalizability of the difference principle, we have to look to Rawls's Kantian understanding of the human being. Rawls's theory suggests a global notion of the individual, which means that his idea of moral agency might also be globalized. According to Beitz (1983: 595), "the argument for construing the original position globally need not depend on any claim about the

existence or intensity of international social cooperation since human beings possess these essential powers regardless." In more recent times, Darrel Moellendorf (2012) has made a similar argument to Beitz, namely that Rawls's understanding of the original contractor and their abilities and decisions may be applied to any situation. The characteristics that are applied to contractors are apparent to people in general. So, the only question is: Why can't there be a single global initial position and a single global contract? Would the fictitious contractors select the same tenets for the foreign market as Rawls did for the local market? Moellendorf and Beitz both contend that they would. If Rawls is correct regarding an individual's moral powers in a domestic original position, then he is also correct regarding these capacities in a global original position. His explanation of justice is therefore universal. As a result, even if economic interconnectedness is a required requirement, the notion of the person supplies the sufficient condition, meaning that the prerequisites of global justice are present. By deriving universal principles straight from an explanation of human traits, Beitz is moving toward a more conventional defense of cosmopolitanism. It is debatable, though, if Beitz is ultimately weakening his arguments by elevating his defense of cosmopolitanism—and specifically, a Rawlsian cosmopolitanism—to the level of the essence of human agency. How come? Because of this, he is now forced to depend on two stages: first, an acceptance of Rawls's theory of agency as universal, and second, and maybe more problematically, an acceptance of the Rawlsian technique for figuring out what options such agents would have. The entire structure collapses if the agency account is false. It does not follow that such agents would choose Rawls's principles, even if they are accurate. Consequently, the Rawlsian method is universalist in content but not in justification. It makes use of an explanation of what reasonable people would agree upon, but it is dependent on the general acceptance of Rawlsian theory in general.

The most significant anti-cosmopolitan stances, as we shall see later, center on this critique; in fact, a large portion of the anti-cosmopolitanism of the last several years has been squarely directed at this kind of Rawlsianism. A significant amount of Kantian cosmopolitanism has been overlooked due to the prevalence of this Rawlsian approach. Additionally, it has meant that cosmopolitanism has come to be virtually entirely linked to a specific kind of global egalitarianism and liberalism (Shapcott 2018b). There are advantages and disadvantages to this connection. The advantage is that liberals have forced liberalism to confront issues of great moral concern, such as world poverty, and to think globally or cosmopolitanly. However, anti-cosmopolitans may make a lot of valid complaints against liberal cosmopolitanism. Lastly, it is important to note that the Kantianism of Jürgen Habermas and Andrew Linklater (1998)

develops an account of rules of global scope that are derived not from a fictitious social contract but rather from universal processes of consent and deliberation between real people. This contrasts with this view of contractarianism.

Human Rights, Capabilities and Cosmopolitanism

As we wrap off this section, a few remarks about the role of human rights in cosmopolitanism are appropriate. R. J. Vincent asserted in a 1992 essay that "rights talk" had taken on such a prominent role that people would mistakenly believe it to be "all that ethics is about" (Vincent 1992: 250). It is undoubtedly true that the language of human rights has grown in significance within the realm of international politics and diplomacy. Indeed, many contend that we inhabit a "rights civilization," or an international system founded on rights (Frost 2012). The cosmopolitan values of impartiality, universality, and individuality are embodied in universal human rights. They center moral thought around the concept of the individual. Human rights are possessed "universally" by all people, as explained by Donnelly (1989: 1), "If human rights are the rights one has simply because one is a human being, as they usually are thought to be." Everyone is entitled to and can exercise their universal human rights. Because they belong to us just by being human and not as citizens, human rights are allegedly different from civil rights (or subjects). This implies that a person's human rights should not be determined by whether or not they live in or are a citizen of a nation-state. These rights are transcendent and universal because they are rights that are held as human beings rather than as citizens. Human rights are mostly institutional rather than interactional, and they imply both positive and negative obligations. Human rights violations can occur between people, although most rights claims are made against nations and institutional structures. According to Pogge (2012b: 168), "Human rights give persons moral claims on the global institutional order, which are claims against their fellow human beings, as well as on the institutional order of their societies, which are claims against their fellow citizens." Many proponents of deontological cosmopolitanism contend that rights are useless in the absence of matching duties and without an explanation of who is in charge of ensuring that rights are upheld (O'Neill 1986). Generally, the state has a positive obligation to protect or enforce these rights for all people living within its boundaries, as well as a negative duty to refrain from infringing on those rights. However, it is not always evident in the modern international system whether nations are required to protect citizens' rights abroad. A restricted obligation to interfere to preserve human rights overseas is the goal of the growing obligation to preserve (R2P) theory, which aims to eliminate this ambiguity.

The rhetoric around human rights is widespread, but it also borrows heavily from various ethical stances, whether they are the outcome of a social contract scenario (like that of Rawls) an explanation of natural law, positive international law, or Kantian deontology. One way to look at human rights is as the result of a social contract—that is, what the parties agree upon. They can be seen as a means of acknowledging other people's status as a means to an aim in and of themselves. The most significant arguments in the practical sphere have unquestionably been made on the basis that nations have committed to a social compact that establishes universal human rights, which they are obligated to preserve. These many perspectives lead one to the conclusion that the question of rights is best understood as a common language that is derived from several distinct ethical traditions rather than as a singular approach. All of these rights are predicated on fundamental ideas about what it is to be human and why some people are entitled to particular treatment or have specific rights. Most recently, Nussbaum and Sen have created the capabilities approach, an alternative to conventional rights-based methods. This method, which derives from rights-based thinking, focuses on the most basic human rights (Nussbaum 2017). This method establishes universal standards by identifying some essential human capacities that are shared by everybody, rather example the ability to reason or experience pain. The fundamental tenet of the capabilities approach is that all people can develop particular capabilities and that the presence or lack of these abilities "is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of a human life," as stated by Nussbaum (2012b: 30). Her reasoning follows the same logic as other cosmopolitans and rights approaches: if we can recognize these skills as uniquely human, there is no fundamental reason why they should not be valued or achieved for all people.

Undoubtedly, one of the most effective cosmopolitan languages has been the discourse on human rights (Anderson-Gold 2011). It is untrue, nonetheless, that cosmopolitanism and human rights are equivalent or interchangeable. It is appropriate to conceive of universal human rights as one manifestation of cosmopolitanism rather than the epitome of cosmopolitanism. Most cosmopolitan interpretations are deontological in that they focus more on duties than rights, even if "rights talk" is ubiquitous in modern international politics.

Reason and Suffering in Contemporary Cosmopolitanism

A significant critique of cosmopolitanism has centered on its purportedly detached rationality. Specifically, their explanation of what it is that makes humans universally relatable sounds overly abstract, leaving out crucial facets of what it is to be human or the reasons we need to

have empathy for others and own up to our mistakes. According to Kant's method, we are driven to regard other people as goals in and of themselves only by reason. Furthermore, our motivation to perceive rationally insightful people as ends in and of themselves is limited. Only rational "agents" and morally self-determining entities in the truest sense are granted moral equality. According to Kant, individuals obey their duties because they logically see them as the only reasonable course of action. This approach downplays factors like feelings, which spur individuals to action. The consensus among Kant's detractors and those who oppose Kantianism is that Kant provides an insufficient explanation of moral motivation. Specifically, they contend that Kant's portrayal of humans ignores important aspects of humanity by downplaying feelings or other factors that spur action. There is a tendency toward this in modern cosmopolitan philosophy. For example, Martha Nussbaum implies that reason alone is what connects people when she says, "[w]e should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason, and moral capacity, our first allegiance" (1996: 7). Critics argue that this is an overly simplistic view of what it means to be human. Is the statement from Nussbaum—that humanity is limited to the use of reason—true? Both feminist and communitarian ethical perspectives have criticized this part of cosmopolitanism. Some feminist writers have promoted the idea of an "ethics of Care" (Held 2016; Robinson 1999, 2018) as an alternative to Kantian rationalism. This theory focuses on the motivations that people have for caring for one another daily and offers an ethical framework that is fundamentally grounded in real-world situations.

Utilitarians and others contend that it feels like we are missing something crucial and that relying just on reason's power to explain the moral life might have unfavorable effects. Because of this, the emphasis on pain or suffering has more recently been added to the Kantian approach. Focusing on the causes of sadness is one of utilitarianism's most crucial ideas. Pain is the most significant of them. There are many different ways that people might suffer, and each one has potential moral significance. A major component of moral motivation is the knowledge that all humans and many other sentient beings are capable of suffering. It is also a major justification for treating others equally to either prevent or lessen their suffering. Identification with another person's pain is the realization that we have something in common with them that we would prefer not to have, that we can comprehend their suffering, and that this understanding motivates us to take action to lessen it.

In the Kantian tradition, modern cosmopolitans have started to highlight that pain and injury may take many different forms and to be more clear about this issue. Suffering "has diverse

implications, affecting not only physical security but also human agency and autonomy," according to Lu (2010: 257). We can express moral concern to others because we recognize them as fellow humans. After all, suffering and the ability to empathize with others' suffering are inherent aspects of the human experience. Because of this, treating everyone equally requires sensitivity and understanding. Not only are other people rational agents, but we also acknowledge that other people have the same potential to suffer or be hurt by other people's acts, so we may treat them equally. The Kantian objective of determining rules that should govern our lives—more specifically, norms that all agents may agree upon—is not undermined by the realization that we are driven by something other than pure reason. Reason is required to create laws based on what the general public may agree upon, yet a rational definition of humanity leaves out crucial aspects of comprehension and empathy. Humans are still social actors that require a purpose to establish norms of behavior rather than just being physical agents, or subjects, to be acted upon. The principle that all those impacted by a set of regulations should agree upon it still exists.

