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Democracy, Global Citizenship and Development in a Multidisciplinary World

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Abstract

The relationship between democracy, global citizenship, and development is discussed in this paper. The first substantive portion delves deeper into the two notions of democracy and development, highlighting the hegemony of liberal, restricted official discourse and policy understandings. After that, it analyses three modern phenomena to demonstrate why this is problematic: the ambiguous role that outside interventions frequently play in influencing democratic or developmental change, the difficulty presented by emerging authoritarian growth and development patterns that seem to be shielded from democratic reform, with a particular focus on China; and the apparent decline in both development and the calibre of democracy that pervades much of the West. This paper contends that the many conceptual and empirical connections between global citizenship and development are only partially explained by approaches to global citizenship that are policy-framed, promoted, and mainstreamed. It highlights some of the most essential theories of global citizenship and distinguishes between methods that emphasise status and method. This paper examines how global citizenship is becoming more mainstream within the framework of development that is becoming more popular, based on studies on international volunteerism and development education. It demonstrates how certain understandings

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and experiences of global citizenship support and unite traditional North-South conceptions of poverty with neo-liberal notions of agency. This paper seeks to decenter dominant conceptions of global citizenship and development by focusing on the subjectivities of global South civic actors, disparities in access to global civic space, and silences in current practitioner and scholarly discourse. In light of changing geopolitics and current calls for greater citizen participation in these fields, it concludes by examining the direction of democracy, global citizenship, and development research and practice.

Keywords: Democracy, Global Citizenship, Development, Development Education, International Volunteering.

Introduction

It is impossible to ignore the connection between democracy, global citizenship, and development. In the social sciences, the idea of development itself was developed to aid newly independent nations following World War II (Omoniyi, 2023The idea of development itself was, in fact, not new. The earliest indications of this idea can be found in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century social philosophy. One important medium through which it was expressed was the theory of social transformation. One way to conceptualize the shift would be moving from ordinary to superior forms or from less efficient to more efficient forms. Development may be defined as the process by which an organization or system is strengthened, more structured, more effective, and more gratifying to the needs and goals of people. It may be separated from progress since progress involves moral judgment and uses normative criteria, whereas development is measured empirically.

Development suggests making a deliberate attempt to achieve a particular objective. The state of society may be defined as its degree of progress, measured by how far it is from that objective. According to J.H. Mittelman (2008), underdevelopment is "the blockage which forestalls a rational transformation of the social structure." In contrast, development is "the increasing capacity to rationalize natural and human resources for social ends." This concept is also frequently expressed in other significant definitions of development but in a more complex manner. According to Paul Baran (1957), development is a comprehensive alteration of society's economic, social, and political framework and the prevailing production, distribution, and consumption system. It 'has never been a smooth, peaceful process flowing placidly over time and place'. Then, in 1974, Walter Rodney defined growth as "a many-sided process," suggesting that it involves "greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being" for the person. Individuals want to maximize utilizing their natural

and human resources to further their societal goals. A “development” process aids their efforts, while obstacles to this progress are called "underdevelopment."

If you routinely watch TV news and listen to politicians, you would be forgiven for thinking that democracy and growth have a clear and unquestionably good link. A straightforward and comforting message is constantly thrown at us: more of the former results in more of the latter, and vice versa. It is natural to agree that development raises living standards both locally and globally since most of us are, at least normatively, democratic, and we support raising living standards both locally and internationally.

Similarly, many academics believe that democracy and development go hand in hand. Political science and development studies have consistently asserted since the 1950s that increased development, democratization, human advancement, security, and other factors will lead to and continue to drive the "modernization" of less developed nations (Gilman, 2017). Such an opinion has been strengthened more recently by the introduction of the "Democratic Peace Theory" (DPT), which holds that wealthy, democratic nations do not go to war with one another, into the more traditional domain of international relations (IR) (Geis & Wagner, 2021). Thus, it should come as no surprise that these concepts have favoured Western governments, institutions of global governance, and non-governmental organizations. As a result, they serve as the foundation for official global development agendas and discourses and the extensive advocacy of democratic change.

Nothing about this is intrinsically erroneous: democracy and development are two things that may coexist, are generally accepted as good ends in and of themselves and can even strengthen one another. The notion that they copy one another in a linear method, on the other hand, is incorrect. Therefore, it is simply a short step to conclude that liberal democracy and development currently exist in North America. Europe is the only ones that exists. Any bond they may have been seen to be so strong as to have some genuine scientific value, making it deserving of active replication outside of the West.

In theory, this point of view is as problematic as it is. First, neither "democracy" nor "development" can be limited to what is seen in the West; instead, they are two hotly debated ideas that represent many unanswered questions. Second, the causal relationship between the two is still somewhat unclear, even if we disregard this and accept the liberal explanation of human development in its terms. Third, liberal conceptions of modernization contain a significant amount of teleology. From this perspective, democracy and development are understood as ideals that "developed" and "democratic" nations have, by definition, attained at some undefined period in the past (Leftwich, 2020). As a result, they become the standard by

which everyone else is evaluated—often in an unfavourable way. However, democratization and development occur on a spectrum; as a result, their relative strengths in any given society are prone to gradual improvement or decline and should be viewed as continuous processes of change that are fundamentally dependent on the actions of individuals within particular political, economic, social, geographic, and cultural contexts (Pay, 2015).

Global citizenship ideas and practices greatly influence the history and current state of international development. The term "global citizenship" has been used in various occasionally conflicting contexts. The operations of global justice networks, state initiatives to promote aid support, corporate social responsibility plans, NGO fundraising, and the application of "universal" ethics to missionary work in the global South are a few examples. This is despite the concept's significant shortcomings. Kant's concept of a "citizen of the world" may resonate politically and emotionally. However, it is unclear from a philosophical and empirical perspective whether it is desirable or possible to establish moral or political communities outside of nation-states. When concepts and behaviours with specific historical and geographical roots are promoted as universal, it becomes challenging to identify them as symbols of global citizenship.

New forms of "global citizen action" (Edwards & Gaventa, 2021), the work of global social movements (Waterman, 2008; Cohen & Rai, 2022), global justice networks (Routledge & Cumbers, 2019), and the development of a "global civil society" (Anheier et al., 2020a; Taylor, 2020) have all received increasing attention since the 1990s. Make Poverty History and Live 8 are two recent popular events that have contributed to the increased celebration and promotion of the perceived relevance of "ordinary" persons in determining global decisions and international development trajectories. Scholarly interest in, public acceptance of, and policy framings around "global citizenship" have increased (see, for example, Bic, 2010; Dower & Williams, 2020b; Smi & Laurie, 2021; Schattle, 2017). Global citizenship gained prominence in the UK school curriculum in the 1990s and early 2000s, first due to pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and then official assistance under the pretext of "development education" (Smi, 2023b). The potential role of global citizenship education within the education goals to be agreed upon by the expiration of the Millennium Development Goals was explored at a conference sponsored by Concord Europe (the European Confederation for Relief and Development NGOs), Oxfam, UNESCO, and others in June 2018 (Concord, 2018).

