A Critical Analysis of the Politics of Violent Conflict and Post-Violent Conflict in Modern Africa

[1]Bimbo Ogunbanjo, Ph. D*
Department of Government
Lagos State University
School of Basic and Advanced Studies, Lagos, Nigeria
&
[2]Adebola Alade, Ph. D
Department of Politics and International Relations
Lead City University, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Abstract

Since the late 1990s, a clearer knowledge of the connections between the onset of violent conflict and underdeveloped or uneven growth has resulted from a stronger awareness of the relationship between conflict and development as well as between peace and development. Despite their potential to contribute to violence, developmental variables have been shown to both prevent or reduce violence and start the process of rebuilding after a conflict. This report provides some helpful information regarding African war and post-conflict issues. It examines African development through the prism of violent conflict, emphasizing both the ways in which conflict influences and is influenced by development. Before exploring the widely held belief that development is a crucial component of peacebuilding, this paper provides a short overview of both developmental and non-developmental explanations for violent conflict in Africa, namely intra-state combat. Then, it focusses on how development could react to violent conflict circumstances using the specific examples of peacekeeping and aid. This research concludes that violent intra-state disputes are likely to continue and cause misery across Africa due to a lack of knowledge about their intricate causes.

Keywords: Africa, Conflict, Post-Conflict, Violence, Intra-State Wars, Development.

Introduction

Africa is a rapidly changing continent. However, it remains a mystery place shrouded in myths and misconceptions for many. Despite possessing 14% of the world's population and over 20% of its land area, the 54 countries only made up 2.2% of global trade by value in 2020, compared

to 38.5% from Europe and 40.7% from Asia (Chijioke, 2021). Africa continues to be a marginalized continent in many ways. It is undeniable, however, that things are changing and will probably continue to change significantly in the near future. The early years of the twenty-first century have been dominated by economic development in China and India, which has greatly aided in the expansion of the middle class in Asia. Africa will undoubtedly be the continent to watch over the next 20 years and beyond, since there are indications that this may be occurring in several African countries despite sometimes questionable statistical data. Many African nations now have some of the greatest rates of economic development in the world, despite often starting from a poor foundation. Between 2010 and 2018, the average yearly GDP growth rates of thirteen African nations exceeded 6% (Chibundu & Chaba, 2022).

Sadly, despite significant advancements in democratic governance, healthcare, and education in a number of nations, Africa continues to be the world's poorest and least developed continent. Afghanistan is the only non-African nation to be listed among the "worst 20" in the United Nations' 2018 Human Development Report. The tragic fact that Swaziland, a small country in southern Africa with a high rate of HIV/AIDS, has the lowest life expectancy at birth in the world is 48.9 years, far less than the 83+ years of countries like Japan, Singapore, and Switzerland (Chijioke, 2021). Compared to Norway, where 2.6 babies per 1,000 died before turning five, Angola had the highest rate globally in 2017 (156.9).

However, we should be worried about more than just advancement and economic prosperity. The cultural heritage of Africa is still rich and varied. The origins of humanity, the amazing legacy of past civilizations, historic cities, and a diverse range of art, music, and literature. But a lot of people don't know about these qualities. This limited public understanding of Africa is largely due to sensationalized stories in the international media, which typically show a lack of knowledge about African countries and people and focus on 'newsworthy' topics like civil war, terrorism, famine, drought, desertification, and other man-made and natural disasters.

Given Africa's rapid transformation and enduring issues, it appears crucial to analyze African development through the lens of violent conflict at this time, emphasizing both the role of development in conflict and the effects of war on development. Since the late 1990s, a greater understanding of the relationships between conflict and development, as well as between peace and development, has led to an improvement in our understanding of the links between violent conflict and underdevelopment or unequal development (Collie, 2003; International Development Committee, 2006; Ademola et al. 2019). Research has shown that while

developmental variables can incite violence, they can also be useful in preventing or halting violence and initiating the process of reconstruction after a conflict (MacGint & Williamson, 2016). Scholars, legislators, and politicians today understand the importance of development in averting violence. However, policymakers, politicians, and scholars need to be aware of how development might contribute to violent conflict. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts increased, leading to the collapse of many African economies and a humanitarian disaster. For decades, countries like Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have been devastated by intra-state conflicts characterized by extreme violence and indiscriminate killings. In the first decade of the new millennium, more people died in conflict in Africa than in the entire world. The United Nations Development Program called it a "decade of despair" for Africa (UNDP, 2013).