This ability to suffer (as opposed to, for example, the ability to enjoy delight) also serves as the foundation for negative responsibilities, which center on preventing or lessening cruel or painful deeds. Given that everyone is capable of suffering, it follows that the first cosmopolitan principle is humanitarianism, or the affirmative obligation to work for the reduction of suffering. According to Lu (Lu 2000: 256), "The moral condemnation of cruelty by Cosmopolitanism translates, at the very least, into a moral obligation to uphold the principle of humanity" and to "prevent and alleviate human suffering where it may be found." It's important to notice that she puts reason in a new context, not that pain should be ignored, to prioritize suffering. It is evident that pain and reason are universal aspects of human nature, and as such, they should serve as the cornerstones of a morally sound universalism. Do no damage is the second cosmopolitan obligation that results from this. "Harm is evil (physical or otherwise) as done to or suffered by some person or thing: hurt, injury, damage, mischief," according to Linklater, quoting the Oxford Dictionary of English. "Grief, sorrow, pain, trouble, distress, and affliction" are some of its impacts. 2011; Linklater, p. 265. One of the most fundamental moral precepts is perhaps the need to prevent damage, which is best defined as the notion that it is preferable to suffer a wrong than to do one. Linklater claims that the damage principle's applicability ranges from:

> two universal features of human existence: first, all human beings are susceptible to particular (though not identical) forms of mental and physical pain [. . .]; second, shared

> (though unequal) vulnerability to mental and bodily harm gives all human beings good reason to seek the protection of a harm principle (2016: 20).

Therefore, the universal principle of harm avoidance may be used in a fashion that is consistent with a wide range of ethical worldviews, even if one disagrees with the terminology of more substantive universalism, such as Rawlsian global distributive justice. The simplest version of the "do no harm convention" may be applied "unilaterally" in a world of independent sovereign nations, negating the need for an already-formed global community to include it in "our" interactions with outsiders. It also follows that people in a variety of contexts are more likely to identify an injury as such the more significant or fundamental it is. Starvation is a damaging situation that is almost universally agreed to be bad and is almost objectively recognized (the point at which life can no longer continue). Similarly, it may also warrant such a consensus if one's identity or sense of community is taken away or destroyed (harmed). One value that governments have potentially decided to prioritize over national sovereignty is genocide, viewing it as a universal crime (or damage) committed against both persons and communities. The fundamental idea of the Genocide Convention is the elimination of a group identity in various ways, such as mass executions or murder, in addition to the physical devastation of a community. It follows that there is a shared interest in safeguarding oneself and one's group from harm, which is provisionally universal or universalizable, as all persons experience these kinds of harm. This implies that it makes sense to return the favor.

Cosmopolitanism faces a major obstacle in the form of the danger that comes with the formation of universal norms: the risk of imposing on others a culturally particular idea of justice or a decent society. However, when viewed through a cosmopolitan lens, the "not harm" principle can offer direction to those who support cosmopolitan ideals and want to apply them to their interactions with strangers and "outsiders" in a way that is compatible with a world split into nation-states. Consent and communication are necessary to determine if a specific conduct is detrimental and whether it should be sanctioned. The main way to obtain agreement or permission for activities is through dialogue (see Shapcott 2011, 2018a). In many cases, such dialogue is the only way of ascertaining whether a harm has occurred or is perceived.

Communitarianism

A unique moral epistemology and ontology unique to each tradition is at the core of the conflict between cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans (Cochran 1999). As we have seen, cosmopolitanism—particularly liberal cosmopolitanism—has typically been based on

assertions on the nature of human agency and the ability for disinterested rationality, or—in Kant's case—the capacity of humanity to discern transcendental reason that is universal. On the other hand, communitarians asserted both ontological and epistemological points: people are products of their culture and can only acquire moral knowledge as a result of living in that society. Communitarians hold that morality originates in and is meaningful only inside the particular, or what Michael Walzer (1994) refers to as "thick," cultures that we are a part of. In our diverse historical, cultural, and political groups, moral life, as they say, begins "at home." Because communitarianism maintains that moral norms are exclusive to the particular communities from which they originated, it is referred to as "contextualist." This communitarian argument is transformed into a rejection of cosmopolitanism by the anti-cosmopolitan stance. Contexts restrict universalism and eliminate the prospect of a moral viewpoint in and of itself.

Brown (1992) claims that the German philosophers Herder and Hegel are the sources of contemporary communitarian epistemology and ontology. Even if there aren't many modern anti-cosmopolitans who even remotely resemble Herder or Hegel, they have influenced and inspired anti-cosmopolitanism as a whole. Kant's focus on a pre-social or even asocial individual was criticized by Herder. Brown claims that Herder offers the framework for considering the country as an organic whole and as the social source of identity and goodness. Herder was the first to draw attention to the connection between personal identity and culture. People's identities are shaped by their language, customs, history, and common culture. According to Herder (1992: 59), "the individual was not before culture... but shaped by it." Herder's emphasis on the contextual person makes him relevant to the discussions of today. Herder's focus on the societal roots of uniqueness extends to the domain of epistemology. Herder argues that the Kantian focus on an individual's transcendent reason is essentially flawed. Herder favored a multiplicity of de-centered communities, which he referred to as "anarcho-pluralist" communities (Brown 1992). Hegel on the other hand was a statist. According to Hegel, the state is the ideal form of human society because it allows individuals to express their uniqueness while also balancing it with that of others. According to Hegel, the sovereign state was the only environment in which individuals could attain their freedom and uniqueness since it was the only group in which individuals could rule themselves rationally or had reflectively built their identities.

According to statists, "the framework which founds and enables ethical discourse is a social tradition within the state" (Cochran 1996: 13). This implies that men (sic) can only be free

when each person lives in their unique state. The state, which Hegel regarded as the pinnacle of the historical process, is the object of Hegel's next attempt to reconcile particularity and universality. As stated by Linklater:

For Hegel an account of the development of human powers must analyse the emergence and evolutions of societies which are based upon rational, critical thinking. The development of human freedom is exhibited in man's increasingly rational control of his self and his environment . . . The culmination of this process in modern history is the sovereign state. Within this community, within a community of rational law- makers, humans realize the triumph of thought over nature, and express those capacities . . . which are specific to human subjects (1990a: 147).

States were able to do this because they were rational communities founded on historical, not transcendent, reason, rather than because they were organic communities in the Herderian sense. That is a reasoning that has grown over time. This is why David Boucher (1998), referring to Hegelian thinking as simply the legacy of historical reason, contends that communitarianism falls short of capturing it. However, Hegel's analysis leads to the conclusion that the center of personal ethics and existence is and should be the less-than-universal association known as the sovereign state. Herder and Hegel appear to have encapsulated the core of contemporary anti-cosmopolitanism as an argument that blends a view that the state serves as the greatest representation of the community with cultural and communal sources of moral knowledge and personal identity. Although modern anti-cosmopolitans reference Herder and Hegel, the argument between liberalism and communitarianism that arose in reaction to John Rawls's Theory of Justice has had a more direct impact on them (see Avineri and De Shalit 1992). The main contention was that Rawlsian liberalism was based on a decontextualized conception of individualism and misread the nature of the moral sphere and moral argument.

David Miller (2012) illustrates the boundaries of universalism by drawing a comparison between communitarian or contextual justice and universal or cosmopolitan justice. Miller explains that the goal of universalism is to "discover principles of justice that can and should guide our judgment and our behavior in all circumstances. It tells us what justice is." The fundamental tenets of justice are invariant. According to Miller, no universalist explanation of justice has ever been able to win over everyone (universal justification) or take the lead in explanations of justice. Because of this, communitarians contend that whereas cosmopolitans

claim access to a unified moral narrative, communitarians maintain that diverse cultures have their ethics. Rather, there are still many different perspectives on justice throughout the globe. This is not only a coincidence or the product of badly expressed ideas; rather, it is the essence of justice. There is no one definition of justice, and so no one explanation of justice. Justice is therefore always contextual. According to communitarian theory, our understanding of morality is ultimately shaped by the specific historical groups we are a part of. Morality is a cultural artifact, and many cultures have varied moral standards and conceptions of good and bad.

According to anti-cosmopolitans, there is no real agreement on what justice is in practice because of the existence of a great deal of cultural variation and a wide range of divergent perspectives on what justice is. We cannot, in the sense that cosmopolitans do, conceive of a transcendental universal morality that is above history and culture since human beings only come to moral knowledge in certain historical contexts. There is no cultural artifact that is coterminous with the entire species as there is no single global civilization or society of all humans with a shared history or culture. According to Walzer, moral communities:

have members and memories, members with memories not only of their own but also of their common life. Humanity by contrast, has members but no memory, so it has no history and no culture, no customary practices, no familiar life- ways, no festival, no shared understanding of social goods (1994: 8).

Therefore, moral obligations are exclusive to societies that can exchange these cultural artifacts. We really cannot have obligations to people with whom we do not have a "social contract," whose values we do not agree with, and who we do not identify with. Put another way, there are only local or specific contexts for global justice—not a universal one. "Our shared humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe," says Walzer. Particularism is a vital trait shared by all members of the human race: we all engage in rich, culturally distinct societies (1994: 83). The absence of these common understandings explains why people would not connect with cosmopolitanism and also hinders the implementation of the cosmopolitan moral code. People have a moral incentive to do well because they identify with their communities. On the other hand, we do not sufficiently connect with humanity to inspire us to take action in its name or on behalf of distant strangers (see Kymlicka 2011; Calhoun 2013). At best, our humanity is diminished, vague, and ethically incidental.

Additionally, attempts to advance universal concepts of justice encounter the obstacle of cultural heterogeneity if morality is context-dependent and can only be determined inside a culture or group. According to Thompson (1992: 22), communitarians contend that "why should they accept the criteria or evaluations of cosmopolitans if individuals are constituted wholly or in part by the social relations of their communities, or if their goals, their ethical judgments, and their sense of justice are inextricably bound up with community life"? According to communitarian criticism, there is no way to know or distinguish between the various contextual conceptions of the good and determine which ethical framework is the greatest since knowledge is specific and local. Put another way, given the wide range of moral cosmologies, it is neither desirable nor conceivable to choose one over the other. Sometimes, a counterargument to this one holds that contextual information is incommensurable by definition (see Brown 1992). That is to say, it is not only true that cultural plurality prevents us from reaching a consensus on fundamental principles, but it also makes such a consensus impossible since cultures cannot be translated. For example, it is difficult to be a traditional Islamic scholar and a modern secularist at the same time. There is no reconciling the two cosmologies. This implies that not only is there no agreement in place at the moment, but that there never will be one. The integration or extinction of all other cultures and the triumph of one would be the only ways it could come to pass. And this is precisely the danger that cosmopolitan universalism poses, according to communitarians.