This paper examines the relationship between democracy, global citizenship, and development. The first substantive portion delves deeper into the two notions of democracy and development,

showing how their liberal, restricted interpretations dominate official language and policy. It then illustrates how problematic this is by analyzing three modern phenomena: the ambiguous role that outside interventions frequently play in influencing democratic or developmental change, the difficulty presented by emerging authoritarian growth and development patterns that seem to be immune to democratic reform, with particular reference to China; and the apparent decline in both development and democratic quality that occurs throughout much of the West. This paper argues that policy-framed, promoted, and mainstreamed approaches to global citizenship only partially explain the numerous conceptual and empirical links between global citizenship and development. They conceal some of the disparate and controversial ways that global citizenship is experienced and realized, as well as some of the conceptual limitations of citizenship outside the nation-state. This is not meant to minimize the concept's importance or utility. However, we must see past the "hope" and excitement that sometimes accompany tales of global citizenship and citizens' movements. This calls for examining some of the inconsistencies and letdowns associated with global citizenship and how they relate to development; ideas and practices surrounding global citizenship should be subjected to the same rigorous examination as other aspects of the global development environment. To reframe international development as a global justice endeavour (Grug, 2023), we must acknowledge the significance of global citizenship for this transformation and how various interpretations of global citizenship may either facilitate or obstruct it. The conceptualization and implementation of global citizenship are closely linked to the definition and practice of development since varying interpretations of this notion facilitate the mobilization of organizations, connections, and expertise beyond national boundaries. This paper distinguishes between approaches focusing on status and those focusing on the process by outlining major global citizenship theories. It examines how global citizenship is becoming more mainstream in the context of development's popularization, using studies on international volunteerism and development education. This paper demonstrates how specific concepts and experiences of global citizenship support and unite neo-liberal notions of agency with long-standing North-South imaginaries of poverty. Focusing on the silences in the present scholarly and practitioner discussion, the subjectivities of global South Civic actors, and disparities in access to global civic space, it seeks to decenter dominant conceptions of global citizenship and development. In closing, this paper considers the future of research and practice on democracy, global citizenship, and development in the context of shifting geopolitics and contemporary demands for increased citizen participation in these areas.

Democracy and Development: Conflicting Debates

It is necessary to address these contentious ideas before considering the nature of the link between democracy and development. The notion of development "never has a greater need for analysis and clarification than in the present era," as Anthony Pay and Nicola Phillips (2021, p. 1) proposed regarding the latter. We have indeed reached a stage where careful, analytical thought is required to unravel it. The word has become incredibly common in public discourse, perhaps more so than at any other point in history. However, it has never been used so casually and widely, with so little questioning or understanding, as it was in the early years of this century. These two factors are related to one another. This assertion can be substantiated by taking into account the various trade-offs that accompany development, the most persistent of which is the one between the necessity of raising global material living standards through growth and the resulting social transformation on the one hand and the need to preserve traditional ways of life and the biosphere on the other. For example, many pundits advocate for China's industrialization, often credited with "lifting" hundreds of millions of people "out of poverty." However, how do we balance this with the fact that the pollution caused by this expansion threatens the survival of other societies, most of which are small, marginalized island states in the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the Pacific due to climate change?

It is also interesting to note that the lengthy sentence above would still make sense if the word "democracy" were used instead of "development." Modern definitions of "democracy" are significantly devoid of significance when compared to extreme ones from the past. This is due to two factors: first, ideology, or the dominance of a neo-liberal global system and related official discourses, and second, the fact that precise definitions can be measured, agreed upon, and quantified. However, doing so inevitably entails ignoring several issues and trade-offs, such as the fact that democracies are relatively new, notoriously unstable, painful to create, and—contrary to popular belief—that increased democratization does not always equate to increased democracy. Therefore, these notions must be thoroughly examined before we even get into the more general problem of determining the possible link between the two.

What Are Democracy and Development?

Fundamentally, democracy is just the rule of the people (the "demos"), and there are several methods to do this; liberal democracy is only one particularly contemporary example. Although the term "development" is more ambiguous, it describes a scenario in which an actor—a person, a community, a nation, and so on—goes through a methodical process of change that leads to the advancement from one state of being to another. Western modernization theorists launched the official "development project" after 1945, institutionalizing a particular, contemporary

conception of development as something that "developed" nations had attained while the rest of the world had not. Therefore, by reducing democracy and development to their most basic concepts, we can observe how opposing viewpoints have developed in response to dominant political ideologies, geographic foci, and ideological trends.

Thus, using relatively rough dividing classificatory lines that are considerably fuzzier, academics have presented a basic (far from comprehensive) typology of several viewpoints (Leftwich, 2015; Grug & Bish, 2023, p. 124). These academics demonstrate how the study of both has a unique theoretical heritage that stems from classical liberalism. To put it succinctly, the liberal perspective is limited: democracy is evaluated primarily on its form, i.e., whether or not it has a free press, elections, and the rule of law enshrined in democratic constitutions and upheld by an independent judiciary. Development is essentially seen as a reflection of this, occurring naturally once a small, democratic state allows free markets to flourish and spur growth. At least since World War II and the conclusion of the Cold War, these values, underpinned by Western power, have defined the global order in general and official democratic and development goals in particular (Gamble, 2019; Cerny, 2021; Down & Williams, 2022b). Democracy and development may be virtually reduced to the liberal perspective for many political classes and prominent intellectuals. However, this is intellectually problematic since it obscures radical options, opposing viewpoints, and the depth of philosophical concepts about development and democracy. It accelerates the rise of two malnourished global political agendas. These were separated into "statist" and "radical" approaches by Grug and Bish (2023). Regarding "statist" interpretations, it is essential to remember that liberalism, which championed open markets and free trade, arose in the eighteenth century in opposition to mercantilist approaches to political economy. However, such rhetoric is misplaced: protectionism, not market principles, drove the industrialization and development of Britain, Germany, and the USA during the nineteenth century (Falk, 2012; Chang, 2012, 2021; Massey, 2023). Similar examples of "developmental states" that purposefully distorted free markets to promote the growth of fledgling industries and achieve rapid development include the "Asian Tigers" of the twentieth century and, more recently, China in the twenty-first century (see Kyung-Sup et al. 2022; Fine, Saraswati & Tavasci, 2023). This is unlike a communist or socialist state where the private market is entirely rejected and instead serves as the repository for growth. However, despite global liberalism's supremacy, statist development methods have failed. This is partially because the developing nations of the 1970s, along with broader trends of globalization, increasingly liberalized and integrated into international markets as their fledgling sectors became competitive. Perhaps most importantly, statism—as it is termed—has

relatively little to say about democracy, at least not in the literal sense, since it is either suspended—explicitly or implicitly—until a future point when the state has attained the (also unspecified) necessary level of development and amassed enough power to be redistributed, or it is subordinated to the more extensive developmental needs of the country as a whole. Therefore, how individual liberty is frequently ignored is one of the main complaints levelled at most nationalist ideas.

Authoritarianism, repression, and the denial of human rights have occasionally also been associated with populist and developmentalist initiatives. Widespread diversity characterizes radical approaches, but they all reject the ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues that liberal approaches highlight. Instead of viewing social life as a series of individualistic, self-serving, utilitarian transactions, radical approaches emphasize the structured patterns of inequality that shape social processes. Marxists, for instance, frequently reject the basic notion of liberal democracy, viewing it as a façade that hides the powerful's ongoing hegemony over the oppressed classes and growth as a pattern of accumulation that benefits the capitalist elites at the expense of the general populace. Additionally, radicals stretch the limits of "the political" outside of the public domain and the state. Feminists, for instance, highlight the gendered foundations of capitalist liberal democracy and the inherently patriarchal nature of existing political systems. As a result, they criticize claims about greater "democracy" and "development" in terms of legal and civil rights and economic growth, respectively, for concealing the pervasive realities of female marginalization (Waylen, 2017). Lastly, radicals emphasize the content and substance of democracy and development rather than just the form. For example, having equality before the law is insufficient if only a select few have proper access to justice; a democratic constitution and rapid growth are also meaningless if a small elite controls all the wealth, power, and influence.

As a result, there are several approaches to comprehending democracy and development, and our ontological and epistemological inclinations inevitably influence our understanding of their relevance and meaning. In a nutshell, they are very political concepts and beliefs. Development can be seen as either highly communitarian that rejects or transcends capitalism (as in many radical perspectives) or as intrinsically individualistic, marked by an expansion of human freedom that is, in turn, economically facilitated by open markets (as in the liberal view). Between these two extremes, statist theories reject the assumption that freedom is inevitably correlated with progress, recognizing that developmental results radically alter a society or economy. The same may be said for democratization and democracy. Liberals believe establishing institutions that deliver democratic procedural elements—through which people

may express their preferences—is sufficient. On the other hand, some statists see an illiberal and populist form of government, like that of the late Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, as just as valid in terms of democracy, if not more so, as such a mission entails the deliberate redistribution of wealth and resources from the centre. Radicals take it a step further and contend that hegemonic conceptions of liberal democracy frequently fall short on their account because they do not oppose the dominant power structures and the hegemonic norms and values that support them.