This paper will analyze African growth through the lens of that continent's violent conflict, emphasizing how war affects development as well as how development contributes to conflict. Before diving into the conventional wisdom that development is an essential component of peace-building (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), the paper briefly reviews both developmental and non-developmental explanations for violent conflict in Africa, particularly intra-state wars. It then focuses on the role of development in responding to violent conflict situations using the particular examples of aid and peacekeeping. Using the genocide in Rwanda as a case study, the paper then looks at how development might make violence in Africa worse. In this case, several social processes related to growth produced conditions that made conflict harder to control and even unintentionally contributed to the increase in violence.

Grave and Pernicious Obstacles

Numerous grave and horrifying issues have been introduced to Africa throughout the last 55 years. Poverty is increasing, and the continent's economy is developing slowly and unevenly. According to the International Monetary Fund, by the end of 2021, the continent's GDP per capita is the lowest at US$1,809, while the global average is US$10,300 (IMF, 2021). Furthermore, there has been at least 80 violent regime changes since the 1960s, indicating that political instability is pervasive and continuous throughout Africa. From 1960 to 1989, coups were the most prevalent way to overthrow African governments; however, between 1990 and 2012, the number of coups drastically declined (Hyde & Musiliu, 2019).

Even though scholars disagree about how many armed conflicts are actually occurring in Africa at any given time, armed conflict nevertheless poses a significant threat to the continent. However, between 1980 and 1994, half of the world's war-hit countries were in Africa, with the four most seriously impacted countries being Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, and Somalia (DFID, 2001; Adebanji et al, 2020).

More major armed conflicts occurred on the African continent than anywhere else in the globe between 1999 and 2008. However, there was reason for optimism when over half of these wars were resolved by 2006, and the number of significant armed conflicts continued to decrease as the decade ended (Harbo & Wallenstee, 2009). International comparisons boosted hope and offered useful facts. Africa was responsible for over half of the world's major armed conflicts at the end of the twentieth century, but by the end of the first decade of the new millennium, it only accounted for one out of every five (HSRP, 2008). The optimism was short-lived, though, since studies show that organized violence has sharply increased throughout the continent since 2011, coinciding with a rise in violence against civilians. Significant new conflicts in Mali, South Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic were mostly to blame for this (Adebanji et al., 2020).

In contemporary Africa, violent war has claimed millions of lives, although the majority of these fatalities are not from wounds received in violent battle but rather from malnutrition and illnesses made worse by relocation. Nonetheless, violence claimed 8,300 lives in Sub-Saharan Africa in the first two months of 2015, with approximately 90% of those fatalities taking place in just five nations: Nigeria, Cameroon, Sudan, Niger, and Somalia. Boko Haram assaults on civilians and clashes between the Islamist organization and the military were the main causes of combat casualties in West Africa. Even though violence-related fatalities in Sub-Saharan Africa still accounted for 14,000 deaths in 2016, this is a considerable decrease from the 24,000 deaths that took place in 2015. But since 2015, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and Somalia have seen an increase in warfare that has led to previously unheard-of levels of displacement. According to Adebanji et al. (2020), fewer people perished in sub-Saharan Africa as a direct result of violence in 2016 because fewer people lost their lives in the Boko Harem battle, despite the group's ongoing relative strength.

Conflicts may be more common in Africa than anywhere else in the globe. Furthermore, unsolved disputes and rivalries sometimes continue after a cease-fire agreement is made, making the peace a temporary one that is not welcomed by the majority of parties (Human

Security Centre, 2005). The negotiated peace's total failure often leads to the signed peace agreements, continuing cycles of negotiations, unstable peace, and resumption of war. The crises in South Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia serve as prime examples of this, since numerous deals have failed to even provide the impression of a lasting peace. In addition to direct deaths and injuries, armed war also puts lives at risk through disease and famine brought on by displacement, as was previously mentioned. Violent conflict can devastate a country's infrastructure, healthcare, and educational systems, which hinders its potential to advance. African wars are estimated to have caused "far over $700 billion" in damage to the continent since 2000 alone (Williamson, 2016).