The Critique of Liberal Cosmopolitanism

The most prevalent criticism of cosmopolitanism is that, because it adheres to objectivity, it is antagonistic toward the "local" or national community. This critique stems from a variety of places, but at its core, it is a rejection of the cosmopolitan notion of "the moral point of view" and its methodological individualism. The most significant of these arguments is that the people that cosmopolitanism portrays are not human beings per se, but rather liberal persons who are the result of a particular liberal interpretation. Three suppositions form the basis of cosmopolitan arguments:

1) That there is a neutral explanation for human action that is not influenced by its unique beginnings.

2) That it has been completed.

3) In addition, that an account of this kind can produce a global account of the right.

Liberal views rely on culturally particular assumptions about certain human traits rather than reflecting universal human attributes. It is therefore debatable if the characteristics liberals attribute to all people as being universally true. If not, it appears that the cosmopolitan endeavor is doomed from the start.

The Kantian appeal to rationality is the first and most apparent point of contention here. The communitarian viewpoint simply does not provide empirical support for the idea that humanity's rationality is what unites us. Different cultures have different interpretations of what constitutes reason and rationality. That is to say, because there is, in essence, no universal reason, mankind has little or no potential to be governed by one. Reason is not transcendent in the Kantian sense; rather, it is a historical construct that is a result of certain cultures and circumstances. This claim contains Hegel's description of the evolution of reason throughout time. More precisely, communitarianism contends that because disembodied abstract reason is unable to find a foundation outside of a particular Western school of thinking, it lacks ethical legitimacy. Cosmopolitanism fails to acknowledge to the full extent that it is idealized, abstract, and purportedly objective primary viewpoint is, in reality, a creation of a specific history, place, and culture rather than an objective one. Cosmopolitanism is predicated on the idea that liberal conceptions of justice are, in fact, universal and definitive. Nonetheless, there's considerable reason to believe that they cannot be universalized without issues or that others outside the liberal community would find them objectionable. What is the source of authority for these "external" standards, according to communitarians? (Thompson, 1992: 22). Naturally, the response is that their authority is limited to liberalism and not to a global scale. In the end, the argument posits that substantive conclusions about universal human qualities cannot be drawn beyond the most general ones and that any conclusions drawn from such an account would result in a very different understanding of justice than that which cosmopolitans portray (see Miller 2017).

Rawls's "theory of justice" served as the impetus for the present version of "communitarianism." Many communitarian debates started out as criticisms of Rawls's conception of justice as well as his domestic liberalism. The main critique directed at Rawls was that his narrative depended excessively on abstraction and an individualistic perspective that failed to acknowledge the degree to which socialization influenced personal decisions. Because Rawlsian views largely rely on extremely precise descriptions of what an individual might pick to construct their fiction of a global social compact, they are especially vulnerable to attack at this level. A large portion of modern anti-cosmopolitanism is a reaction to the

growth of Rawlsian interpretations of global justice in cosmopolitanism. The discussion of global distributive justice will almost certainly result in an explanation of a globally just society based on liberal, if not Rawlsian, principles, particularly when seen in the context of Rawlsian justice and the creation of "basic institutions."

Liberal cosmopolitans, according to communitarians and feminists, portray the person as in some kind of acultural (Benhabib 1992). The liberal paradigm is not as universally applicable as liberals would have us believe, according to feminist critiques of Rawlsianism. According to Benhabib (1992: 53), universalistic moral theories in the Western tradition, ranging from Hobbes to Rawls, are substitutionalist because they recognize a particular set of individuals' experiences as the archetypal situation of the human species. All of these subjects are adult white men who are either properly married or at least in the professional class. This person is hidden beneath a "veil of ignorance," in Rawls's words. Liberal approaches view the person as an idealized rational agent, one that we can model and utilize to inform our theories—even if we are unable to locate one in the real world.

Cosmopolitans create and defend norms that should govern everyone using an idealized and abstracted picture of the person. The cosmopolitan stance must abstract away the particularity of agents and substitute a generalized, and hence universal, idea of the person by reducing them to the abstract, rational, unbiased (male) subject. Only then can the cosmopolitan perspective be considered globally impartial. According to Walzer (1983: 5), Rawls' method "reduces the (actual) plurality of moral subjects to one (abstract) subjectivity" and necessitates abstracting the person from their social situation. This idea is faulty, according to Rawls's communitarian detractors, since it deprives the individual of all that distinguishes them as unique persons or as human beings. The person so modeled is a product of a certain culture and, typically, gender, rather than being universal and hence capable of impartiality. As Walzer points out in his critique of Rawls:

> the question most likely to arise in the minds of members of a political community is not, ‘What would rational individuals choose under universalizing conditions of such and such a sort?’ But rather, ‘What would individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?’ (1983: 5)

To put it another way, the person is so cut off from actual people that everything they decide to do or not decide to do makes no sense, and as a result, the structure that supports this idea falls apart. Similarly, the cosmopolitan account's roots are hidden by the notion of impartiality,

claims Iris Marion Young (1990). Every point of view has some background, and none of them is entirely objective. A "non-perspectival" perspective does not exist. It is impossible to choose an unsituated moral point of view, because if a point is placed, it cannot be universal, it cannot stand apart from and comprehend all points of view, as Young (1990: 104) contends. The cosmopolitan stance has to substitute the unique identities of actual persons with a generic idea of "the agent" to remain objective. One way to articulate a specific notion of the good life is through the cosmopolitan commitment to impartiality toward many views of the good life. Should this prove to be the case, cosmopolitan universalism's foundation may not be as solid as it first appears.

Rawls's defense of his work against the cosmopolitan interpretation is a related assertion. The notion of justice is predicated on a set of principles, or the thoughtful balance of values prevalent in liberal society, especially in the United States. It is a description of justice for liberal societies from this point of view. In the global arena, there is no such thing as a fundamental reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1999). The central tenet of anti-cosmopolitanism is that there isn't a single aspect of human nature that can serve as the foundation for a "thick" global creed, or that doing so is extremely difficult, if not impossible. People vary greatly based on their cultural and historical backgrounds. They differ so much in their tastes, values, and fundamental conceptions of life and its meanings that it is hard to pinpoint a single characteristic that would serve as the foundation for a strong or substantial moral universalism. It is impossible to provide substantive explanations of universalism, global justice, or the substantive provisions of universal human rights, or they can only be very narrowly defined (see Miller 2017, for example). As such, the concept of a single universal morality must be rejected as it is a cultural artifact without worldwide credibility. The ontological and epistemological conditions are not met, making the cosmopolitan dream of a disembodying universal reason unattainable.

What is needed is a new definition of justice that does not allow for generalizations about what people should or should not do, but rather considers various social settings. The next step is to talk about how the communitarian heart of the anti-cosmopolitan tradition translates into ethical practice and what this means for the cosmopolitan aim. That is if we accept the communitarian premises, what kind of ethical choices do we still have, and do they successfully undercut the purpose of cosmopolitanism?

Anti-Cosmopolitan Ethics

If we deny the existence of a global moral order, then our fellow citizens must come first, perhaps even at the expense of foreigners. Given that national or communal borders have the highest moral importance, the communitarian thesis on the origin of morality advocates assigning moral precedence to the "community," the country, and the state rather than to the species. In other words, we owe our fellow citizens more than we do foreigners—sometimes a lot more. This suggests that our commitments to the human race as a whole may be minimal if they exist at all. To give an example, national distribution schemes are preferred over global ones under communitarian logic. It encourages moral favoritism for insiders (compatriots) over outsiders, restricts duties to non-compatriots, and holds that national and universal ideals should generally take a backseat when they clash (see Erskine 2012: 28). The borders of the nation-state's political community define any duties that the wealthy may have to the underprivileged or that any individual may have to anybody else. This finding serves as the foundation for the anti-cosmopolitan viewpoint, which holds that it would be unfair to the variety of human ways of existence around the globe if we were to create a world government or significant human community. Since there is no foundation for a worldwide redistribution of wealth and because such schemes can only take place inside nations, not across them, there is little to no need to create a global system based on principles that may transfer money from the affluent to the poor (see Miller 2017).

Similarly, the international community has very little power to enforce universal human rights. Recalling the three connections of obligations presented at the beginning of the book, anti-cosmopolitans are motivated by communitarian principles to favor the least amount of negative duties that exist between political groups. Because we come from various ethical backgrounds and because the norms of coexistence and non-interference are essentially the only obligations that apply to everyone, it is usually impossible for "us" to assess what "they" do to each other. The communitarian foundations of anti-cosmopolitanism manifest themselves in two ways: (1) "realism" (Gvosdev 2015; Erskine 2012); and (2) pluralism (Bull 1967), which manifests itself in a variety of ways. Both demand that we conceive of ethics in a manner distinct from that which cosmopolitanism offers.

Realism

For at least sixty years, realism has dominated theories of international politics. Most discussions within modern realism and commentary on realism center on the dynamics of interstate interactions, with little to no systematic attention paid to ethical concerns. But a

potent moral criticism of the connection between politics and morality and the potential for political community reform lies at the heart of realism's preoccupation with power. Realists contend that ethics must be statist and consequential in the international sphere. Because realist ethics focus on upholding and defending the state or national community, they are statist (and communitarian). Because moral decisions are made based on how successfully they further this goal rather than how they relate to some arbitrary definition of "right" or the common good, realist ethics are consequentialist.

Even while few realists, whether modern or classical, identify as communitarians or use the term, their arguments still share some presumptions. Realists are not the same as communitarians. The majority of realists are communitarians in the sense of norms if not sociology. Strong reasons for national priority and against cosmopolitanism are provided by realism (see Linklater 1990c). These arguments include skepticism of progressivist explanations of international activity and an acknowledgment of the moral heterogeneity that characterizes the international arena. In its early incarnations, it was more of a political philosophy than a "method" of research, particularly in the writings of the two leading exponents of early twentieth-century realism, Hans Morgenthau (1948/1960) and E. H. Carr (1939). Ethics and normative concerns were therefore essential to its definition. Its criticism of idealism makes this the most clear. Carr and Morgenthau claim that idealists erred in prioritizing the common good over the interests of their country by integrating universal principles into their objectives for foreign policy.