Democracy and Development: Their Interaction

It makes sense that the link between the two notions is highly dependent if they continue to be so hotly debated (Bic, 2010; Omoniyi, 2023). Since the 1950s, when modernization theory peaked, the conventional—that is, liberal—account has dominated discourse. It contends that when societies progress through capitalist development, the middle class grows and gains more economic and political clout, which fuels demands for rights, redistribution, and a piece of the spoils of progress. Although this provides an empirical account of the West's development and democratization, it is unclear if this can be easily abstracted as a guide for the current state of global political and economic transformation (Grug & Bish, 2023).

Thus, democracy and development can coexist, although this connection is neither straightforward nor without limitations. According to Adam Przeworski (2018), the idea that democracy is only a byproduct of economic progress is significantly more dubious, even though data supports that democracy survives better in wealthy countries. Instead, in some instances and historical contexts, capitalism and economic growth may contribute to (liberal) democracy and, once a democratic transition starts, aid in maintaining it (Diamond, 2019, p. 77). However, democracy has also endured in governments with modest economic expansion, whereas capitalism accumulation in other regions has consistently supported authoritarian governance. There are also a lot of less-developed nations ruled by self-described democratic autocrats. In this instance, privilege and poverty serve as obstacles to democratization. This explains why democratic theories that prioritize the common good alongside—or, in some cases, instead of—the individual and consider issues of cultural, social, and economic empowerment—beyond the formal creation of liberal rights—are so popular throughout much of the developing world. It also explains why many non-Westerners resist hegemonic forms of development and democracy and the global discourses that go hand in hand with them. These discourses serve as disciplinary instruments, forcing weaker and poorer nations to 'learn' from their more powerful and wealthy counterparts (Grug, 2023).

The multitude of economically impoverished but democratically flourishing states in regions like the Caribbean and, on the other hand, those rapidly developing nations that continue to be steadfastly undemocratic, like China, demonstrate the, at best, ambiguous nature of the relationship between democracy and development (Bish, 2022). Some are incredibly well-run even though they do not have a true democracy, such as Singapore (Barr, 2023). It is possible that the power and efficiency of the state's governance—as many statists have long argued—are more crucial for achieving developmental goals than any democratic qualifications (Leftwich, 2022). As a result, academics like Marc Plattner (2022, p. 109) have insisted on making a difference between "effective governance" (or state competency) and "democraticness," or the character of democracy. Though democracy tends to generate demands for social protection at the bottom, it may be more stable. Of course, not all-powerful nations value development goals or are adept at attaining them (Carbone, 2019; Stockemer, 2022). However, the concept that democratization and growth follow a straight line beyond a certain degree of association in particular settings is still difficult to maintain.

Unresolved Conflicts

It is exceptionally troublesome for liberal hegemony to dominate both democratic theory and practice. This section discusses three recent empirical instances to provide empirical evidence for this claim: uncertainties in the promotion of global democracy and development, new trends in authoritarian development, and, lastly, the erosion of democracy and development in the liberal heartlands of the West.

Ambiguities in the Global Democracy and Development Agendas

Two competing global agendas have emerged in the neo-liberal era, based on a liberal, modernist interpretation of democracy and development as mutually beneficial and interdependent. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a process that has shaped international policy in this field since 2000, define the former. According to Jean-Phillipe Thérien (2009), there are two main trends in the official development discourse: the "Bretton Woods paradigm," which is typified by the IMF's adamant neo-liberalism at first and the World Bank's post-Washington Consensus agenda later on; and the "United Nations paradigm," which is reflected in the more human-centred concepts of development that are included in the MDGs and the Human Development Index (HDI). The former focuses on global market integration and off-the-shelf liberalization. In contrast, the latter focuses on small-scale advancements in particular fields like education, sanitary conditions, access to clean water, etc. Even though many of the MDGs have been achieved globally, despite their achievement, they represent a minimal view of development. In particular, they implicitly deny the transformation of the

economy, state, and society that was so central to the post-war development debates, where an activist state was frequently seen to be so central (Chang, 2012). This is because they conflate the symptoms of development with development itself. Therefore, by letting the UN agenda shape much thought and policy, more revolutionary ideas about development are subtly kept from spreading.

In a similar vein, the global democratization agenda is founded on Western-centric ideas of democracy, which are encapsulated in efforts by powerful countries and international governance organizations to export democracy to other countries. Consequently, a broad philosophical ideal is reduced to a set of technical modifications intended to mimic the political systems that are currently in place in the West. Therefore, newly democratizing countries are expected to adopt familiar aspects of the institutional arrangement that are thought to be the defining characteristic of a liberal democratic state, regardless of whether they produce truly democratic outcomes. Additionally, advancing democracy provides a specific transformation, and its driving forces are multifaceted. The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which holds that liberal democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other, is perhaps the most notable. A significant portion of the US foreign policy establishment has gladly accepted this highly contentious but logical theory, which supports the country's often violent attempts to export democracy. However, due to significant theoretical flaws in the DPT itself, as well as the fact that it has legitimized many of the most heinous elements of the current global securitization of democratization, this agenda is riddled with difficulties (Grug & Bish, 2023, pp. 186–189). Perhaps surprisingly, the promotion of democracy has recently provoked a massive "backlash" (Carothers 2016, 2021). It has even jeopardized the nascent democratic processes in those nations that are either tentatively approaching or currently experiencing an uncertain and contingent transition (Levitsky & Way, 2020). Iran is a prime illustration. The 1990s and early 2000s saw the moderate Khatami government enact reforms that fostered the growth of civil society organizations. Meanwhile, after decades of hostility and mistrust, Washington turned down cautious overtures by the Iranians to start a reconciliation, choosing instead to invest tens of millions of dollars in efforts to promote democracy in the nation. However, this bold move could have done better. It first reinforced the influence of hardliners against reformists, notably Khatami. However, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a very conservative politician who ultimately beat Khatami, took many of the changes. When the 'Green Protests' broke out in 2009, it provided those same hardliners with a justification to suppress a movement that might be seen as a Western conspiracy to topple the Islamic government, delaying Iran's democratic reform by years (Tezcür, 2019). As Laurence Whitehead (2021, p. 25) has argued, many "liberal

internationalists lost their sense of reality in their hubristic desire to remake the entire world by their utopia," which is a significant explanation for the "backlash which will last for a substantial period," can be attributed in large part to misguided attempts to promote democracy. Examining the extreme underdevelopment of many African nations tells a similar tale in terms of development. During the post-Washington Consensus era, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) adopted reform of the state as their guiding principle, implementing neo-liberal "good governance" projects in ways that supported market and civil society-led governance (Pay, 2015, pp. 87–89). These procedures eventually led to the state's liberalization and marketisation (Harrison, 2021). Longer-term effects, however, have undermined the state to the point where it is no longer able to carry out the democratic or developmental functions that are rightfully required of it in many locations. In some areas of Africa, this has resulted in a variety of issues, including the institutionalization of weak governments ruled by strong autocrats; corruption, theft, and rent-seeking; the emergence of armed militias that prey on the void left by the limitation of official authority; and pervasive poverty in many areas.