In both theory and practice, there are several conflict causation ideas that are hotly debated. Analysts who provide economic or development-related explanations for violent conflicts must also look at non-developmental reasons and how they interact with development-related variables since there are several factors that contribute to the formation of violent conflicts. Because there are so many different individuals, processes, and circumstances involved in conflict, it has been difficult to create a universal theory of conflict and conflict management. Evidence points to a wide range of conflict-causing factors, both in Africa and beyond, and the ways in which these factors interact vary according to the circumstances. Although there are primary and secondary causes of conflict, there are always multiple factors at work when a violent conflict erupts due to the complexity of human societies, economies, and politics. When examining any violent conflict, analysts face the challenging task of attempting to identify all the causes of conflict and determine the connections between those numerous characteristics. This is a difficult task because, like the state-sponsored militias in Darfur, actors may hide their genuine reasons or be too cautious to provide much information about them due to the conflict's public debate. Furthermore, the media's portrayals of African conflicts are occasionally simplistic, if not overtly biased. When the genocide in Rwanda became evident, the British media propagated the myth that the murders were driven by long-standing tribal enmity and depravity (Cam, 2013), ignoring the fact that important development issues played a major role in the carnage (as explained later in this paper). However, not just the media ignores how economics, poverty, development, and profit contribute to violent conflict.

Non-Development Causal Explanations for Conflict in Africa

Historical ideas, long-standing tribal animosities, and other non-economic or non-developmental explanations account for a large portion of the literature on conflict causes. The

corresponding fields of psychology (Tajfe, 1978), biology (Simme, 1955), religion (Appleby, 2000), ethnicity (Conno, 1994; Young, 2003; Ali & Henle, 2021, p. 37), the nature of the state (Tilly, 1985), cultural dysfunction (Kaplan, 1994), identity (Senel, 2006), and incompatible worldviews (Huntington, 1998) are used to promote conflict causation theories. Most conflict causation models consider economic factors to be secondary to the main causal factor.

Ethnicity is examined as a non-development causal aspect of violent intra-state conflict in a substantial body of research on conflict causation theories (Denn & Walte, 2014; Kelle, 2014; Cordel & Wolf, 2016). Ethnic warfare's primary goal is the eradication of specific people groups, which usually entails destroying the property and means of subsistence of the target communities. Conflicts between races and ethnic groups have a big influence on social systems. Analysts have concentrated on two opposing currents referred to as "ethnic fears" and "ethnic hatreds" (Fuji, 2011, p. 5). The "ethnic hatreds" approach is predicated on the idea that, in reaction to a shift in the situation, long-standing, mild hostility between ethnic groups may suddenly erupt violence against the other group. According to the "ethnic fears" approach, political leaders and other powerful elites use arbitrary detentions, riot incitement, media hate speech, and other tactics to target an ethnic minority in order to further their own political objectives. This leads to a widespread fear of an ethnic "other" in society. Common people are more prone to retaliate violently due to the accompanying sense of insecurity (Fuji, 2011, p. 5).

This idea is faulty, though, because ethnic variety is not the only factor that explains why groups fight violently against one another. It is hard to comprehend why the most ethnically diverse African states have experienced the highest levels of peace since the 1990s when ethnic variation is seen as a prerequisite for violence. On the other hand, a lengthy civil war that lasted four years in Rwanda, an African country with few ethnic differences, led to the genocide of the Tutsis and the mass murder of around one million Rwandans. Although Somalia's ethnic variety is less clearly visible, the country has been enduring a bloody war for almost thirty years.