Realists see the field of international affairs as a struggle for dominance between various sovereign nations. Anarchic states do not acknowledge a common good. According to classical realists, this circumstance implied that as people are self-interested by nature, they would occasionally work toward achieving their benefit at the expense of others. States should and would increase their welfare and security without taking into account the demands of others to sustain themselves. This is regarded by realists as the primary barrier to the achievement of idealistic goals like world peace. In such circumstances, the statesman (sic) needs to be ready to adopt a Machiavellian strategy and do whatever it takes to prevail. It is a terrible notion to include universal morality in foreign policy or relations with other nations since it is harmful and does not apply to the international sphere, which is a necessary one. According to Morgenthau, "under current conditions, a foreign policy guided by universal moral principles is a policy of national suicide" (1952: 10). Realists also contend that the absence of universal principles contributes to anarchy's dynamics; nonetheless, anarchy would forbid states from

behaving in conformity with such principles even in the case that they existed. Even if every state was liberal, Christian, or Muslim, for example, anarchy would still triumph over any selfless intentions they may have toward one another. Realists disagree with what they perceive to be the prevailing moralist currents in US foreign policy because of this. The tendency of US foreign policy to combine ideology with interest is criticized by realism. All too frequently, states—great powers foremost among them—confuse their interests with universal principles and their ideals with universal values. "The appeal to moral principles in the international sphere has no concrete universal meaning... it will be nothing but the reflection of the moral preconceptions of a particular nation," is a quote from Morgenthau (1952: 10), which is regarded by realists as either a cynical mask or a self-interested delusion. At best, morality in international politics is window decoration, meant merely for show; at worst, it can be a sign of arrogance that goes along with an exaggerated perception of a state's strength. These factors have led many to label realist ethics as, at most, amoral and Machiavellian. Nonetheless, realist support for realpolitik may be qualified or undermined by pointing out the moral and ethical foundation of realism.

Ethics of Responsibility

Above all, a pessimistic view of the nature of the international domain unites the realism tradition. As a result, many commentators have contended that moral skepticism in general dominates realism. Fundamentally, it seems doubtful that politics has a moral component. Nonetheless, a lot of realists frequently contend that the ethics of responsibility, a distinct and more practical morality, lies behind this toughness. An ethics of responsibility considers the results and ramifications of decisions made. Traditionally, this has been understood to mean one of two things: (1) a straightforward means-ends pragmatism (erroneously called prudence), according to which the statesman must advance the national interest by any means possible; and (2) a duty to prioritize one's state. Stated differently, a statesperson's primary responsibility in the erratic circumstances of global anarchy is to protect their state and people. Such self-serving ethics are praised as virtues by realists (see Kennan 1986). To act otherwise would be to disregard the leader's obligation to protect the interests and way of life of their community.

Thucydides provided the most well-known illustration of realism ethics in his Peloponnesian War history. The Athenians assert that in international affairs, "the powerful do what they can and the weak do what they must," as evidenced by their ultimatum to the little island kingdom of Melos to surrender or face destruction. In other words, morality does not support or restrain

strong nations. Weak nations have to accept that strong governments will do whatever they can to get away with it. The Melians in the Peloponnesian War were attacked, and slaughtered, and their women and children were sold into slavery because they refused to submit. Here, the realists want us to consider how morally or ethically sound it was for the Melian leaders to use justice as a shield from the reality they had to deal with. The right thing to do would have been to concede their loss and spare their people from the ensuing massacre and servitude. Self-help is therefore not only a practical need but also a moral obligation. Therefore, realists encourage nations to prioritize material and strategic results over the more widely held belief that their acts are morally just or wrong. For example, if bombing a neutral state like Laos will help achieve the military objectives of destroying North Vietnam's enemies, a realist like Henry Kissinger could suggest doing so. As an alternative, a realist might advocate for friendly relations and support with governments that have a track record of violating human rights, like Augusto Pinochet's military regime in Chile or, more likely, Musharraf's Pakistan, to gain an advantage over a military adversary like the USSR or al-Qaeda. Therefore, a statesman dealing with a state that violates human rights must determine if the rights of foreigners are more important than the interests of even one of their residents. Realist reasoning implies that the rights of foreigners are subordinated to the interests of a single home person. This implies that, as long as the connection benefits us, we not only put up with "bad" states but become friends with them. A state should only become involved in another state's domestic issues if there is no substantial risk to itself. The "offensive" realist, John Mearsheimer, contends that intervening to halt a genocide in, example, Rwanda would only be wise if no strategic interest was at jeopardy (Mearsheimer 2011). But there isn't anything in realist logic to support an interventionist approach that is motivated by morality rather than geopolitics. Assistance should, in theory, only be provided to another state when it is a strategic advantage.

As long as our state benefits, we cannot be overly worried about any pain or injury we could do to other states, either by deed or omission, according to the logic of realism. Prioritizing our interests is necessary if they outweigh the harm we do others, which they nearly always do (see also Kennan 1986). Madeline Albright, the former US Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, makes this claim. "I think that is a very hard choice,... the price is worth it," was the response given by Albright to the question, "We have heard that half a million children have died (as a result of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War)," on the US 60 Minutes program (60 Minutes, December 5, 1996). In this situation, a realist would contend that the sanctions on Iraq were "worth it" and justified since they held Saddam

Hussein's government in check, stopped him from creating and deploying WMD, and protected both the security of Iraq's adversaries and world stability. The realism viewpoint holds that the fact that the US and Iraq's opponents have come out on top is a positive thing and that the significant suffering inflicted upon the Iraqi people is an unfortunate but inevitable side effect if it advances the interests of the US national interest. According to Kant, Albright is acting immorally when she talks of paying a price that involves other people's lives to achieve US national goals and punish the ruler of Iraq.

However, when it comes to their perception of war as an instrument of policy, realists frequently defy expectations. Realists contend that a state should always be prepared to employ force, provided that other governments are as well, but they frequently advise restraint when it comes to particular conflicts. Realists warn against conquering wars motivated by ideology. Realists like Morgenthau opposed the Vietnam War because they believed it was unwarranted and foolish since it neither improved nor could improve the US's standing internationally. Thus, realists throughout the Cold War expressed worry about combating and restricting Soviet influence, but they also contended that the threat was geopolitical rather than ideological. A particular strain of realism found its way into US foreign policy through the Nixon administration's US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's détente policy toward the Soviet Union and China was based on the realization that the USSR could be seen as a state with its security interests rather than an ideological enemy determined to destroy the US and that China could be used to counter the USSR (the adage "my enemy's enemy is my friend"). Similarly, realists like John Mearsheimer, who advised that the strategy of containment through sanctions and the inspection regime had succeeded and that Iraq posed no real threat to US vital national interests, were the most resolute opponents of US policy in the months leading up to the US invasion of Iraq in April 2003 (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). The Bush administration's claims that "American values are universal values" and its efforts to expand democracy throughout the Middle East are met with skepticism by the majority of realists (Lieven and Hulsman 2016). Realists believe that in this way the conflict was needless. The Iraq War was a foolish decision because the benefits were exceeded by the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes, and the US did not need to fight the war to survive. The key takeaway from this is that realists assess policies largely in terms of the national interest and with a prudential ethical framework, rather than because they are pacifists.

Realists believe that the main moral virtue for effective statecraft is prudence, which is the ability to gain insight and understanding about what is and is not achievable as well as—more

importantly—the best ways to accomplish one's goals. "Political morality cannot exist without prudence—that is, without taking into account the political ramifications of actions that appear moral," according to Morgenthau (1960: 10). Weighing the effects of potential political courses of action is a prudent practice. Although pursuing the national interest may be the ultimate goal, it is up for interpretation as to what this entails in certain situations. In practical terms, prudence may force a statesman to make terrible choices or choices that contradict common sense morality, but if the choice is made for the proper reasons and with the appropriate repercussions of accountability, it may be justified. The most apparent example in this case would be the moral rule that prohibits murder in all societies. While most people view murder as evil, for a statesman, murder in the context of wartime is often a vital tactic for attaining a state's security objectives. Realists thus acknowledge that morality in the home is acceptable—and occasionally even praiseworthy—in the political sphere. Realists contend that leaders must put the needs of their people first and that failing to acknowledge these realities would be a betrayal of that duty. Opponents claim that this may veer into opportunism, justifying nearly any acts on ethical grounds.

Contrary to popular assumption, prudential thinking goes beyond a strictly utilitarian or unprincipled interpretation of judgment and behavior, such that one is guided by the maxim "what will help me meet my aims most efficiently." Rather, prudence for Morgenthau, at least, is a process by which the moral, or universal law, is mediated via the concrete practical here and now, as stated by Murray (1996) as well as Lieven and Hulsman (2016). Therefore, a wise realist would wonder whether there weren't any other ways to "contain" Iraq and if the suffering of the Iraqi people wasn't the greatest way for the US to accomplish its goals. It is possible that the weapons inspection regime was sufficient to stop Iraqi capabilities, or at least severely impair them. In this instance, a realist would have believed that the Iraqi people's suffering was not required. Realists would have also claimed that animosity at this program might have had detrimental effects on the US. In other words, if Morgenthau believed that a person's suffering was excessive or out of proportion to their transgression of the moral code, he might not necessarily support that suffering. For example, Morgenthau maintained that realist morality does not permit nations to use genocide as a strategy. Therefore, any national interest pursuit can only be considered responsible if it also considers humanity. This insight is evident in the way that realism continues to oppose idealism or "thick" moral universalism. Not only does such idealism impair the national interest, but it also harms other people who have rightful

interests of their own. This is irresponsible behavior. Similarly, imperialism and arrogance endanger not just the stability of the nation-state but also the system as a whole.

However, the fundamental understanding of politics and human nature as fundamentally tragic is at the heart of realist ethics, particularly for Morgenthau. The term tragedy is not used in the weak or everyday sense that TV news uses to describe the loss of life; rather, it is used in the classical sense, as shown by Shakespeare's works and the Greek tragedies (Lebow 2013). In this context, a tragedy is a circumstance in which an unfortunate outcome will follow whichever decision you make. There is a feeling here that politics is uncontrollable for humans, no matter how hard individuals try. Realists view the world as sad because they believe that people are flawed and fallible. We can never fully understand the social environment or the results of our acts, and we can never fully master our nature. Sometimes there isn't a "moral" or right decision to be made. It is just you and the lesser of two evils—if you are lucky—to choose. For example, the choice to drop an atomic bomb on Japan was, from one point of view, tragic: either risked a large number of American casualties in capturing the Japanese mainland or murdered over 100,000 civilians to quickly end the war. This is heartbreaking because, even though both options were terrible, there was no way to avoid having to select one. This sense of sorrow is aptly conveyed by the concept of the security dilemma. Regardless of the decision taken, there is never 100% security—there will either be an arms race or a war. This implies that we are faced with decisions about what to do that would be least harmful regularly. Therefore, realist ethics are an attempt to consider how to behave ethically well in these situations. Rather than attempting to formulate a definitive definition of what is good, they are an ethics of the least awful.