In conclusion, the prevalence of liberal perspectives on democracy and development frequently masks highly ideological and incoherent policies. For instance, Western nations quickly resorted to the type of interventionism they had spent the previous thirty years criticizing the rest of the world during the global financial crisis (Chang, 2021). Similarly, despite ongoing declarations about their broader commitment to democracy, they were clueless about how to react when the Arab Spring broke out in 2011. The "image of Western governments as defenders and promoters of democracy and development fractures before a fumbling, reticent reaction to mass democratic movements confronting authoritarian rule," as Marion Dixon (2021, p. 310) puts it, is what happens. In Egypt, the Obama administration took a long time to abandon Mubarak, a leader the US had backed for many years. The Egyptian military has once again asserted itself, and Washington has supported it since the short-lived electoral democracy experiment that ended in the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in June 2013. The French government initially provided weapons and logistical support to the tyrannical Ben Ali regime, which had ruled Tunisia since a coup in 1987, so that it could violently put an end to the protests when they began. However, the government quickly stopped supporting the uprising after realizing how large it was (Noueihed & Warren, 2022, p. 65).

Critical thinkers are adept at seeing and understanding these inconsistencies and hypocrisies (Harvey, 2024). The degree to which global liberalism sows the precise seeds of lack that it claims to eradicate, however, is frequently overlooked. This is primarily due to the perception that development largely eschews the state, which is also thought to require structural reform

to make the governance it offers "good" in the sense of neo-liberalism. The emasculation of governments and other public institutions, especially those in developing nations, results in the emasculation of emerging democratic and developmental forms. Results will always be dismal when liberal institutions are just "grafted onto weak states," meaning they cannot be strengthened with substance (Møller & Skaaning, 2019, p. 1). The statist perspectives covered earlier in the chapter define development as a broad social transformation brought about by fundamental shifts in a political economy's capacity to produce, which allow it to rise above its current state of existence. Similarly, true democratization can only occur in a society where the state is robust and well-established enough to ensure that democracy is fostered in form rather than just content, such as equal access to power, equitable resource redistribution, and a real expansion of citizenship.

New Trends in Authoritarian Development

Examining the countries that have steadfastly resisted democratization while frequently attaining astounding levels of growth, mainly in Asia and the Middle East, makes this very evident. The idea that democracy and development are directly correlated is certainly questioned by the recent explosive growth of nations like China, Vietnam, Qatar, and Singapore. According to Adrian Leftwich (2020), the "Asian Tigers" proliferated in the 1970s, when these countries were undoubtedly armed with a highly invasive and illiberal state apparatus, if not overtly authoritarian. During times of fast progress, questions about human rights were often deferred to developmental goals.

Currently, China is undoubtedly the most notable example of authoritarian growth. Over the last thirty years or more, China's GDP has grown at a double-digit rate every year: in 2000, its GDP was around US$1.1 trillion, or a tenth of the US equivalent; by 2018, it had grown to over $10 trillion, or more than half of the US GDP (Jiang, 2021). A multitude of broader developmental advancements have been made possible by this economic boom, such as significant investments in infrastructure and a rise in GDP per person from below $900 in low-income countries to about $7000 in middle-income countries. This is especially noteworthy because the rural peasantry in the nation still numbers of hundreds of millions whose lives have not been significantly altered by the economic transformation and who live on incomes significantly below the mean average (Yeh et al., 2023). Therefore, it is not an understatement to say that China's recent remarkable success has been guided by its extremely interventionist state institutions, which have managed capital to further industrial development.

This does not suggest that there are no significant paradoxes in Chinese authoritarianism. Many contend that the nation may be facing "a looming crisis of authoritarianism that will generate a new opportunity for democratic transition in the next two decades" and that the political system in place is volatile (Diamond, 2019, p. 6). However, opponents of China have primarily made the same claim since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Neo-liberal supporters loudly proclaimed that China's transformative growth would stall if it did not emulate Russia and abandon its slow, state-led development strategy in favour of its rapid liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, as Giovanni Arrighi (2017, p. 14) explains. At this point in the 1990s, the disastrous IMF "shock therapy" experiments in Russia started. However, as we now know, Russia's post-Communist path is far from encouraging: a state reliant on resource rents that have slowed the expansion of productive industry, a setting where wealthy oligarchs control many of the significant economic levers; and, in any event, the rise of authoritarianism that is even more irrational than China's.

Undoubtedly, the post-1949 Communist settlement in China was marked by widespread mobilization and acts of terror, as well as a disastrous strategy for agricultural collectivization and a centrally planned economy that claimed millions of lives. Liberal democracy has significant challenges due to these legacies and a one-party state. However, it is also impossible to understand Chinese authoritarianism outside of the framework of a vast nation with historically unstable boundaries, areas of disputed sovereignty, and a long history of foreign hegemony and humiliation (Hobson, 2018). Hence, the state has been able to sustain the Chinese "economic miracle" while causing significant social unrest and environmental trade-offs by wisely using its power to satisfy development goals and uphold social and economic control, all at the same time protecting emerging industries and directing capital to privileged sectors of the economy (Lin, 2021).

Most crucially, Chinese progress has not (yet) been followed by democratic reform, which goes against liberal theory's assumptions. The government has significantly invested in "the great firewall" to maintain control over information flows and its supremacy. As noted by Fukuyama (2012, p. 22), this accomplishes two goals: first, the government nowadays frequently permits some degree of online criticism to flourish as a way to let political unrest out, and second, the process also functions as a learning tool that the state can use to assess and react to public opinion. According to MacKinnon (2022), this trend is known as "networked authoritarianism," in which more online liberties are allowed than in a traditional totalitarian setting. However, there are still no fundamental rights or guarantees.

However, several academics have highlighted the fundamental fragility of the state, even though modern Chinese authoritarianism has become more sophisticated. This is illogical, considering how assertive modern China seems to be becoming. However, issues are becoming worse. Communist elites, particularly in the provinces, frequently give the impression that they operate independently of the central party, with no scrutiny, and that they can get away with the most heinous acts of corruption and persecution. Therefore, for many, the everyday reality is a "decentralized predatory state" in which party insiders may gain personal wealth by abusing public authority arbitrarily and unchecked (Pei, 2016, p. 16). As a result, the wider populace is becoming hostile, and there are large-scale demonstrations against economic, social, ethnic, and cultural injustices. Many people need help with the long-term viability of the nation's current governmental arrangement (Pei, 2022).

In summary, there is no reason to believe China would "modernise" along liberal democratic lines due to its progress. It might be a paradigm-testing example for those who equate the two processes. Because China's rise is nothing less than that "of a country sui generis, a civilizational

state, a new model of development and a new political discourse which questions many of the Western assumptions about democracy, good governance, and human rights," it is impossible to apply existing frameworks to China without encountering difficulties (Zhang, 2022, p. x). According to this interpretation, China is progressively pursuing a distinct political and developmental path firmly based on its understanding of its history and values, meaning that it does not need the kinds of liberal institutions that its adversaries support. China's fast development over the past 30 years or more does not necessarily follow a predetermined democratic path; it may democratize, or it may not; both ways, the politics (and development) of China that emerges over time will likely be unique and reflect the current balance of state-society relations.

Democratic and Developmental Crisis in the West

The challenge this poses to our comprehension of both ideas is further compounded by the possibility that democracy and development are viewed as ongoing processes rather than finished states. A large portion of the supposedly "developed" and "democratic" West, currently going through a noticeable decline, makes this very evident. These three interrelated issues are examined: the effects of neo-liberal globalization and the current global crisis, the waning ability of domestic democratic forces to influence political decision-making, and, finally, the

devious patterns of securitized violence that have come to characterize the foreign and domestic policies of Western states.

Numerous Western governments have implemented neo-liberal restructuring since the 1980s. However, the broad changes are better described as the "embedding" of a political economy characterized by the widespread outsourcing of state functions and the concurrent creation of "competition states," as opposed to popular descriptions of this process as the creation of liberal, free-market political and economic orders (Cerny, 2021). These oversee and commission the private delivery of public services, unlike the free market envisioned in traditional liberal economic theory. From a democratic standpoint, these changes have been criticized as intrinsically harmful to their quality—as expenses are brutally reduced in the name of private profit—and their vital function in enabling welfare access and civic engagement. According to this interpretation, the "emancipatory potential of democracy" is somehow "undercut by its alliance with, or subservience to, capitalism" (Hobson, 2018, p. 1919). Many have long expressed concern that the worst effects of globalization, such as states' growing incapacity or unwillingness to address massive tax revenue leaks offshore, competition for the lowest labour or environmental standards, and broader ecological deterioration trends, will only exacerbate these processes. Thus, they directly stem from the fact that globalization "infers a spatial mismatch between the essentially rooted social relations that underpin the economy and essentially rootless capital," as stated by Mathew Watson (2015, p. 201).