The 'divide and rule' colonial strategy weakened patrimonial groupings and purposefully destroyed indigenous institutions and power structures. It also rearranged patron-client relationships inside fictitious borders. In addition to forcing non-contiguous tribes to coexist, the colonizers' artificial borders across the continent caused the anomalous separation of normally contiguous communities, which likely contributed to instability and laid the

groundwork for armed conflict (Zelez, 2008). The claim that European colonialism is the primary cause of current conflicts in Africa is another non-development-related viewpoint (see Nasong'o, 2015). Conflict theorists cannot overlook the importance of colonialism's past. At the end of the nineteenth century, colonialism's effects and practices were generally felt equally across the continent. Despite this, many post-colonial African regions have not experienced serious intra-state violence. Therefore, a clear flaw in the thesis is that the concept of colonialism fails to recognize African agency and Africans' responsibility for wars in which Africans are involved. Additionally, it doesn't explain why Africa had such a terrible time between 1980 and the early 2010s.

However, another commonly cited non-developmental explanation for violent conflict in postwar Africa is the role of postcolonial ruling elites (e.g. see Bøå & Dun, 2013). For the past thirty years, the most identifiable and pervasive form of African governance has been neopatrimonialism, a legacy of colonialism. According to a number of distinguished African studies scholars, the majority of the political and administrative behaviour on the continent can be categorized as neopatrimonialism (Medar, 1982; Bratto & van de Wall, 1994; Engleber, 2000; van de Wall, 2001; Erdman & Engel, 2007; Eisenstad & Babajide, 2019: 188). Political science and development studies have been using the concept of neopatrimonialism since the 1970s to explain political instability and the underdevelopment of many African nations. Neopatrimonialism is basically a "big man" and his close associates rationally pursuing their own interests (Rot, 1968; Eisenstad, 1973; Dalo, 2003; Chukwu & Lynch, 2022). Clapha (1985, p. 48) defines neopatrimonialism as a type of organization where formally established political and administrative structures are permeated by broad patrimonial ties. In bureaucratic organizations, officials hold positions with formally defined powers, but they use those powers to the best of their abilities as a kind of private property rather than public service.

Neopatrimonialism promotes corruption and erodes official accountability frameworks. Violent wars have been mostly caused by corruption and poor government in a number of African nations, including Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and many more. According to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, poverty, corruption, and poor governance were the primary causes of the violence (Fithe, 1999). Good governance has been emphasized in African development programs since the late 1980s as a means of combating corruption and promoting economic growth, particularly in those of major international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

Economic and Developmental Reasons for African Conflict's Occurrence and Persistence

Some academics, however, favour using theories pertaining to economics and development to explain the origins and enduring nature of conflicts in Africa. There are two fundamental presumptions about the economics of war. The main premise is that economic progress on both a personal and global level provides a means of resolving disputes. According to Mandelbau (2004), p. 265: "Free markets made free men," and free men wouldn't engage in such a foolish activity as going to war. Economics focuses on the cruelty of capitalism and how conflict can be exacerbated by the massive inequality it creates. The profiting of warriors as a trigger for armed conflict is part of this second economic concept. War is a lucrative enterprise for individuals involved in smuggling networks for blood diamonds or crude oil in conflict areas, whether they are roadside thugs collecting a "war tax," arms merchants selling their goods, or others. Soldiers who profit from conflict are threatened by peace. Economists have created complex models to show how economic thievery, including looting, provides significant incentives for warriors. These models don't, however, provide any insight into the characteristics of civil war economies or the challenges faced by non-combatants during hostilities. Anthropologists have, however, also usefully demonstrated the amazing complexity of civil war economies and the extreme measures that families, communities, and individuals would take to survive violent conflict (Nordstro, 2004; Cram, 2006; Butle, 2016). Over the years, economists have produced a substantial body of research showing a connection between economic issues and the outbreak of violent conflict; nevertheless, the specifics of this connection are still up for debate (Collie & Hoeffle, 2004).

Conflict discourses in development have been influenced by the "greed versus grievance" controversy, which originated from political economic theories of violent conflict. A group of economists with ties to the World Bank argued that warlords' avaricious behaviour may account for the bloody conflicts in Africa. These economists challenged the idea that political complaints could be used as an explanation for violent conflict by claiming that civil war was caused by economic possibilities in Africa, since the former was prevalent in the continent while the latter was not. They concluded that economic and greedy forces were responsible for the answer. Therefore, the development rhetoric tended to place all responsibility for Africa's wars on the shoulders of rapacious warlords (Collie & Hoeffle, 2002).