Since realism upholds the ethical superiority of the national or state community and takes the nation-state for granted, it can be broadly characterized as communitarian and anti-cosmopolitan. This is a philosophical and practical stance. Since realists want to accept reality as it is, their viewpoint is pragmatic. Realist ethics are the finest accessible ethics in light of the world as it is, which makes it principled. Because realists frequently express compassion for the multiplicity of communities and because embracing realist principles results in giving importance to the specific rather than the universal, realists are also communitarians. Realists contend that while it is occasionally essential to disregard the interests of other nations, it is typically advantageous that no state has the authority to do so and impose its interpretation of universality. This desire for diversity is virtually always there, even if it is never completely explained in realist philosophy. Murray (1996: 101) points out that for Morgenthau,

"fundamental moral necessities are ultimately asserted to be tolerance and the acknowledgment of the right of the other to pursue an alternative conception of the good."

Realists are susceptible to the criticism that governments do not always have to choose between extinction and survival. The realism criticism that the condition of nature dictates the state's moral decisions only holds in situations where maintaining a given moral standard would put the state in danger of collapsing or exposing a population to actual danger. But in many states, especially the richest ones, these kinds of situations are sporadic and usually limited to specific problems. The realist argument against international ethics only applies in particularly severe situations since governments often do not face life-threatening implications if they choose to act morally (see Beitz 1979 and Moellendorf 2012). While it is true that most states must make decisions that will impact their interests, these decisions often have little bearing on a state's capacity to continue existing or to thrive. Instead, a lot of decisions come down to advantages or disadvantages. It defies logic that the pursuit of advantage permits the statesman, in the same manner as survival might, to choose to reject traditional morality. For people and their moral decisions, the situation is identical. Ethics is about weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each individual and figuring out whether one's interests should come before those of others, and vice versa.

Whether it is morally irresponsible for a realist statesperson to use foreign policy to change the international system's logic so that realpolitik is less or nonexistent is the main ethical question that arises from realist analyses of the nature of international politics. According to the aforementioned considerations, realism steers foreign policy more toward maintaining the status quo than toward altering the global environment. It is important to remember, nevertheless, that both Morgenthau and Carr argued that for humans to survive, the logic of anarchy must be overcome and the concept of state sovereignty must be supplemented or replaced (see Morgenthau 1949; Carr 1939).

Although nationalism and realism are compatible, realists themselves are frequently against nationalism due to its harmful repercussions and ethical objections; instead, they prefer to refer to it as patriotism (Lieven and Hulsman 2016). Particularly, remarks made by Morgenthau (1949) and Carr (1939) seemed to imply that they did not consider the national state to be the ultimate form of political society. These thinkers believed that nationalism was a bad thing that would worsen the "centrifugal" tendencies that already existed in anarchy, thereby adding to the chaos on a global scale. The ability to pursue incremental, piecemeal transformation of the

international order in the direction of cosmopolitanism may be the difference between national survival and failure. According to Morgenthau's observations in his chapters on international morality and the last pages of Politics Among Nations (1948/1960), the establishment of a cosmopolitan world society or world state is ultimately the only path that will eventually promote human well-being. The latter might be seen as the goal of a realist ethics of responsibility, as the national interest should always be pursued within the context of the welfare of mankind. Lieven and Hulsman (2016) have recently shown such a case. But it is unclear if these kinds of assertions are part and parcel of realism or just highlight the genre's shortcomings as a whole (for more on the latter, see Carr 1939).

While realpolitik and the limited pursuit of national interest are frequently linked to realism, realism also addresses the establishment of a stable international order. The safety and stability of the communities that comprise it depend on the existence of such an order. Gvosdev contends that communitarian concern in creating a workable global infrastructure connects with realism's emphasis on making the world's states... partners in a stable and predictable international order (2015: 1593; see also Wesley 2015). But perhaps more completely developed are the ethics related to this in the pluralist notion of an international society, which is discussed in the next section.

Pluralism: Ethics of Coexistence

Communitarians see the varied ways in which people are produced in other cultures as positive things in and of themselves since they respect community and variety. They contend that the ideal code of ethics values variation above uniformity. The concept of pluralism fits well with this point of view. The universalism of cosmopolitan visions is contrasted by pluralists with the notion of a diverse world where each society seeks its definition of the ideal life. This is the world that pluralist anti-cosmopolitans foresee and defend. There are several ways to convey pluralism. There may be disparity between statist, non-statist, and nationalist pluralism. Their concern to preserve and uphold the customs of already-established groups, as well as their orientation toward the pre-existing group and propensity to assign each individual a primary identity within a single community of descent, are what unites them (Hollinger 2022: 231). Communitarians contend that any imposition of universal standards is a loss of integrity or group autonomy and that specific norms and cultures should be maintained and preserved.

According to pluralists like David Miller and Michael Walzer, it is unfair to argue that "strong" or "thick" cosmopolitanism necessitates the universalization of a certain account of what is

good as well as the supremacy of specific understandings and "shared ways of life." According to Walzer, justice is found in preserving the various moral "spheres" in which people engage in their daily lives. Justice is based on a unique knowledge of locations, honors, jobs, and several other items that make up a common way of life, according to Walzer (1983: 314). To behave unfairly is (always) to subvert their understandings. Imposing a single universal norm is bad because it pushes individuals to adhere to standards they may not share and penalizes them for breaking them. It is also unjustified because there is no such standard. However, the anti-cosmopolitan argument cannot work in the absence of a conviction in human equality, even when this ideal is articulated within the framework of the "thick" national communities in which we are raised. One way to argue that we can only be free within the framework of our national community is through the demand for national self-determination. According to Kymlicka (2011), equality must be interpreted as serving the interests of individual members of communities while also ensuring equality amongst them. Differentiation and identity are how equality and humanity are conveyed, according to communitarians. Being a human means having a culture, and identifying with one's community of origin or belonging means belonging to a group smaller than the species. Therefore, preserving and acknowledging these cultural variations is the method to achieve this aim. In this regard, Walzer contends that it is a global responsibility to acknowledge other cultures as distinct but equal.

Pluralism and Nationalism

The idea that all people are members of a nation and that this society has unique rights regarding our moral responsibilities is known as nationalism. It is probably the common notion that most people have. It undoubtedly supports the global political system, as seen by the concepts of national sovereignty, national self-determination, and the United Nations. Nonetheless, nationalism and communitarianism are not synonymous. Nationalism and communitarianism coexist side by side, and communitarianism does not always identify the country as an important community. Communities of a religious, subnational, or other kind may have just as much, if not more, influence than the country. However, nationalism is perhaps the most prevalent political manifestation of communitarian ideals.

The majority of nationalism narratives that deal with international relations present a pluralistic picture of nation-states. Miller compares this to the liberal cosmopolitan viewpoint, which he says "implies a world state with a single homogenous citizenry and single distributive scheme" (2012: 976). This cannot be reconciled with "a world of diversity in which each community's

unique national cultures find expression in its own sets of citizenship rights and social justice schemes" (Miller 2012). Nationalism's defenders define the country as the community that allows for the expression of universal principles like justice, liberty, and equality. In that they understand the state using Herderian rather than Hegelian ideas, a large number of nationalist and anti-cosmopolitan writers today appear to work within the spirit but not the letter of Hegelian thinking. Rather than an Enlightenment perspective centered on reason, freedom, and individuality, the Herderian state is more in line with a romantic understanding of the interplay between community, culture, and tradition. In fact, if not in theory, modern communitarians prefer to associate the state with the community. They also support individuality, but they do so by defending the national and cultural origins of it rather than the state as the defender of freedom and individualism. Compared to communitarians like MacIntyre and Walzer, Mervyn Frost, for instance, is far more Hegelian (Frost 1996, 2012). David Miller underlines that our cultural frameworks are derived from our national links and makes a distinction between the nation and the state (Miller 1995). Because of this, he is more like Herder than Hegel. What they do have in common is the belief that, to the extent that moral principles exist, nation-states should enforce them domestically, and only under extraordinary circumstances abroad (such as genocide, for example).

Nationalists differ in their opinions regarding the obligations that nations have to one another. They disagree with "global egalitarianism" and "liberal cosmopolitanism," but they do not want to forsake moral universals altogether. Both David Miller and Will Kymlicka defend the country in liberal terms, emphasizing individual liberties and rights, but they also acknowledge the cultural presumptions required to ensure adherence to those ideals. Basic individual rights are more important to liberal nationalists than communal identification, yet they can only be fulfilled within national communities (Miller 2010: 181). According to Kymlicka (2011), nationalism is not an alternative to cosmopolitanism; rather, it is a counterbalance to it. Although David Miller acknowledges that all states have a universal need to protect fundamental human rights and ensure the welfare of their citizens, his defense of nationalism is less beholden to liberalism and is thus more antagonistic to liberal cosmopolitanism (Miller 1995, 2017). The right to self-determination is viewed by nationalists as a positive universal good, and as such, there is a duty to promote national self-determination in other nations as well as one's own. While nationalism may, of course, lead to a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between nations (such as Nazism in its most extreme manifestations), modern

nationalists typically stress equality between nations. The next section's notion of natural duties similarly expresses the nation's identity as the medium for moral universalism.

Rawls's Non-Statist Pluralism

Though Rawls is well known for his Theory of Justice (1972), he produced The Law of Peoples (1999) as the most intellectually robust description of a non-statist pluralist ethics. As was previously said, several cosmopolitan thinkers have modified the idea of justice for use in global contexts. But Rawls himself objected to and condemned this action. According to him, the philosophy of justice must be predicated on a contemplative balance that already exists between opposing basic doctrines or on an overlapping consensus of fundamental values that allow egalitarian principles to cohere. According to Rawls (1999), the absence of reflective equilibrium and overlapping agreement in the international arena made a global justice system both unfeasible and undesirable. Furthermore, Rawls supported the communitarian claim that moral universalism is difficult since the idea of the moral person, which forms the basis of his theory, is not undisputed.