With the broader effects of the global crisis—which may be seen as a profound crisis of neo-liberalism—these issues have reached their pinnacle (Kotz, 2015). The financial crisis in the centre of Western capitalism, the transfer of political and economic power to emerging nations, and the unfolding environmental catastrophe are at least three overlapping phenomena that characterize this, and together, they pose a fundamental challenge to the prevailing modes of development (Hay & Pay, 2021). According to pessimistic analyses, we are experiencing a "crisis without end" that is causing the "unravelling of Western prosperity" and threatening the tax state itself, established patterns of capital accumulation and growth, and the liberal democratic global order (Gamble, 2014). Essentially, we are at a crossroads where it is unclear if state sovereignty, globally concentrated capital, and domestically limited democracy can coexist; to settle the conflicts between all three, something may have to give (Rodrik, 2022).

These changes have very concerning domestic ramifications, both democratic and developmental. Many academics contend that a fundamental problem in liberal democracy is convincingly reflected in the fall of political involvement in most of the West, at least through the official political process, if not other forms of citizen activity (Stoker, 2016; Hay, 2017).

However, Hay and Pay (2023) point out that this is not only a result of the neo-liberalization of the civic sphere undermining the more extensive public deliberation process necessary to make justifiable democratic decisions about allocating and managing public goods. The underlying cause of this issue is much more profound: political parties, which are responsible for carrying out and consolidating societal preferences, "have become so disconnected from the wider society, and pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form" (Mair, 2019, p. 1). Similar to this, Colin Crouch (2014, 2023) has dubbed to this political system as "post-democracy," where elite competition has gradually devolved into a pointless struggle between opposing ideas of the "good society," each of which is founded on a wide range of societal interests. This analysis, which focusses on the rise of a self-referential political elite that is disengaged from subaltern demands and increasingly entangled in ever-larger webs of corporate and financial influence, has bolstered many recent analyses of "oligarchic" power, especially in Britain and the USA (see, among others, Winters, 2021; Mount, 2021; Gilens & Page, 2022; Jones, 2022). Whether the specific accusation of oligarchy is true or not, there is no denying that the grotesque dislocation of Western societies during the neo-liberal crisis poses a serious threat to the quality of development and democracy that can be said to exist on a wide range of measures, including poverty, inequality, and wealth distribution.

The last thing to consider is that this deterioration is made worse by the aggressive goals of the majority of the West, especially the USA and Britain, who have failed to change the global order in the wake of 9/11. Naturally, this ties into the more significant criticism of democracy promotion that was previously discussed. It is also highly problematic, not the least, because it is incoherent to attempt to forcefully impose liberal ideals like democracy and good governance in the face of heinous violations of human rights and sovereignty. This is nothing less than "the violent manifestation of a liberal world ordering and governance project, attempting—but often failing—to export Western forms of rule, statehood, and democracy," as Geis and Wagner (2021, p. 12) have noted. The political and economic system imposed on nations like Iraq may be even more concerning from a developmental perspective, as it reflects the darker aspects of the contradictions inherent in neo-liberalism in the worst possible ways. The main function of this system is to benefit foreign contractors working in a freshly privatised and securitized state, which is backed by what Naomi Klein (2017, pp. 358–359) refers to as "the disaster capitalism complex." Importantly, this broad goal might be negatively impacting democracy in the West at the same time. The prevalence of anti-democratic practices, procedures, and laws undermines Western claims to democratic probity and even serves to legitimize anti-democratic

practices elsewhere in the world. Examples include the destruction of entire cities, the use of torture, and legal blind spots abroad; authoritarian laws; the use of coercive powers that are often unaccountable; increased monitoring and surveillance; and the growth and less supervision of security services domestically (see, among other sources, Beetham, 2019; Whitehead, 2019; Ramsay, 2021).

Key Debates on Global Citizenship

Although the term "global citizenship" is being used more and more by academics and international development actors to define specific behaviours or mobilize groups, it is still conceptually disputed (Bic, 2010; Bail & Lau, 2019; Desforges, 2020; Edwards & Gaventa, 2021). In spite of, or perhaps precisely because of, the apparent natural connection between global citizenship and development, as evidenced by programs like Make Poverty History (2015) and deeds like international volunteerism, we must take into account some of the theoretical foundations and paradoxes at the heart of global citizenship. Such a conversation regarding geography and history is unavoidably incomplete. Still, it is also essential to provide a conceptual framework for evaluating global citizenship's state of growth in the present and the future.

The ideas of the Greek stoics and more contemporary European political philosophy demonstrate that the concept of a "citizen of the world" is not new. Furthermore, notions of community and subjectivity beyond the local are not exclusive to the liberal West; instead, they are widely and historically represented by a variety of

organizations. However, it is flexible and robust, with discussions in various academic fields and light of various social, cultural, and political contexts. The recent social and political changes that have occurred on a local and global scale and have significant ramifications for the concept of citizenship today can be used to contextualize the arguments around citizenship more. Discussions on globalization and its impact on the political community and democracy (e.g., Archibugi et al., 2008), as well as new experiences and concepts of mobilities and belonging, have all been important (e.g., Calhoun, 2013; Szerszynski & Urry, 2016). Anheier et al. (2021b) state that "what we can observe in the 1990s is the emergence of a supranational sphere of social and political participation in which citizens' groups, social movements, and individuals engage in dialogue, debate, confrontation, and negotiation with each other and with various governmental actors—international, national, and local—as well as the business world." This development of a "global civil society" has been crucial to international development.

Empirically and conceptually, the concept of a "global civil society" is disputed, especially in light of the absence of a shared political culture and understanding of political community (Lupel, 2023, p. 20) and the dominance of self-appointed private actors in the guise of international NGOs in emerging civic spaces (Anderson & Rieff, 2020). Though an uncritical appreciation of them obscures some theoretical difficulties with global citizenship, such spaces offer new arenas for developing and expressing citizenship. Increasing complexity and variation in state social, political, and economic integration is entangling "their citizens involuntarily in a web of rights and responsibilities concerning the environment (wildlife, pollution), trade (copyright, protection), security, refugees, crime, minorities, war, children, and many other issues," according to Isin (2018, p. 15). It also involves "implicating them in various social, ethical, political, and social decisions."

Secondly, he highlights the reality that a growing number of state residents and non-residents (i.e., illegal aliens, immigrants, migrants) have become more mobile, bringing these webs of rights and responsibilities with them and further entwining them with other webs of rights and duties (Isin, 2018, p. 15). Then, in ways that transcend the traditional North-South imaginaries that have shaped development, citizens are already engaged in discussions about what "justice" is. The following could be added: "a neo-liberal ideological climate; the erosion of statist responsibility, creativity, capacity, and autonomy; and the general technological and economistic embrace of corporate or neo-liberal governance" (Falk, 2012, p. 15). These shifts have influenced aid and development strategies that prioritize capital mobility in ways that violate citizens' rights, such as the privatization of Indigenous knowledge and the erosion of impoverished people's land rights, in addition to inspiring and enabling transnational civic action on issues like corporate responsibility, climate change, global poverty, and human rights.

The modern era of citizenship is marked by increasing complexity as "status and habitus (ways of thought and conduct that are internalized over a relatively long period)" become more complicated due to the various layers, connections, and inequalities through which citizenships are formed and practiced (Isin, 2018, p. 15). Though they are not granted, this intricacy may create new opportunities for "global citizenship." Recognizing this complexity is necessary when participating in the occasionally highly normative debates about the feasibility of global citizenship or the arguments put forth today for its existence.