Scholars who supported ethnicity or religion as the primary drivers of violent conflict in Africa were divided by the findings of Collie and Hoeffle (2002). Even though no war is apolitical,

they contended that Collie and Hoeffle's logic was flawed because it asserted that resentment and greed belonged to different categories and that elucidating the causes of war required elucidating individual motivations (Ballentin, 2003; Berda, 2005; Kee, 2008; Bangura & Nwachukwu, 2021). Though there is disagreement regarding the relative relevance of greed and resentment, there is now broad consensus that both are drivers of violent conflict (Murshe & Tadjoedde, 2009). After making changes, Collie stated that "when revolt is viable, it will occur without any particular inducements in terms of motivation" (Collie et al., 2009, p. 25).

Since there are undoubtedly a variety of factors that contribute to violent conflicts in Africa, research efforts to develop theories of conflict causation in this continent must consider both economic or development-related explanations as well as non-development-related explanations and their interconnections (Nhem & Zelez, 2008; Chijioke, 2018, p. 262). In addition to being a cause of war, developmental factors can also have an impact on the beginning of post-conflict reconstruction and the prevention or cessation of violence.

African and International Efforts to Put an End to Continental Wars

When armed conflict has caused a crisis in areas of Africa, development—in the form of assistance and peacekeeping—has been essential in resolving the situation. However, international mediators and their troops—which as of April 30, 2017, numbered 95,993 uniformed personnel—face tremendous hurdles due to the complexity of African crisis situations (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017). International initiatives to promote development and offer humanitarian aid have proven difficult in post-conflict African environments. To address these problems, efforts have been made to manage war and post-conflict areas and advance peace in Africa by bolstering the continent's own institutions for resolving disputes. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution was the main African conflict resolution organization from 1990 until 2002. Sub-regional agreements were used to launch several minor projects around the continent. The African Union (AU) was founded in 2002 to take the place of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The most significant organization within the continental union is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which is composed of the 54 officially recognized governments on the African continent. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government determines the tenets and goals of the African Union.

Prior to the establishment of the AU, Africa's continental conflict management initiatives were mostly impromptu responses to crises, with a few sub-regional organizations overseeing the restricted licenses for both military and peace operations. The OAU was destroyed in awareness of the necessity to create a more efficient conflict management system on the continent by moving beyond their usual purview of small observer missions and assuming a far broader responsibility in terms of military intervention and peace operations. To do this, the AU Constitutive Act's Article 4(h) granted the assembly the authority to step in "in respect of grave circumstances: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity" in a member state (Kuwal & Viljoe, 2014). The OAU's dissolution and the creation of the AU are primarily attributable to the publishing of the OAU study on how the international community failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Despite its noble objectives, the right of military intervention in a member state for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity under Article 4(h) has proven difficult to implement due to a lack of political will. Considering this, the AU has not yet used Article 4(h) to support military action against a fully recognized sovereign government (Frank, 2009, p. 97; Chukwu & Lynch, 2022, p. 266).

The Commission took the unprecedented move of using Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act in December 2015 to deploy a 5,000-person AU force in Burundi, even though the Darfur conflict has sparked strong global discussions and there is ample evidence of "grave circumstances" as defined by the AU. The Sudanese government, which is equally responsible for the "severe circumstances," must provide its prior consent before the Assembly may sanction the deployment of military action. Political unrest has been taking place in Burundi since May 2015. There were ninety-six hours for President Nkurunziza to welcome the soldiers. However, as African leaders declined to support the expedition, the idea was withdrawn in January of 2016.These revealed discrepancies between AU Commission members who favoured a more interventionist strategy and those who favoured a less forceful one in relation to the Burundi conflict. The reluctance of member states with questionable democratic and human rights records to support the application of Article 4 (h) may not come as a surprise.

Traditional peacekeeping, ceasefire monitoring, peace enforcement, nation-building, humanitarian assistance, police training, and peacebuilding are all components of international conflict management on the African continent. With over 80 missions—much more than the number of missions on any other continent during the same time period—the growth of peace operations on the African continent between 1990 and 2015 was unquestionably the most

notable international response to Africa's conflicts. In the history of peacekeeping—the term for the regular UN "blue helmet" troop deployments, which are typically used to establish a mutually agreed-upon separation between adversaries—this period proved to be the most unstable (Bellam et al., 2010).