The contractors are logical people in the first scenario (Rawls 1972). But when it comes to the international sphere, he contends that there should be another contractual session where the norms are selected by representatives of just peoples. The representatives of the peoples are not provided with any information on their population's housing patterns, the amount of natural resources they own, their income or wealth, or their relative prosperity to other societies during this second round of negotiations. This second round's agreement is a contract that, for the most part, follows the customs of international society and diplomacy. These consist of the principles of non-intervention, reciprocal recognition, just war, self-determination, and so on. Stated differently, contractors formulate coexistence rules at the international level rather than justice rules, even if Rawls contends that they are akin to the fundamental principle, which is that all people have the same, free, and equal rights. Though there are restrictions on the potential for a global community depending on the presence or absence of a common language or culture, these restrictions are not unachievable. According to Rawls (1972: 114), there are three basic or "natural" duties that all people have: "the duty to help another when he (sic) is in need or jeopardy provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself (mutual aid); the duty not to harm or injure another... [and] the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering."

'Support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us... [and] to promote just arrangements not yet constituted' was another obligation (1972: 115). In Rawls' view, these

inherent obligations are universal to all people and exist outside of whatever social compact we may be a member of as well as any personal moral or ethical pledges we may have made (for further debate, see Kokaz 2017). Furthermore, Rawls contended that there is no mutual benefit system in the international sphere. His controversial theory was that communities or governments should be viewed as essentially self-sufficient, with very little morally significant contact. Societies should be seen in a vacuum, as though their interactions with one another are negligible and their webs of interdependence just bind them together loosely. Therefore, a theory of international legitimacy and coexistence—a "law of peoples" that addresses norms of cohabitation between liberal and other good peoples—rather than a theory of justice is the most that can be hoped for. The following are the guidelines for global cohabitation proposed by Rawls in The Law of Peoples (1999):

Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.

Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.

Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.

Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.

Peoples are to honor human rights.

Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.

Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (mutual aid).

Natural obligations inform the narrative of mutual help here, even if he does not address them in The Law of Peoples (Kokaz 2017). The sole purpose of mutual help is to allow people to grow and enjoy a well-ordered society. It's unclear if this is required because everyone deserves a well-ordered society or because it permits a functional modus vivendi, which is essential for liberal societies to continue being well-ordered. According to Kokaz, Rawls defends mutual help as a prerequisite for sociability, saying that without it, societies—even societies of peoples—cannot exist (Kokaz 2017). Though representatives of decent societies can agree on mutual assistance, they are not obligated to or able to agree on global equality or distributive justice principles. The presence of natural responsibilities begs the obvious question: how can

communitarian premises be used to sustain even this modest moral universalism? To address this question, there are two potential sources. The first is the natural law tradition, and the second is Immanuel Kant's writings. One of the primary lineages of international political philosophy, according to David Boucher (1998), is the concept of natural law, from which the idea of natural responsibilities may have originated. Boucher claims that the best way to categorize normative thinking in international relations is to separate it into three categories: historical reason, universal moral order (natural law), and empirical realism. Boucher's classifications offer a valuable supplement to the cosmopolitan/anti-cosmopolitan paradigm, as they enable us to emphasize an additional facet of anti-cosmopolitan ideas that do not stem directly from Herder and Hegel's assumptions.

Boucher claims that the notion of a universal moral order is expressed in natural law theory. By applying reason, natural law theory seeks to identify a set of universal moral principles or laws that apply to all people (see also Nardin 2022b). A "belief in a cosmic, moral constitution, appropriate to all conscious things, a system of eternal and immutable principles radiating from a source that transcends earthly power" is what Martin Wight refers to as natural law (Wight 1991: 14). The concept of natural law seeks to define universally applicable moral standards. Cultural variations, according to proponents of natural law theory, do not preclude the establishment of a universal moral code. These fundamental moral precepts are substantial and obligatory despite their inevitable thinness.

The list of natural laws generally includes the freedoms of trade, travel, private property rights, mutual aid, and, most importantly, not harm. Certain versions of natural law theory stress individual responsibilities and rights while incorporating certain cosmopolitan ideas; in other versions, natural law transforms into a statist code of cohabitation. Although Kant's cosmopolitanism undoubtedly represents the cosmopolitan end of the spectrum, Samuel Pufendorf is frequently recognized as the pinnacle of the statist tradition (Devetak 2017). In terms of thick and thin cosmopolitanism, Walzer has defended his "minimal moral universalism." Mutual help, or something akin to it, may be distinguished "in different times and places... even though (it is) expressed in different idioms and reflects different histories and different versions of the world," according to one argument made in support of this defense (Walzer 1994: 17). On other instances, meanwhile, Walzer has directly cited Rawls's idea that there is "one positive moral duty" that transcends national boundaries about natural responsibilities (see Walzer 1981, 2013b). Conversely, Miller argues for his more nuanced concepts of fundamental human rights and a minimal global "humanitarianism" based on what

he refers to as an "empirical" basis in human need and suffering (Miller 2017). Walzer, Miller, Jackson, and others may argue that their support for mutual help stems from natural law.

Rather than relying on natural law, Rawls himself advocated mutual help as one of his natural obligations, although he did so on broadly Kantian reasons. According to Rawls, the categorical imperative (CI) and the natural obligation of mutual help are compatible, and Rawls even acknowledges that Kant is attempting to rationally support the earlier natural law premise. Kant supported it on the grounds of human reason rather than the ability to feel pain:

as a person's true needs are those which must be met if he is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end- setting agent. Respecting the humanity of others involves acknowledging the duty of mutual aid: one must be prepared to support the conditions of the rationality of others (their capacity to set and act for ends) when they are unable to do so without help. The duty to develop (not neglect) one's talents and the duty of mutual aid are thus duties of respect for persons (Herman 1984: 597).

Herman contends that Rawls draws his mutual help principle from the original position and seeks a different foundation than Kant. Under the cover of ignorance, contractors would concur on this rule and, once more, from logical interest calculations, apply it to non-contractors. As a result, Rawls contends that the idea of mutual help applies to all people and is universal beyond national boundaries. The concept of natural responsibilities derives directly from Kantian arguments rather than communitarian premises if we accept Kantian premises as the foundation for Rawls's natural duties rather than natural law. Therefore, when Rawls and later communitarians like Walzer speak of natural responsibilities, they are speaking, if not explicitly, of Kantian moral universalism. Even if cosmopolitan principles are not completely developed or institutionalized, Rawls's inclusion of cosmopolitan aspects like human rights and natural obligations strengthens the argument in favor of including them as the cornerstones of international order. Because of this, some opponents of his Law of Peoples have written it off as merely another kind of cosmopolitanism or liberal imperialism (see Jackson 2015; Mouffe 2016). Liberal cosmopolitans have criticized Rawls, arguing that he is not liberal enough and that it is conceivable to take his account global in a manner that he is not prepared to. The Law of Peoples by Rawls is in line with his earlier Theory of Justice explanation. Beitz may be right when he says that the international sphere lacks an overlapping consensus, but the sphere is nevertheless sufficiently linked to qualify as a system of social cooperation. Consequently, Rawls aims to provide a liberal account of justice that they may accept without completely

liberalizing the international system and going against the liberal ideal of plurality and toleration. In this sense, a moral liberal state does not need to globalize its understanding of distributive justice and should not attempt to do so. Therefore, despite the presence of certain cosmopolitan aspects, Rawls's overall position is anti-cosmopolitan because, as Wenar (2023: 3) contends, people cannot be the center of a global theory in an environment of plurality and anarchy.

Pluralism and Statism: The International Society of States

Writings from the English school (see Linklater and Suganami 2016) and Terry Nardin (1983), part of the international society tradition of statist pluralism, are heavily referenced in Rawls's list of liberal duties to foreign states. Two manifestations of communitarian ethics that concentrate on the cultural or sociological level are nationalism and the law of peoples. The political manifestation of these concepts is the goal of statist pluralism.

As we have seen, non-statist pluralism does not always equate the state, which is viewed as an administrative organization that rules but doesn't always represent or embody the customs and beliefs of a political community, with the political or cultural community. This perspective separates the state analytically from the country (Miller 1995), peoples (Rawls 1999), or just the political community (Walzer 1983). There are several justifications for drawing this kind of differentiation. The most apparent is that no state represents a particular country or people. While this may be true analytically, most observers contend that in the political sphere, it is absurd to discuss political communities in the modern era without mentioning the state since it has come to represent the only acceptable form of political association. The Grotian view that states create an international society rather than merely an international system expresses anti-cosmopolitan pluralism in its statist form (see Bull 1966, 1977). Statist pluralists contend that states and the society of states are the appropriate entities to mediate any commitments to mankind.

Although several anti-cosmopolitan writers, like Walzer and Miller, fall under Boucher's historical reason category (Hegelianism), their views on the ethics of global society are "Grotian" or pluralist. For instance, Walzer (1977) seems to support a statist interpretation of international law in his discussion of just war. The dichotomy between pluralist and solidarity theories of international society and the statist pluralist argument is the most pertinent for our purposes. According to Terry Nardin (1983), "those who are associated with one another, if at all, only in respecting certain restrictions on how each may pursue his purposes" make up the

society of states, which he describes as a "practical" affiliation (Nardin 1983: 9). Rules of engagement, or "a set of considerations to be taken into account in deciding and acting," are among the topics covered by this form of association, which also includes the rule of law and standards of behavior (Nardin 1983: 6). Purposive associations, on the other hand, are focused on achieving shared objectives, much like a labor union could. For this distinction, Nardin (1983) himself refers to Michael Oakeshott's work. "The nature of international society is such that all-inclusive association can only be practical," according to Nardin's pluralist ethics (1983: 215). The goal of such an association is simply to maintain the boundaries between the numerous purposeful associations. The Treaty of Westphalia and the creation of the society of independent nations occurred precisely because the Catholic Church's authority was under question and the global moral consensus of Christendom was beginning to break apart. According to Bull, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was a cohabitation agreement intended to prevent disagreements about the validity of the Church's temporal position from breaking down.