One who "is a member of the wider community of all humanity, the world or similar whole that is wider than that of a nation-state or other political community of which we are normally thought to be citizens" is what Dow (2022, p. 1) defines as the fundamental characteristic of a global citizen. This membership is significant as it entails a primary identity, devotion, or

commitment that extends beyond the nation-state, assuming individuals believe they are global citizens. Thus, global citizenship involves institutional as well as moral components. It can refer to both belonging to a community and expressing certain morals or ideals, or both. This links cosmopolitanism debates to discussions of global citizenship, which have been increasingly brought up in development debates (e.g., Smi & Jenkins, 2019; Smi et al., 2020; Gidwani, 2021; Kothari, 2018; Pogge, 2018) and helps clarify some of the significant conceptual and empirical questions surrounding the status and habitus of global citizenship (e.g., Appiah, 2016; Archibugi & Koenig-Archibugi, 2021; Beck, 2021; Vertovec & Cohen, 2022a). Vertovec and Cohen (2022b, pp. 8–22) provide a helpful overview of cosmopolitanism by classifying it as: 'a) a socio-cultural condition; b) a type of philosophy or world-view; c) a political project aimed at establishing transnational institutions; d) a political project for acknowledging multiple identities; e) an orientation toward attitudes or dispositions; and or f) a mode of practice or competence'.

Strong parallels may be seen between parts of the development rhetoric and practices and concepts of political community outside the nation-state, tolerance for diversity, acknowledgement of universal principles, and dedication to the equal worth of all people (Smi, 2023). The broad focus of cosmopolitanism on "thinking and feeling beyond the nation" is reflected in commitments to "distant others," which include international civic engagement and government assistance. Global citizenship based on "identities, loyalties and commitments beyond the nation-state" is one way we might conceptualize development as both generating and being generated by it (Dow, 2022, p. 1). However, these identities and commitments are challenging, as history and the current state of international development demonstrate.

While certain moral and ethical obligations that transcend national boundaries may be associated with global citizenship, it is unclear where these ethics come from and what the "core norms" should be. Although they may appear to arise "out of nowhere," cosmopolitan or global citizenships have their roots in specific historical periods and geographical locations. Speaking of his father, who spearheaded the Gold Coast independence struggle, Appiah (2016, p. xvi) states that "he never saw a conflict between local partialities and a universal morality—between being part of the place where and a part of a broader human community." However, such a straightforward compromise is not supported by the increasingly popular forms of global citizenship. According to Jefferess (2018), a number of political philosophers have "all argued for a particular responsibility for the other that is either explicitly or implicitly theorised as an expression of global citizenship" (p. 27), including Dower, Singer, Rawls, and Ignatieff. This deprives the poor of agency and reinforces historical legacies and structural injustices by

reducing the contribution of global citizenship to development to a question of who is responsible and for what. In this sense, global citizenship is not very similar to a democratic reconceptualization of development as an international justice effort that addresses past silences and exclusions (Gidwani, 2021). Finally, given the persistence of national varieties of citizenship and the lack of a set of shared values and an understanding of relations, rights, and duties that can be effectively governed—that is, without a global state—it could be argued that global citizenship is neither desirable nor possible (Turner, 2021, p. 135).

These issues partially emerge from the "container concept of citizenship," which holds that the nation-state is the final arbitrator and defines global citizenship in terms of status and behaviours (Kivisto & Faist, 2016, p. 102). Therefore, we should not consider cosmopolitanism to be "some exalted attainment" (Appiah, 2016, p. xvii). This is explained by the straightforward notion that, just like in national communities, we must establish coexistence habits, or the conversation in its older meaning, of living together or in association. "[T]he relationships, practices, and acts that construct, regulate, and contest citizenship are at least as important as the status assigned to individuals" is one way that thinking about citizenship in terms of process raises new problems and possibilities. Thus, identities or subjectivities as citizens are equally unstable, and citizenship is constantly forming and never static, established, or complete (Staeheli, 2021, p. 6). This emphasizes the processes by which global citizenship is created and evolves, regarding instability as a characteristic of citizenship rather than as a "problem" exclusive to global citizenship. Along with the participants' status, it also highlights the variables influencing participation and the process.

Our attention is drawn not only to the participants' status but also to the factors that have shaped their participation or exclusion when Dower argues that what makes global citizenship important is "the very fact of participation in public deliberation and activities for the global common good" (Dow & Williams, 2022a, 2022b) and Arneil (2022, p. 314) suggests that "citizenship is not the either/or proposition of liberal theory (either one is a citizen or not) but a process that evolves towards equality." When global citizenship is viewed in these terms, it becomes essential to emphasize democratic engagement and redefine development as an endeavour of global justice. Therefore, it may not be beneficial to see global citizenship as something that advances development; rather, it should be understood as an integral aspect of what development is and accomplishes. It is possible to see how the mainstreaming of global citizenship in the public language of international development impedes the shift towards conceptualizing development in terms of global justice.

Increasing Awareness of Development and Mainstreaming Global Citizenship

Recently, efforts to popularize development have evolved to emphasize the concept of global citizenship. This section critically examines how global citizenship has shaped how citizens of the global North engage in development and how development is utilized to support the development of individuals as global citizens.

International development has gained popularity recently, or as Cameron and Haanstra (2018) put it, "made sexy." Aided by the use of new technologies and social media, as well as the rise in celebrity engagement in development (Brockington, 2018; Kapoor, 2016; Omoniyi, 2023), large-scale spectacles like Live8, Make Poverty History, and Jubilee 2000 have made connections between development and contemporary popular culture more visible. International firms, historically the target of protestors for their exploitation of the global South, have significantly boosted and mainstreamed fair trade and ethical consumerism. A rise in international volunteering, voluntourism, and "gap years" has been facilitated by increased international mobility, which has also made it possible for more individuals to go to nations in the global South (Fagbemi et al., 2024). These developments have coincided with an increasing focus on mobility as a sign of employability.

Development is becoming increasingly popular, and this has been largely fueled by concepts of "active" global citizenship that, at least on the surface, are based on issues that transcend national boundaries. However, there has been much criticism of the different types of citizenship created in the global North, with a focus on how acts of consumption and charity are prioritized over other forms, which commodify development and highlight the agency of the "giver" and their ability to bring about change (Smi, 2023; Desforges, 2020; Bic, 2010; Jefferess, 2018; Darnton & Kirk, 2021). NGOs have also come under fire for prioritizing corporate policy aims above democratic decision-making when determining campaign involvement (Bail, 2018, p. 14).

By viewing global citizenship as a duty rather than in terms of democracy or a route to equality, one could support an image of development mediated by charities and celebrities. Acting on development is defined as both the ability to act as a global citizen by decontextualizing poverty and rejecting a structural explanation of inequality, as well as a responsibility that primarily lies outside the unequal interdependence that has shaped global poverty over time. In other words, many global citizenship activities pertaining to development are viewed through the prism of colonially ingrained ideas of duty and compassion for the poor because citizens do not participate in structural inequality. Assuming that the "here" has nothing to do with the poor there, this runs counter to the idea that development is a global justice because it maintains the power imbalances and unequal access to resources that already exist globally. This starkly

contrasts Massey's assertion that duty and care transcend geographical distances regarding the mutual composition of distant locations (Bail & Lau, 2019; McEwa & Goodman, 2020, p. 105; Whitehead, 2021; Massey, 2023). The emphasis on "care as a fundamental feature of our human being," which places responsibility in the "recognition of our inter-subjective being," is another example of a relational approach to responsibility (Popke, 2016, p. 507). These conceptions of accountability and its underlying principles contrast with a perspective that writes off participation in past and contemporary systemic injustices. Since aid and development have emerged from mission work and the experiences of colonialism, responsibility has been infused with historically unequal power relations that prioritize the subjectivities, "authorities," and capacities of citizens in the global North (Nox, 2016). Unless people deserve the good fortune to be in a particular location with specific resources and a specific network of (more or less) caring relationships, Smi (2008, p. 32) contends, "[s]patial inequalities in capacity to care (or disparities between capacity and need) will thus tend to perpetuate patterns of uneven development which are morally indefensible."