These peace operations were authorized and carried out by several parties and international agencies, with the overwhelming backing of the UN Security Council (UNSC). In the post-Cold War period, there has been a movement towards "outsourcing" or "subcontracting" peace operations due to the engagement of regional organizations, INGOs, and NGOs to carry out peace assistance and development activities on behalf of the UN. Since the UN does not have its own army, it is entirely dependent on member countries to provide soldiers (Richmon & Care, 2005). Small observation missions and massive operations involving hundreds of men are examples of these missions. Observing ceasefires, promoting DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) initiatives, protecting humanitarian aid supplies, aiding weak governments, strengthening public security and the rule of law, protecting civilians, and counterinsurgency are just a few of the many mandates for these international operations to maintain peace and security.

Various outcomes have resulted from these operations in terms of conflict management. But since 2011, most of the UN's troops on the continent have been based in only three nations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. Over the last six years, there has been a significant increase in the number of UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa. Between 2013 and 2014, the UN formed two multinational operations, substituting UN soldiers for African-led forces in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). These UN deployments caused the total number of UN uniformed soldiers in Africa to reach over 80,000, which at the time was a record high. 120,000 uniformed troops have been sent to nine UN operations, three AU-approved missions, and additional missions run by the EU or France by the middle of 2015. Senegal has sent twice as many soldiers to the UN as Cameroon, whilst the former has only sent 1,380, demonstrating that peacekeeping has clearly become a burden for the less wealthy nations. in 1,650 soldiers serving in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and additional personnel stationed in MINUSCA, Rwanda is now the third-largest African supplier of peacekeepers to UN peace operations.

Perhaps the most severe example of UN troops stationed in hostile environments failing to stop mass killings is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was

active in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Human security is an important development issue, and safeguarding people is unquestionably the most important duty given to peacekeepers (Bellam & Williamson, 2010; Chijioke, 2021). Regardless of how well the mission performs other duties, locals frequently evaluate peacekeepers on their capacity to safeguard citizens who are at risk. But until 1999, the protection of civilians was not specifically a part of the UN's complex peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Nevertheless, within the parameters of their mission, peace operations attempted to solve the problem of civilian protection. Operation Artemis and the EUFOR deployments in the Central African Republic and Chad (particularly AMIS, AFISMA, and MISCA) were among the AU and EU peacekeeping missions that included civilian protection in 2003.

The revision of mandates was also influenced by high-level UN investigations that revealed the failure to protect victims of genocide and mass atrocities (see UN documents S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999; A/54/549, 15 November 1999; and A/55/305-S/2000/809). Similarly, the OAU assessment on the failures to protect civilians during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 led to changes in the mandates of AU soldiers and missions (Capla, 1994). Despite this, UN mandates for civilian protection frequently contained geographic, political, and operational constraints, which made it more difficult for troops to successfully aid those in need of immediate protection. Peacekeepers were asked to protect civilians "without prejudice to the responsibilities of the host nation." Nonetheless, it is commonly acknowledged that the primary cause of civilian injuries is often the host nation's military. The mission's goal was restricted to protecting civilians who were "under imminent threat of violence," and peacekeepers were only supposed to defend civilians within their preexisting "capabilities and areas of deployment" (Willmot et al., 2016, p. 262). This ensured that attempts to protect people would be unsuccessful. By removing the qualifier "imminent" from the expression "danger of violence" and highlighting the necessity of peacekeepers actively preventing violence against civilians, the UN fixed these errors. It is important to recognize that, even in the most dire circumstances, the existence of a peacekeeping force has helped local residents rather than made their circumstances worse. The shortcomings of peacekeepers in terms of human security have typically been the focus of media coverage and local and global opinions (Hultma et al., 2013; Bankole, 2019, p. 245). The unarmed Ghanaian peacekeepers who were part of the UNAMIR deployment in Rwanda during the genocide saved many Rwandan lives via negotiation alone (Dallair, 2004). When UNAMIR forces guarding government leaders were present, genocidaires, usually in groups of 20 or 30, would often flee the area (Des Forge, 1999).