Solidarism, another term for what Nardin termed a purposeful international society, is opposed to pluralism in international society. Solidarism differs from pluralism in that it sets higher norms for acceptable tolerance and goes beyond the ethics of sheer tolerance (see Bull 1966). Because it conditions sovereignty on how people are treated, solidarity has aspects of cosmopolitan ethics (Nardin 1983; Brown 1992). The application of human rights in diplomacy is viewed with skepticism by pluralists since it allows certain governments to deny others their sovereignty (Jackson 2020), however humanitarian intervention in times of crisis that transgress the "conscience of humankind" may occasionally be justified (Walzer 1977, 2014). Any cooperative activity amongst the sovereign independent members of international society necessitates a high degree of consensus because there is no centralized law enforcement in this society. Effective action on matters like the censure of South Africa's apartheid state was only feasible when such a consensus was reached (Bull 1983). States do not, however, generally reach this kind of unanimity. This viewpoint maintains that any claim to universal morality is questionable insofar as there isn't a true moral agreement in global society. International society members find it challenging to act in unison when they disagree on important normative or ethical issues. Attempts to create a more united world where human rights are upheld and humanitarian action is formalized are met with resistance from pluralists. Pluralists, on the other hand, believe that tolerance for diversity in culture is necessary. If we owe anything to those living outside of our boundaries on a global scale, it would be to abstain from forcing our

values—whether they be ethical, cultural, or conceptual—on them. According to this perspective, sovereignty is an ethical precept rather than merely a means of coexisting amongst nations and the many cultures they include. Similarly, because universal distributive justice necessitates imposing a particular, typically liberal, understanding of justice on other cultures, pluralism does not support it as a viable option or as a morally acceptable ideal in and of itself. Pluralists argue that rather than creating a universal theory of justice, the statesman's principal ethical duty is to preserve peace and order among nations.

Because there is not a strong enough international consensus to support it and because acting as though there were would weaken international society's ability to uphold order, pluralists are hesitant to undo the compact of coexistence by subjecting states to scrutiny for their human rights records. According to Bull (1977: 157), "the rules of coexistence serve to maintain order in an international society in which a consensus does not exist about much else besides these rules." Beyond cohabitation, a solidaristic international society upholds common objectives including justice, the defense of human rights, and the use of force when necessary to further these objectives. The extent to which they represent a consensus among its members will determine whether or not international society can advance in a solidaristic path (Bull 1977; Wheeler and Dunne 1996; Nardin 2022a). Bull contended that:

> the interests of order are not served . . . if in the situation in which no such consensus actually exists and the international society is divided into contending groups, one of these groups claims to represent the consensus and act as if it does . . . the result is that the traditional rules which assume a lack of consensus are undermined (1977: 157).

Thus, the best moral responses to normative disagreement and cultural variety are sovereignty and pluralism. While acknowledging that nations have various ethical systems, pluralism allows governments to come to an agreement on a set of limited damage principles, accept one another, and refrain from imposing their own opinions on others. This is known as the "egg box" model of international society, according to R. J. Vincent (1986), who stated that "the general function of international society is to separate and cushion, not to act." States recognize in international society that national conceptions of the good are not always the same and, more crucially, that independence from unwarranted external influence can only be ensured by a contract of coexistence between these conflicting ideas. International society is therefore the way that several distinct civilizations preserve their uniqueness. They can proceed with their work in a comparatively calm and relatively safe manner as a result.

According to the pluralist perspective, states have duties, not private citizens. According to the pluralist perspective, this is a moral society where people create rules and regulations to direct one another's behavior. States have an international social compact, often known as a covenant (see Bull 1979; Frost 1996; and Jackson 2020). Sovereignty is undoubtedly the most significant of these accords. State, sovereignty, and international law constitute the proper moral domain and ethical lexicon. Members of international society are morally obligated by sovereignty to respect one another's independence, refrain from going to war with one another, and preserve and protect the norms of international society. However, as states are the contractors, only states are subject to these requirements. Nowadays, very few pluralist authors advocate for purely coexisting ethics, and the majority agree that human rights ought to be included in the standards of global society. Human rights, for example, are seen by Mervyn Frost (1996) as fundamental to an ethical society of states, by Robert Jackson (2020) as part of his description of a pluralist international society, and by John Rawls as the foundation of the liberal "law of peoples." While he initially describes international society as a regime of toleration and occasionally supports the "morality of states" (2019), Michael Walzer later argues in a work published in 1994 that "We can (and should) defend some minimal understanding of human rights and seek its universal enforcement" (though this statement contradicts his earlier argument above). Similarly, Miller makes a compelling argument for a universal minimum standard predicated on the realization of fundamental rights (2017).

However, doubts about moral advancement, a normative defense of the status quo, and the idea that people are divided into distinct political and moral groups ultimately bind anti-cosmopolitans. Those who are anti-cosmopolitan oppose any attempts to change the global political system to make it more consistent with universalist theories. It follows that there is no need to institutionalize cosmopolitan ideals within the present international system or to change the current world order in the manner that cosmopolitans foresee since moral universalism is both mistaken and harmful. Regarding international ethics, the traditions covered in this chapter include, at most, a responsibility to uphold order, act based on natural obligation, and minimal or fundamental rights.

Problems with Anti-Cosmopolitanism

The state of international anarchy, the difficulties with normative pluralism in practice, and the defense of variety put out by anti-cosmopolitans make a strong argument against cosmopolitanism and in favor of particularist ideals. The anti-cosmopolitan traditions of

realism and pluralism, drawing on communitarian critiques of liberalism, offer several crucial remarks about the boundaries of universalism in the global arena. Communitarian criticisms show that many universalist narratives, particularly liberalism, depend on dubious premises and methods of reasoning. A true global morality cannot be founded on the problematic and too substantive liberal explanation of agency, which presents a homogenous and idealized view of human nature. Similarly, it does seem that some universalisms are "hostile" to or incompatible with substantive moral/cultural heterogeneity. It would seem that prevailing over competing conceptions of fairness is necessary for the universalization of a Rawlsian account of justice, as conceived by Beitz or Moellendorf. The accusation of apathy towards the many definitions of the good has some merit when it comes to the anti-cosmopolitan criticism of liberal cosmopolitanism.

However, it is arguable whether these facts cast doubt on cosmopolitanism as a whole, as many particularists contend. The urge to reject homogeneity and recognize the diversity of moral cosmologies is the central feature of the communitarian criticism of cosmopolitanism. In response, cosmopolitans should consider whether or not these principles supersede universal obligations to the individual and if they are inherently or simply partially at odds with universalism. Pluralism and anti-cosmopolitanism have several shortcomings, according to cosmopolitans. Reason is trusted by cosmopolitans, particularly liberal cosmopolitans, to give objective—or at the very least, well-founded—accounts of ethics and morality. This lends credibility to the cosmopolitan account and eventually validates its universality. Both communitarianism and pluralism require a framework of universalism to make sense.

Communitarians also assert several fundamental truths, the most significant of which is that culture, which is the wellspring of ethics and identity, provides meaning. This discovery leads communitarians to contend that it is important to protect and maintain various cultures. Pluralists are unable to support this argument, though, unless they violate or significantly give up some of their arguments on the nature of moral knowledge and accept some universalist tenets, such as equality or the significance of protecting diverse cultures everywhere. That is, authors like Miller, Walzer, and Frost all tend to assert certain basic truths about the objectivity or veracity of their communitarian viewpoint, even in light of the relativistic implication of the communitarian position that norms are culturally dependent. As per Cochran's (1999: 16) argument, communitarians act "as if their weak foundations yield non-contingent ethical claims"—that is, even when they assert weak foundations, they rationalize as though they are strong. Anti-cosmopolitans act as though their claim that it is never appropriate to ignore

certain understandings is unquestionable, universally valid, and defensible. Should this be the case, then the argument against cosmopolitanism is similarly culturally specific and cannot be considered universal; it cannot be considered valid in a moral or trans-historical sense. So why should cosmopolitans acknowledge the universal importance of its arguments?

At this point, the crucial issue to address is: What claim to truth can any ethics make? Is it feasible to offer solid guidelines for making moral decisions as well as for making decisions inside decisions? The reasons offered for the anti-cosmopolitan concessions to universalism are either extremely flimsy or, worse, in direct opposition to other premises in their arguments. This raises another query: why not more universalism if some is acceptable? Once universalism is accepted, the responses to this can only be pragmatic; that is, they can only be based on statements that are contingent rather than absolute. How can communitarians support any form of universalism if it violates communal priorities? What grounds do communitarians have for accepting natural obligations or minimal human rights? Is it a result of prior agreements about these rights? If this is the case, communitarians are acquiescing to the possibility of reaching a consensus among all people. If so, communitarians need to be prepared to defend their position against the need for more consensus. Why is it impossible to claim that no one should be denied the freedom to express their mind or the ability to marry the person of their choice if it is acceptable to assert that no one should be refused the right to exist, to shelter, or the most fundamental principles of human decency? (Miller 2017 is an example in that he does offer a clear stance on these particular issues, albeit one that gives cosmopolitanism a lot of leeway). The strongest argument used by communitarians is that these concerns are now unresolved. This just raises the issue, though: why not create or work toward such a consensus?

One such critique of pluralists is that they reify communities. Regardless of the level of government, communitarians or pluralists believe that variety does not exist (or is at least controlled) inside communities and that communities are generally cohesive. Communities are often viewed by pluralists as unique, biological entities that are distinct from one another. The reason this is paradoxical is because communitarians and pluralists both criticize cosmopolitans for idealizing humanity and ignoring certain individuals. However, pluralists frequently overlook specifics, downplay the existence of conflict within communities, and downplay the historical ways in which the so-called consensus or shared norms of political groups are dependent on historical dominance or absorption. Pluralists cannot explain how disagreement inside a community differs substantively from disagreement across communities. Similarly, why should dominance and assimilation be accepted "within" groups if they are detrimental to

relationships between communities? Only if pluralists believe that the national state is unique can they successfully argue their position. However, no equivalent argument is available for many other less Hegelian pluralists. Walzer and Rawls speak about individuals and communities as if states don't exist or even matter. Nevertheless, the strongest form of communal connection in recorded history is the national state, which still exists today.