In these respects, being a global citizen becomes more about status than procedure, helping others rather than taking responsibility for others (Jefferess, 2018, p. 28). This does not occur in an apolitical or economic vacuum, as the UK's evolution provides evidence.

Development Education and Depoliticization of Global Citizenship

Development education has traditionally attempted to refute charity-based approaches to development participation, rooted in Freirean pedagogy and Marxist dependence theory (Bail, 2018). Generally speaking, development education is instruction intended to foster a critical understanding of unequal interdependence in the hopes of promoting more equitable relations between the North and the South. In the UK, a network of regional development education centers and international non-governmental organizations specifically developed and implemented it. The Department for International Development (DfID) was established in 1997 to facilitate the extension of initiatives aimed at "Building Support for Development" (DfID, 1999) among UK people. These initiatives promote an awareness of development and the ability to take action towards it. This significantly increased funding for development education, which became more described in fostering global citizenship or a "global dimension" in the curriculum via a collaboration between the Department of Education and DfID.

The phrase "development education" eventually gave way to "global learning" and emphasized education instead of development. Though Bryan (2021) and Humble (2022) have been pointed out, these developments have succeeded in mainstreaming some aspects of development,

leading to its professionalization and depoliticization. The focus on "development awareness" in the UK can be understood, according to Bic (2017, p. 1114), as a state-led and colonially rooted attempt to produce "little developers" for a neo-liberal world. Cameron and Fairbrass (2022) have argued that state funding narrowed the space for debate. With an increasingly professionalized and state-funded development education tending to support a "soft" global citizenship that emphasizes poverty and helplessness over injustice, addresses interdependence over unequal power relations, promotes universalism and raises awareness over an ethical relationship to difference, Andreotti's (2016) postcolonial delineation of "soft" versus "critical" global citizenship is valid here. The purpose of this is not to disparage attempts to counteract these forces or to remove context from the actions of NGOs or development education institutions. As Bauman states, "liquid modernity," or neo-liberal economies, are reflected in far broader ways in engagement tactics (Bail, 2018). In a similar vein, Desforges (2020) contends that the restricted interpretation of global citizenship provided by INGOs can be interpreted as reflecting the preferences of advocates; however, it is essential to acknowledge that our understanding of the intricate ways in which citizens' subjectivities influence their participation in development is comparatively limited (Bail, 2023). However, mainstreaming development education has resulted in a global citizenship that needs to be more political.

Thus far, we have observed how the current emphasis on global citizenship as a means of development may perpetuate prevailing North-South narratives and give those in the global North more agency. Many individuals are kept out of development efforts, and other, more radical kinds of "active citizenship" may also become marginalized due to the concentration on consumption and philanthropy. The prevalence of this interpretation of global citizenship has detrimental effects on development in the global South. When speaking about post-tsunami help in Southeast Asia, Korf notes that "rites and practices of relief distribution were most responsible for weakening the social respect of tsunami "victims." A variety of actions were necessary for the visible replication of "our" kindness and "their" gratitude as a type of consumer good, and these actions have humiliated people who needed assistance following the tsunami. Aid intermediaries faced pressure to select and concentrate funds on readily marketable programs and appealing to the general public (Korf, 2017, p. 369).

In this case, mainstreaming certain concepts of global citizenship within the framework of growing development marketisation perpetuates and widens the disparity in power relations between the South and the North. As the example of international volunteering demonstrates, how development is exploited to attain forms of global citizenship that serve political, strategic,

and personal goals is based on the emphasis on development as a commodity rather than a project of justice (Fagbemi & Ogunbanjo, 2023).

International Volunteering and Neo-liberal Citizenships

The efforts of governments in the global north, as well as commercial and nonprofit gap year companies and international NGOs, have contributed to the popularity of international volunteering in recent years. Volunteering has long been associated, albeit controversially, with being a "global citizen," in the sense of an act that explicitly transcends national boundaries and is based on a contribution to well-being and openness towards distant others (Gamble, 2014; Anheier et al., 2020b; Lyons et al., 2022; Lough & McBride, 2022; Palacios, 2021; Jones, 2021; Rovisco, 2019). However, its role in providing aid and development has received more attention recently (Bail & Lau, 2023). More data is needed about the significant influence of international volunteering on global citizenship. Some studies suggest that volunteering abroad might allow people to express their preexisting subjectivities (Bail et al., 2023). However, it also dramatically impacts broader goals with related citizenships, which may be categorized as partner/professional, socially inclusive, and employee citizenships (Bail & Lau, 2021). International volunteering is touted as a method to "get on" in a global market economy (Jones, 2022) or to improve one's chances of getting accepted into a university (Bail & Lau, 2023). It is also advertised for its CV-enhancing qualities. Additionally, it is becoming increasingly important in corporate social responsibility strategies (Muthuri et al., 2023). This is done through multisector partnerships between multinational corporations like Accenture and volunteer organizations like Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) (Bail & Lau, 2021). Last but not least, international volunteering has also come to promote interfaith tolerance policies in a post-9/11 world through state-sponsored programs like Platform2 in the UK (Lewis, 2019, p. 20). This initiative aims to bring together many excluded populations in the UK through volunteer work.

Plans to encourage global citizenship have incorporated development because of its growing accessibility and acceptance. Despite the seeming connection between global citizenship, ethics, and the pursuit of justice through international volunteering, this could include highly neo-liberalized citizenships based on mobility ability rather than ethical commitments. Similar to how consumer identities and NGO engagement strategies have replaced poverty and lifestyle, development has suffered in international volunteering (Smith, 2022b; Chouliaraki, 2023; Cameron & Haanstra, 2018; Grug & Bish, 2023). Thus, in addition to the necessity of understanding how global citizenship may contribute to development, we can see how

development helps to facilitate the construction of global citizenship by generating forms of organizational and personal capital. However, while concentrating on technology-driven spectacles like Live 8 or the more widely publicized and ridiculed activities of international volunteers (e.g., VM Productions, 2020) can draw attention to certain aspects of the co-optation of the relationship between development and global citizenship, it can also obscure a number of complex connections that exist outside the traditional boundaries of the aid industry and beyond the movements of wealthy individuals and elites in the global North.

Global Citizenship: Going Beyond Northern Benevolence

The majority of scholars who write about global citizenship work at Western universities in the global North. Their main areas of interest have been the colonial histories that have moulded our perception of the world and its "others," as well as the European philosophical and enlightened traditions that have impacted them. However, the fact that certain ideas of global citizenship have gained specific policy and strategic traction in the global North should not overshadow the diversity and range of global citizenship expressions within and between the global South, nor the emergence of new global civic spaces where new global citizenships are emerging.

There is disagreement over the concept of a global civil society. However, a growing number of platforms, approaches, and meeting locations bring diverse people together and enable them to think and act on issues that transcend national borders. This is where global civic spaces ought to be romanticized more. Avaaz (avaaz.org/en/), a growing online activist group that bills itself as "people-powered politics," has enabled citizens to take advantage of new global citizenship opportunities that do not require relocation and are focused on issues that are not always decided by professional policy staff. However, access to technology, which is still mostly reserved for the global North, is its cornerstone. Studying the cosmopolitan subjectivities of South Indian NGO activists has shown that their access to international civic spaces is frequently patchy and limited (Smi & Jenkins, 2019). However, new global civic spaces and historical links are creating chances for the manifestation of different global citizenships in ways not typically defined by the Global North's aid industry centres. Among them, the World Social Forum is arguably the most well-known. At the Mumbai event, the forum expressly declined financial support from donors, including the Ford Foundation, European Union, DfID, and MacArthur Foundation (Smi, 2022a, p. 418). Jeffress not only offers the conceptual framework for thinking beyond race and nation, but also demonstrates how movements such as the World Social Forum, the Zapatistas in Mexico, the anti-apartheid

movement in South Africa, the Narmada Bachao Andalan movement in India, and the Penticton Indian Band have all contributed to the development of a transnational politics of identity and solidarity. The concept of subjectivity expressed by the southern African concept of Ubuntu, the Zapatista concern with comprehending human beings' interconnectedness, or the Narmada struggle's emphasis on the relationship between humans and other animals and the environment provide alternative epistemologies to the European enlightenment thought of Kant, Locke, and Hobbes, to which political philosophers of global citizenship confine their theoretical framework. Furthermore, noteworthy is the understanding of these movements and programs as efforts toward economic and social justice rather than "development" endeavours (Jefferess, 2018, p. 33).