UNAMIR is credited for saving the lives of almost 30,000 Rwandans despite lacking the authority and resources to stop the massacres (Cam, 2013).

Peacekeepers can be credited with alleviating some of the worst situations in Africa, but they have failed to prevent or end violent conflict and genocide because to a lack of sufficient funding, personnel, and missions.

Conflict Environments and Aid (Humanitarian and Developmental)

As was already established, the expansion of peace operations on the continent during the past 25 years is the most evident international response to the wars in Africa. The international reaction to the wars in Africa has heavily relied on aid, particularly development and humanitarian help. Effective conflict resolution strategies, however, were rarely the cornerstone of development and humanitarian assistance in Africa's war-torn regions. The purpose of humanitarian aid was to lessen the most severe and immediate effects of armed conflict, whereas international development initiatives aimed to lessen the risks of war and were a part of a longer-term endeavour. By the conclusion of the Cold War, regional authorities, transnational corporations, NGOs, and philanthropists had joined the practice of international humanitarianism and international development, which had previously been the exclusive purview of governments and international organizations (Riddel, 2007; Bankole, 2020).

Even while the main goals of those who gave help were to end poverty and advance fair economic growth, many development advocates saw aid as having a role in avoiding violent conflict and as an essential part of long-term conflict prevention strategies. Their argument was simple: if civil war and violent conflict were "overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low-income countries," then poverty on the continent must have played a significant role in the occurrence of civil wars in Africa (Collie & Hoeffle, 1998, pp. 568–571). They contended that if poverty made war more likely, development might be able to stop it. In some ways, this assertion had some foundation because it is widely accepted in the quantitative research that high-income states are significantly less likely than low-income states to face violent intra-state conflict (Dixo, 2009). Between 1965 and 1999, literature on African civil wars established a link between poverty and civil war (Collie & Hoeffle, 2002). The fact that more people are surviving on less than US$1.24 per day is very concerning (DFID, 2009). Such results are supported by World Bank statistics on African nations that demonstrate the relationship between development programs and concerns of violence and peace.

The connection between Rwanda's civil war, genocide, and development projects serves as a helpful example of how conflict and development strategies interact. Rwanda had the sixteenth-lowest GNI per capita on the continent when the four-year, low-intensity civil war broke out in October 1990. Between 1980 and 1990, Rwanda's gross national income (GNI) per capita increased steadily from US$270 to US$350 (World Bank, 2017). However, from 0.299 in 1985 to 0.233 in 1990, the country's Human Development Index (HDI) rating fell (UNDP, 2013). Therefore, it is debatable if Rwanda's economic levels obviously declined in the ten years prior to the genocide, despite the fact that it is indisputable that the country was among the poorest in the world. Furthermore, prior to the civil war, international development actors had already made substantial investments in Rwanda, with roughly 200 donors present (Uvi, 1998; Bankole, 2019). Within a year after the civil war began, these international development actors began providing Rwanda with aid of over US$600 million (Uvi, 1998; Bankole, 2019). Such a strong international presence points to a link between the start of the civil war and the genocide in Rwanda and global development ambitions. It's unclear exactly what the link is.

According to some critics, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) destabilized the institutions of the Rwandan state in the years preceding the civil war and the genocide by destroying domestic economic activity and causing famine and unemployment. Genocide was made possible by this (Chossudovsk, 2003, p. 332; Falola & Cheesema, 2022, p. 285). Others dispute this, claiming that Rwanda was a powerful, functioning state that imposed political violence on some of its own citizens, in contrast to assertions that it was a state of weakness in the years before the civil war and the genocide. The argument that the Rwandan state was ineffectual, according to these experts, ignores the critical role that official authority played in the genocide's planning. For this reason, it is important to understand how external pressures supported "a repressive and ultimately genocidal state apparatus" (Store, 2001, p. 366). These international development actors provided assistance to the Rwandan government, enabling "the government machinery to exist, to expand, to control, and to implement" (Uvi, 1998, pp. 226–227). According to this study, the genocide in Rwanda was caused by a complicated network of racism, marginalization, exclusion, and inequality, all of which were exacerbated by international development initiatives meant to address these issues (Unvi, 1998, p. 231). Rwanda had a serious economic crisis in the 1980s, which was made worse by the 1986–1987 drop in world coffee prices. IFIs, especially the World Bank, therefore developed close relations with the administration of President Habyarimana. According to World Bank data, Rwanda received over 70% of its public investment from foreign sources between 1982 and

1987, and this percentage increased in the following decade (Uvi, 1998; Store, 2001; Chibundu & Chaba, 2022, p. 521).