One reason for the pluralist idealization of the national state is the widespread incapacity and reluctance to confront the reality of interdependence among communities. Here, there's an empirical and normative argument to be stated. The first empirical finding is that communities are becoming more intricately entwined with one another. This implies that it is more difficult to define communities as "autarkic." However, this is exactly what Rawlsian theorists want (again, Miller is an exception to this; see his 2017). Communities are treated as though they are self-sufficient by many anti-cosmopolitans. This is problematic in two ways. Treating communities as if they were self-sufficient leads to an unwillingness to address the effects that communities have on one another since communities are not cohesive solitary identities. One of the most serious shortcomings of pluralist explanations is this. Communities cannot be accepted as autarkic or as not-influenced outsiders, even if we believe that they are essentially distinct in identity. For example, the process of drawing a nation-state's borders frequently has an impact on those who live outside of them. Therefore, communitarians must consider what duties, if any, the members of these communities have to outsiders given that the majority of governments participate in international trade and business, travel, and other activities. Nevertheless, many pluralists minimize these moral or ethical duties, as we have looked at in this paper. For example, Rawls's Law of Peoples offers little to no help when considering the morality of economic development or even global warming when domestic activity has a significant influence on people living outside national borders.

If pluralists are to be believed, they must either maintain that states ought to try to minimize their interactions with one another or that economics is outside the purview of morality. Additionally, communitarian ethics provide a right of isolation from external pressures. groups that limit access to these groups have the right to preserve their identity. It is implied that virtually all interactions with non-members of the community would be detrimental to it. This includes interactions with outsiders that we may locally view as advantageous to our community, such as commerce or exposure to another's culture via media like books, TV, or movies. This line of reasoning is consistent with realist conceptions of interdependence as a source of conflict rather than a means of resolving it. It follows that pluralists emphasize states'

rights but not their obligations because of this reification of communities (again, Miller has done the most to remedy this imbalance). Buchannan (2020) described Rawls's Law of Peoples as "rules for a vanishing Westphalian world" because of this. Reality has surpassed pluralists in that the universe they uphold is no more. They argue that pluralism's "reality"-based foundation contrasts with cosmopolitanism's idealism, which leads to specific issues, yet pluralists' notion of reality is debatable. In this spirit, proponents of cosmopolitanism and solidarity contend that a rigid code of cohabitation is not only antiquated but also potentially detrimental, given the exponential rise in the potential for harm between communities brought about by globalization and interconnectivity (Hurrell 2017). The majority of cosmopolitans contend that in the context of globalization, an "egg box" ethics is insufficient.

Most notably, pluralists prefer to grant the community control over individuals even as they protect individual interests by standing up for their participation in groups. Does the freedom to associate with a group imply that the rights of the group may supersede those of the individual, permitting actions and policies that cause injury to people? According to pluralists, the society's collective right to self-determination, not the individual rights of women, is what matters in this situation if the community believes that women are second-class citizens with limited rights and responsibilities. In this instance, the group takes precedence over the individual. Put another way, there are situations in which societies as a whole—rather than specific people—are the pertinent or even fundamental topic of morality. It is an obvious inference even if this assumption is not usually made explicit in anti-cosmopolitan literature. For instance, Walzer (1983) accepts the moral superiority of the society over the individual in the context of supreme emergency, non-combatant immunity, and refugee situations. When pluralists contend that people are best benefited by communal standards, even if such rules are not acknowledged by the community as bearers of equal moral worth, they are putting themselves in a difficult position. A good illustration of this is the status of women in various cultures (see Nussbaum 1995 for an insightful discussion). Implicitly, pluralists deprive women worldwide of hope when they attempt to question cultural norms that injure women or deny them equal moral attention. Communitarianism suggests that women in those societies should accept their situation if they lack the means to argue otherwise. Furthermore, communitarians are unable to show how that community may effectively support those women (Nussbaum 2017; Nussbaum & Glover 1995; Nardin 2022b). Naturally, it is this stance that finally distinguishes cosmopolitans from anti-cosmopolitans.

Cosmopolitans are unable to concede that there are situations in which the community should take precedence over the individual. Cosmopolitanism holds that as the individual is both the moral subject and the moral agent, they should be the center of moral concern. The argument that individual rights cannot supersede those of the collective must logically imply that the individual would benefit more from the override, as the community's worth can only be found in how beneficial it is to each member. If this foundation were not there, we may end up tolerating all kinds of misery and injury because it is what the community supports or represents a right to collective self-determination. Along with the notion of impartiality, cosmopolitan philosophy has the benefit of shielding people from mistreatment by members of their own culture.

Conclusion

The Greek Stoic philosopher Diogenes is often recorded as saying, "I am a citizen of the world," in response to the question of which city he belonged to, long before modern governments and telecommunications were invented. Nussbaum cites Diogenes' position as the model of international thought. According to Nussbaum, Diogenes disapproved of the customs prevalent in his era, which held that the polis served as the epicenter of moral and political life. Nussbaum (1996) explains that he meant that he saw himself as a human being first and foremost, rather than as a Spartan, Greek, or even Athenian. Diogenes' position was expanded from one that supported skepticism and apathy to one that addressed convention and materialistic worries. Diogenes was also well-known for demonstrating his apathy by living in a barrel. This also meant that Diogenes was banished or treated as an outcast within his society. Diogenes had no "home" per se; he was a citizen of the world, but he also had no "home" in the traditional sense (for the complete history of Diogenes' position in Greek thinking and his cosmopolitanism, see Baldry 1965).

According to the detractors, Diogenes's estrangement from society is precisely what makes him a bad exemplar and cosmopolitanism an unappealing moral perspective. Being a global citizen, or cosmopolitan, means you are somewhat cut off from the polis, or community, which is where moral and ethical life occurs. Because its appeal to a universal stance necessitates the rejection of the very things that we need to live a decent life, our culture and society, the appeal to Diogenes, for its opponents, stands for all that is wrong with the cosmopolitan position. Numerous individuals find cosmopolitanism to be unappealing due to these and other objections. Above all, they are to blame for the conflation of imperialism with

cosmopolitanism. Many opponents believe that the universalism of justification in cosmopolitanism is subordinated to or greater than its universalism of scope. Because cosmopolitanism is predicated on ideas that may not be shared by all those it affects, it cannot be said to have successfully defended moral universalism of scope or justification. In attempting to outline some of the fundamental features of cosmopolitan philosophy, this paper has focused on the nature of moral universals and the foundation for asserting the universal breadth of cosmopolitanism across a variety of cultures. After going over the most significant objections to cosmopolitan moral universalism, this paper aims to present a reworded version of the main cosmopolitan arguments that both address and refute the most fundamental complaints.

One of nationalism's most significant critiques is that, to paraphrase Voltaire, it turns its supporters into "the enemy of humankind." This kind of challenge is what communitarianism poses to cosmopolitans. Are we not doomed to become the enemies of humanity if we adopt their moral epistemology and ontology? The task facing cosmopolitanism is to uphold a type of moral universalism that can take this acknowledgment into account, while the task facing anti-cosmopolitanism is to make room for the valid demands of universalism to prevent us from turning against one another. The problems that arise from attempting to establish a global moral domain in a setting where universalism is either disputed or nonexistent must be addressed in any defense of cosmopolitan ethics. The presence of ethical plurality implies that we cannot presume that others would behave according to our ethical principles, whether between ourselves or in other relationships. Stated differently, we cannot presume to possess a universal moral and ethical system.

Furthermore, a global society governed by universally accepted norms cannot exist if morally significant characteristics—like the ability to engage in "rationality"—cannot be found in any human being. It is important to note, however, that a variety of theories of moral universalism and cosmopolitanism have been developed from communitarian premises; one need not always conclude against cosmopolitanism (see, for example, Kung 1990; Etzioni 2014; Shapcott 2011). According to all of these interpretations, as long as moral universals are formed dialogically, their contextual beginnings do not preclude their formation, development, and even agreement. It is important to remember that acting morally is challenging, not that universalism is unachievable while considering the communitarian argument. Normative pluralism undoubtedly makes it more difficult to create and uphold rules, as well as to feel sure in the morality of one's judgments, but it does not make these tasks impossible. In a similar

vein, a lot of us individually presume that we share certain ideals with certain people but not others. This often indicates that we accept variety or that we try to comprehend the viewpoint of others before acting or making judgments about them. The starkest illustration of this in modern Western cultures is the contrast between orthodox Islamic customs and secular liberal norms, particularly concerning women. The idea that we should treat individuals ethically and our ethical responsibilities are not seen to be absolved by the existence of differences; rather, it only renders these concepts and obligations more nuanced and open to discussion and revision.

Put another way, in the context of the preceding discussion, ethical behavior is questioned but not refuted, even in circumstances when not everyone concurs that all individuals (like women in the aforementioned example) should be treated equally. We may envision a scenario in which, despite our recognition and treatment of them as equals, a slave would feel that they are not. Regardless matter what they think, we would feel guilty about treating them unfairly. However, we would also have to take into consideration the slave's living circumstances; if we encouraged them to behave as if they were free, they may be punished. However, this would not absolve us of our moral need to treat the slave with respect, even if it means terminating their servitude. The idea is that, for those of us who care about upholding moral standards, the presence of others who have other moral standards does not automatically mean that we should give up and assume that we are no longer obligated to treat them with respect, i.e., as ends in and of themselves. It simply implies that it becomes more challenging to treat someone fairly. For states, the same idea or conceptual framework is applicable. Even though it calls for a more delicate handling of the issues, the fact that others may not share our understanding of human rights or our foreign policy objectives does not absolve us of the duty to pursue human rights as our own ethical goals if we believe in them and incorporate them into our foreign policy goals (see, for example, Brown 2012).

All things considered, the thesis of anti-cosmopolitanism is that it promotes a justifiable concern for moral and ethical variety as well as the understanding that various standards apply in different contexts. It is better to interpret this critique, nevertheless, as a correction to cosmopolitanism rather than a rejection of its main tenets. As we have seen, anti-cosmopolitan pluralism draws on the moral universalism of natural obligations while also resting on its universal underpinnings. Furthermore, ethics in the modern globalized world must rely on a wider range of sources than those offered by "communitarianism" and anti-cosmopolitanism. The anti-cosmopolitan invocation of natural responsibilities tacitly acknowledges this. As soon

as this argument is made, we are talking about a cosmopolitan discourse. The institutional framework of international ethics, as well as the scope and character of responsibilities to help and not damage, are all called into question by the recognition of natural duties. Due to the lack of theoretical resources in the anti-cosmopolitan framework, questions about such tasks are best analyzed from a cosmopolitan perspective. The ontological, moral, and epistemological defenses of both cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism were briefly discussed in this paper.

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