The emergence of new transnational social movements and other formations specifically aimed at opposing the Western dominance of international civil society and promoting alternative ways of thinking is influencing new ideas of global citizenship and subjectivities. The World Social Forum has brought together individuals from the North and the South to discuss social, political, and economic alternatives to the dominant neo-liberal paradigm in an effort to create more inclusive environments. According to Wallerstein (2020), some contend that it has not gone far enough in "de-colonizing," remaining "too much in the hands of persons from the pan-European world, of men, of older persons, and others defined as coming from the privileged populations of the world." It has not been without its detractors. Its internal structure and organization, which includes limiting room for discussion and direction-setting and establishing a forum intimidating for activists unfamiliar with such grand events, have drawn criticism for failing to develop a clear strategic direction (Smi, 2022a, p. 418). However, "the WSF is unquestionably the most globally inclusive initiative for fostering transnational civil society, despite its limitations" (Smi, 2022a, p. 420). In terms of goal, the global citizenship articulated and generated by such events is less about status and more about involvement in producing knowledge and building relationships towards greater equality.

Additionally, we must be mindful of global citizenship and subjectivities that clash with how subjectivities are expressed through well-known social movements or globally operating non-governmental organizations. For instance, Datta (2019) has examined the daily cosmopolitanisms of East European construction workers in London, while Kothari (2018) has reviewed the subjectivities of migrant peddlers in terms of a "non-elite openness to difference" and "strategic" cosmopolitanism. According to research on faith-based volunteering, young people from the UK who were volunteering in Latin America would "perform" their subjectivities during interviews in ways that aligned with how their faith identities were

typically expressed and with popular activism ideas shaped by events like Make Poverty History (Bail et al., 2023). However, their journals would provide more situational and reflective explanations of their subjectivity and citizenship. This research presented methodological difficulties and demonstrated the significance of faith in forming cosmopolitan and global citizenship forms (Bic, 2017; Gale & O'Toole, 2019; Levitt, 2021). This is noteworthy because faith-based organizations play a significant role in development (Deneulin & Bano, 2019; Rakodi, 2021; Leftwich, 2021; Clarke, 2023). Although these forms of citizenship might not align with conventional notions of global citizenship, global faith communities offer a framework for citizens to form connections across national boundaries and a transnational community with established, if occasionally disputed, sets of ideas and values (Bail, 2023). There are two types of religious global citizenship: restrictive and inclusive, as noted by Levitt (2021, p. 787). Some people are motivated by it to merely think about the people in their immediate neighbourhood, while others are encouraged to think about people everywhere. A paradigm for global citizenship that transcends and sometimes overlaps with the prevailing assistance and development mechanisms may be found in religion. Beyond international development contexts, many places, histories, and linkages can influence the conceptions and manifestations of global citizenship.

Conclusion

Liberal ideas on democracy and development are based on a few basic, obvious, and what seems to be an intuitively correct set of presumptions. As a result, the dominant discourse is complex and challenging in ways that the general public can easily understand. For example, it is impossible to respond sharply to a neo-liberal politician who is on television defending the logic of purportedly "free" markets or the virtues of electoral democracy; instead, the arguments of opponents are usually more intricate, nuanced, and replete with qualifiers. Thus, it is worthwhile to restate one of the main points of this paper: democracy and development, particularly of the liberal variety, can and do coexist in many contexts throughout history; however, neither concept can be reduced to a liberal interpretation that is merely one flavour among many when viewed in a much broader philosophical, intellectual, or political context. As such, our conceptualization of these ideas and their connections depends on our preexisting theoretical and ideological inclinations, the environment in which we think and write, and how we understand actual occurrences.

Being aware of this complexity forces us to have a more thorough discussion that clarifies the things we should be concerned about: (1) the teleology found in many liberal and modernist

theories about democracy and development; (2) the situations in which these ideas are incompatible; and (3) international policy that is predicated on such questionable assumptions. David Runciman (2020) has demonstrated convincingly that a complacent belief in the inherent superiority of liberal democracy and its more ideological proponents is a major practical problem. In a world where a number of convergent crises and other processes of upheaval threaten established patterns of order, including the financial and debt apocalypse, the war on terror, the emergence of emerging powers like China, and an imminent environmental disaster, this is, at best, a dangerously presumptuous viewpoint.

The Development Awareness Raising and Education Forum, one of the working groups of the European Confederation of Relief and Development NGOs—Concord—issued a position paper in 2011 with the title "Development Needs Citizens".

In reaction to criticism that there is not enough citizen involvement in development, the paper makes the case that civic engagement is crucial because it increases credibility, empowers individuals to change their everyday circumstances, and "opens a space for debate on root causes of global poverty. Thus, it allows discussing and implementing systemic changes required to tackle global justice and poverty issues" (DARE Forum, 2011, p. 3). The report advocates increased public ownership, oversight of development, and assistance cooperation. The necessity of this kind of position paper draws attention to the fact that, despite the ongoing discussions about global citizenship and development and the increasing acceptance of global citizenship activities, citizen participation in development still focuses on promoting growth in its current form.

Global citizenship is frequently interpreted in terms of standing in the global north. It is connected to development by mobilizing specific behaviours centred on duty and concern for "others." It replicates concepts of agency and power rooted in colonialism and has nothing in common with contemporary democracies and conceptions of fairness. However, global citizenship principles and practices are more comprehensive than the assistance and development sector, which is becoming increasingly neo-liberalized. While we should not homogenize these citizenships or regard them as inseparable from other citizenships, forums like the World Social Forum can help us consider global citizenship models that are less instrumental and more focused on democratic principles and justice. However, access to these environments has remained restricted and private up until now.

Global citizenship as global justice (Grug, 2023) can only be realized if we consider how global citizenship is conceptualized and how its practices align with the evolving development scenario. Not least because these disrupt the North-South imaginaries that have shaped much

policy and thinking on global citizenship to date, the emergence of new development actors and sites of development power (Bail & Lau, 2023) poses significant new challenges for thinking about global citizenship and development. Mawdsley (2022) highlights the need to pay attention to the global citizenships that arise from new development-aid initiatives from non-DAC donors, as well as the South-South exchanges and mobilities whose lengthy histories run the risk of being overshadowed by the focus on "rising powers." When considering the future connections between global citizenship and development, it is essential to consider how various citizens interact discursively and in specific locations. This calls for awareness of the multiple ways that compassion and accountability function not only across time but also space (Massey, 2023, p. 10), connecting global citizenship to the past but also, especially when it comes to environmental resources and sustainability, to the responsibility that lies ahead for future generations. Additionally, more focus will be required on how class, community, gender, location, and religion negotiate the link between global citizenship and development (Bail, 2023). This demands a shift in perspective from viewing citizenship as a status to understanding it as temporal, contradictory, and flexible. While this makes it more challenging to align citizenship with the strategic goals of the state, businesses, and voluntary organizations, it also offers more opportunities to express concepts of justice that transcend national boundaries. Global citizenship is unlikely to contribute to the shift in development from an endeavour of self-interest, control, and charity to one of global justice as long as it is perceived as something that needs to be rigorously "managed" and "audited."

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