In the early 1990s, international development professionals were aware of the Rwandan government's heinous human rights abuses and massacres (Adelma & Suhrk, 1996; Cimol, Dosu & Stiglit, 2019). The IMF then provided Rwanda with a US$41 million credit arrangement to finance a three-year economic reform program, while the World Bank also granted Rwanda structural adjustment credit (SAC) in June 1991. Notwithstanding this, the IFI's policies show that it assumed the Rwandan government was a good administration that prioritized national development, even under trying conditions (Uvi, 1998). Because the World Bank and other organizations saw Rwanda as a concerned state attempting to help national development under difficult conditions, they permitted the Rwandan government to redirect monies provided by IFIs for the import of commodities into the purchase of military equipment. The accounting procedures of the IFIs allowed the dictatorship to finance large weapons purchases that were ultimately used in the 1994 massacre. For example, the Transport Ministry's account was used to purchase army trucks that were imported, while the Health Ministry's account was used to purchase fuel that was actually meant for use by militia and army vehicles (Toussain, 2004).The Habyarimana dictatorship was able to use the substantial quantities of money already held in accounts at foreign banks that were not blocked to purchase more weapons and munitions, which were subsequently dispersed during the establishment of the Rwandan genocidal military forces. Even after the World Bank and IMF suspended loans to the Rwandan government in early 1993, this remained the case. The aid sector "closed its eyes to the racist currents in society" (Uvi, 1998, p. 8), and it is questionable whether the policies and practices of the IMF and the World Bank in particular encouraged rather than inhibited the criminal behaviour of the Rwandan government during the planning and execution of the Rwandan genocide.

However, the IFIs were powerless to prevent the use of their funding for the purchase of military equipment due to the continuing civil war and the ensuing dearth of trustworthy information on the actions of the Rwandan state. Since the government's defense spending grew from 45% to 64% of the budget between 1985 and 1992, the World Bank had to make the tough option of whether to continue funding the government (World Bank, 1994). In the hopes that at least a portion of their investment would benefit the health and education sectors, they decided to continue supporting Juvenal Habyarimana's administration. Any possibility that

financial benefits would have reached the health and education sectors would have been eliminated if the credit agreement scheme had been suspended entirely until peace negotiations were completed.

Since the 1980s, economically vulnerable countries in Africa have been forced to rely significantly on IFIs for aid and development funding. Contrary to popular belief, the political economics of development and IFIs "builds a dynamic in which poverty is not reduced but rooted and reproduced" (Brackin, 2009, p. xiii). In the case of Rwanda, "the way development was conceived, controlled, and implemented was a major element in the genesis and progression of many of the processes that led to genocide" (Uvi, 1998, p. 3). It is clear that challenges with structural adjustment and development are linked to violent intra-state conflict. Unfortunately, there is sufficient evidence that development actors have significantly contributed to the increase in violence throughout Africa, even though this is an extreme example.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated how development in Africa might actually make violence worse rather than lessen it. It becomes more difficult to control or diffuse conflict in many of the social processes associated with development. Scholars, policymakers, and others also believe that development is linked to conflict escalation, maintenance, and transformation. The exact nature of these linkages remains unclear.

Numerous factors, such as poverty, human rights violations, ineffective leadership and corruption, racial marginalization, and the widespread use of small arms, are often the cause of the current violent conflicts in Africa, such as those in the Sahel region, which affects the West African countries of Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, and low-level arguments that occur within notably stable countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. Numerous organizations, notably the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), civil society, and the international community, have made fruitless attempts at conflict settlement. Due to a lack of knowledge about the intricate causes of these disputes, violent conflicts between states are likely to continue across the continent.

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